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An Adverse Drug Reaction (ADR) is defined by the World Health Organiza-
tion as “a noxious response to a medication that is unintended at doses usu-
ally administered for diagnosis, prophylaxis, or treatment.” Estimates suggest
that such episodes – in which prescription drugs cause negative health con-
sequences – account for more than 2 million hospitalizations and more than
100,000 deaths per year in the United States alone, making ADRs one of the
leading causes of death. To put these numbers into perspective: death from
treatment with prescription drugs is about 10 times as common as death from
suicide. This dissertation aims to understand why these numbers are so high.
Prior work has focused mainly on the politics of drug approval to show that
factors such as deadlines, status of pharmaceutical firms, and foreign approval
can account for variation in regulatory decision making by the Food and Drug
Administration. I take another route and focus on the production of evidence
about the safety of prescription drugs. The way in which medical scientists
have typically used evidence is by extracting meaning through aggregation or
classification of pieces of evidence. The argument that I am making in this dis-
sertation is that rather than aggregating or classifying evidence, one needs to
account for the relationships between pieces of evidence. In particular, the dis-
sertation shows how social theories about the structures of evidence production
can be used to better understand the harm that drugs can do and, as a result,
allow us to identify unsafe drugs more rapidly.
The dissertation presents analyses based on data from the two main sources
of evidence that the Food and Drug Administration has at its disposal to iden-
tify unsafe drugs. The first is the Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS).
AERS is an FDA maintained system through which patients and physicians
can voluntarily report ADRs to the FDA. The FDA uses this system by mon-
itoring disproportional increases in the number of ADRs reported for a given
drug. The second source of evidence is the scientific literature about prescrip-
tion drugs. The FDA uses this literature to inform regulatory action.
The first set of findings in this dissertation demonstrate that ADR reports
for a specific drug are more likely to be submitted if a drug has been publicly
scrutinized or when a drug treats the same health condition as a drug that was
publicly scrutinized. Patients and physicians differ in the ways in which their
reporting behavior changes in response to increased scrutiny. Preliminary find-
ings suggest that these episodes of changes in reporting behavior are associated
with delays in regulatory action compared to drugs in which reporting behav-
ior did not change. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the
detection of signals in massive yet sparse data benefits from social theories of
evidence production.
The second set of findings show that the social structure in which scientific
evidence about the safety and efficacy of prescription drugs is not uniformly
cumulative. In particular, in some cases the scientific debate about the safety
and efficacy of prescription drugs is characterized by a disconnect between the
claims made before a drug is approved for marketing and the claims made af-
ter approval. Moreover, the results from the study demonstrate that debates
characterized by a strong disconnect are more likely to be the target of regula-
tory action. This suggests that a discontinuity in scientific closure is consistent
with the idea that the quality of pre-approval scientific evidence predicts post-
approval regulatory action.
In sum, this dissertation identifies salient structures in collective production
processes and it demonstrates that the structure of collective production reveals
meaning that could reduce ambiguity in interpretation.
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Production in the Context of
Drug Safety
Advancements in medical science have resulted in a wide range of prescrip-
tion drugs that improve health, reduce pain, and save lives. However, recent
years have also been characterized by a large volume of adverse drug reac-
tions (ADRs) including life-threatening injuries, hospitalizations, and deaths.
A meta-analysis published in 1998 based on studies conducted in the U.S. con-
cluded that among hospitalized patients the overall incidence of serious ADRs
and fatal ADRs was 6.7% (95% CI, 5.2%-8.2%) and 0.32% (95% CI, 0.23%-0.41%)
respectively. These percentages imply that ADRs resulted in 2,216,000 seriously
injured patients and 106,000 deaths per year (Lazarou and Pomeranz 1998). To
put these numbers into perspective, in the U.S. the number of hospitalized pa-
tients that are killed by unsafe drugs is more than twice as large as the total
number of suicides per year. The number of deaths and injured patients is even
more stunning if one considers that the study by Lazarou and Pomeranz (1998)
only includes hospitalized patients. More recent studies confirm the results pre-
sented in the 1998 meta-analysis (Pirmohamed et al. 2004; Krahenbuhl-Melcher
et al. 2012).1
1.1 The Social Organization of Drug Safety
To understand the mechanisms responsible for generating the dazzling num-
bers of deaths and injured patients, researchers have identified a battery of
characteristics of (the sponsors of) drugs that have been disproportionally re-
sponsible for generating safety problems. These studies have predominantly
focused on variation in the organizational, social, or regulatory context in which
a drug is embedded prior to approval by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). The FDA regulates the approval of prescription drugs by providing
sponsors of a new therapeutic substance with a license to test the drug in clini-
cal trials prior to approval, by interpreting the results from these clinical trials,
and by approving those substances that have been shown to be safe and effec-
tive for use in larger populations of patients.
One area of study in this body of literature is concerned with changes in
the regulatory environment. In a series of articles, Daniel Carpenter and col-
leagues (Carpenter et al. 2012, 2008) study how timing issues in the approval
process of prescription drugs affect the quality of regulatory decision making.
1 Although these numbers put ADRs in the top of the leading causes of death, one may argue
that the benefits that prescription drugs provide – i.e. the number of lives that they save – might
outweigh the damage that they do. This is certainly the case for many drugs, because they treat pa-
tients with life threatening health conditions and/or they account for only a small percentage of all
ADRs. However, some drugs have several alternatives or do not treat life-threatening health con-
ditions and account for the a large share of all ADRs. For example, Howard et al. (2007) show that
the majority of preventable drug-related admissions to hospitals involved either antiplatelets (pre-
vents blood cloths), diuretics (treats several conditions including high blood pressure, glaucoma,
and edema), nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (painkillers), or anticoagulants (prevents blood
cloths). Drugs in these classes either have several alternatives or they do not treat life threatening
conditions.
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These studies exploit the variation introduced by a new policy – called the Pre-
scription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) – that was adopted in 1992. This new
policy required the FDA to review a new application for a prescription drug
within a limited time frame, effectively creating a deadline. Findings presented
in this research demonstrate that reviews pile up at the FDA to right before
the deadline. Moreover, regulatory decisions to approve a new prescription
drug that are made right before the deadline are characterized by higher rates
of post-approval and post-marketing regulatory actions (which are induced by
concerns over the safety of a prescription drug) including market withdrawals,
severe safety warnings, and safety alerts. Although the authors don’t explicitly
address the question of what triggers regulatory action, FDA statements in their
communications about regulatory actions indicate that they are based on new
information regarding the safety or efficacy of a prescription drug that was not
taken into account when the prescription drug was approved. However, the
very fact that regulatory action was taken implies that this new information is
salient and should be used when deciding to start treatment with the drug or
when deciding to continue treatment with the drug.
The positive association between approval right before the deadline and the
number of safety problems that occur after approval is explained by suggesting
that regulatory decisions just before the deadline were not based on the high
quality evidence that would potentially have been taken into account by the
regulator, had the deadline not rushed them into making a decision (Carpenter
et al. 2012, 2008). Although these findings on deadlines and the quality of reg-
ulatory decisions are consistent with the plausible explanation that a thorough
review allows the regulator to precisely determine the boundaries of efficacy
and safety of the prescription drug, questions about several closely related and
important issues are not yet answered. For example, it remains unclear why
some drugs are rushed before the deadline while others are reviewed much ear-
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lier. The mechanism causing the correlation also remains obscured. Do longer
review times enable the FDA to study all the evidence that is available to them,
do longer review times allow for additional studies to be conducted, or are ex-
tensively reviewed drug applications more likely to be approved2 than drug
applications that received less scrutiny, thereby introducing a selection effect?
In a related line of research, firm characteristics are linked to the review
time of a new drug application. Olson (1997) analyzes all drugs approved be-
tween 1990 and 1992 and finds that firms that are less diversified and more
R&D-intensive receive shorter review times for their drugs under review at
the FDA. Using a similar type of research design Kim (2012) presents findings
that demonstrate that the status of the sponsor of a prescription drug is as-
sociated with shorter review times. The argument advanced in these studies is
essentially that some characteristic of the firm provides a signal to the regulator
about the quality of the application which is then internalized by cutting review
times. This idea is consistent with research on status and reputation conducted
in other empirical settings that demonstrates that status fosters trust in an ex-
change partner, thereby reducing transaction costs (Podolny 1993). Both Kim
(2012) and Olson (1997) aim to control the quality of the drug and sponsor char-
acteristics that are likely to be correlated with application quality to isolate the
effect of status and reputation. However, neither study links drug review times
to post-approval regulatory action, making it difficult to reconcile their findings
and the findings presented in Carpenter et al. (2008, 2012). If the status and rep-
utation of pharmaceutical firms are indeed good proxies for the quality of the
drug application, the induced variation in review time should not account for
different levels of regulatory action. However, if status and reputation are poor
proxies for application quality and if one assumes that differential treatment of
2Data on drug applications that were not approved are not publicly available and to date, no
study has been able to effectively create a complete risk set of all drugs that have been reviewed by
the FDA.
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a drug application by the FDA is limited to shorter review times – and not to
more intense scrutiny – then drugs sponsored by high status firms may well be
characterized by higher propensities of post-approval regulatory problems.
Variation in foreign experience of a prescription drug has also been argued
to account for differences in the likelihood that drugs will be the target of post-
approval regulatory action (Olson 2013). Foreign experience is defined here as
the lag between the date of first foreign approval (approval in any country out-
side the U.S.) and the date of approval of the prescription drug in the U.S. The
study by Olson (2013) hypothesizes about the effect of the length of foreign ex-
perience of a prescription drug before approval on the U.S. market on the post-
approval safety problems associated with the drug in the U.S. The findings pre-
sented in the study show that longer, post-approval exposure of a wide range
of patients to a therapeutic substance in foreign countries reduces the number
of post-approval safety problems. In interpreting this finding the author sug-
gests that additional information about drug safety and efficacy obtained from
experiences in foreign markets can be used to inform regulatory decision mak-
ing (e.g. labeling). However, the study by Olson (2013) also demonstrates that
drugs first approved in the U.S. are less likely to be associated with high levels
of regulatory action, a finding that generates an odd functional form in Olson’s
model. A first coefficient in her model suggests that as the foreign launch lag
diminishes, drugs are characterized by more post-approval safety issues. The
second coefficient in her model, however, shows that if the launch lag is zero3,
the likelihood of post-approval safety issues abruptly reduces again. It is diffi-
cult to propose a hypothesis that captures the mechanism that could produce
this functional form.
In addition to variation in firm characteristics and regulatory contexts, re-
3Or negative – neither does the paper of Olson (2013) describe how it handles drugs approved
in the U.S. first., nor can it be inferred from the table with descriptive statistics.
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search has also focused on variation in behavior by the FDA. Research by Mof-
fitt (2010) scrutinizes the process of evaluating prescription drugs prior to ap-
proval by examining the use of FDA advisory committees. These committees
are comprised of academic experts and are consulted by the FDA to guide the
agency in decision making about the approval of prescription drugs. The distri-
bution of advice given by advisory committees tends to approximate unanim-
ity and the outcome of the voting process is very likely to be adopted by the
FDA; a shift from 50% supportive voting to unanimity increases the approval
probability from 0.64 to 0.92 (Lavertu and Weimer 2011).
Two interrelated questions are addressed in the research on advisory com-
mittees. First, what are the conditions under which the FDA decides to consult
with an FDA advisory committee about the approval of a prescription drug?
Second, are prescription drugs for which the FDA consults with an advisory
committee more likely to be associated with post-approval safety problems?
The findings from the analyses conducted by Moffitt (2010) indicate that the
FDA tends to consult with advisory committees when there are high levels of
uncertainty about the safety and efficacy of a prescription drug. The author
interprets this result by suggesting that the FDA uses the advisory committee
to gain further insights about those basic properties – safety and efficacy – of
the drug under review. Moreover, she argues that by consulting with a group
of experts the FDA builds a buffer to mitigate future blame that could poten-
tially arise. Regarding the second research question, the results presented in
the paper are somewhat mixed, depending on the dependent variables used
in the model. This is not surprising; on the one hand, the argument can be
made that drugs for which the FDA consulted with an advisory committee have
undergone greater scrutiny and should therefore exhibit fewer post-approval
safety problems. On the other hand, one may argue that since drugs associated
with higher uncertainty are more likely to be subjected to advisory committee
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review, the scrutiny of the advisory committee does not eliminate this uncer-
tainty.
In summary, research that focuses on the social organization of drug safety
has essentially studied two outcomes: review speed and volume of safety is-
sues that occur after approval of the prescription drug. To explain the variation
in these outcomes, researchers have looked at deadlines, sponsor credentials,
prior foreign experience with the drug, and the use of scientific expertise in
the form of FDA advisory committees. Reconciling the findings in this litera-
ture is not straightforward. For example, in the interpretations of their results,
Carpenter and colleagues (Carpenter et al. 2008, 2012) demonstrate that shorter
review times (drug applications piled up to right before the deadline) reduce
the quality of the review. However, as mentioned earlier, it is unclear which
types of drugs are piled up before the deadline. If the FDA is able to infer the
quality of applications by observing the credentials of the sponsor of the drug,
the FDA may have pushed the high quality applications towards the dead-
line. If that were the case, the second finding in the studies by Carpenter and
colleagues (Carpenter et al. 2008, 2012) should be surprising and theoretically
inconsistent. Turning to the studies by Kim (2012) and Olson (1997) does not
alleviate this potential contradiction. Although both studies show that certain
firm characteristics (mostly those describing some form of reputation or sta-
tus) are correlated with shorter review times and suggest that this correlation
could arise from inferring the quality of the application from firm status, none
of those studies show that there are indeed differences in the quality of the evi-
dence that supports a new drug application.
It is also not entirely clear how Olson’s (2013) argument about the effect
of foreign experience fits with other work on the social organization of drug
safety. Even if one were to disregard the odd functional form presented in Ol-
son’s model, it remains unclear why some drugs are approved earlier in other
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countries. Comparative studies on the approval of prescription drugs suggest
that the FDA approves drugs fast compared to regulators in other countries
(Kessler et al. 1996; Schweitzer et al. 1996). Therefore, one starts to wonder
whether some drugs are submitted to different national regulators at different
times (Olson (1997) does not account for variation in submission dates) and
whether some firms devise variation in submission dates as a strategy to max-
imize their profits. For example, a potential hypothesis could be that if the
approval success rate varies with foreign experience and if foreign approval
benefits domestic approval, firms may exploit their experiences with different
national regulators to develop a global submission plan.
Finally, the research on advisory committees does not provide evidence on
whether consultation with advisory committees benefits the decision making
process at the FDA. And neither does it show a difference in the safety prob-
lems associated with drugs for which an advisory committee was consulted to
decide on its approval. However, it may still be the case that advisory commit-
tee consultation has had a beneficial effect in terms of decreasing the number
of patients harmed by an unsafe drug. First, advisory committees may have
kept the most harmful drugs of off the market, but since rejected applications
remain unobserved, it is impossible to answer this question. And second, if the
drugs discussed in advisory committees are indeed the ones that have the most
risk and uncertainty associated with them, FDA advisory committees may have
shaped the conditions under which their harm is minimized. The main prob-
lems in testing this hypothesis is that given the data constraints, establishing a
counterfactual is very difficult.
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1.2 The Salience of Understanding Post-approval Ev-
idence Production
To understand why there is significant variation in the likelihood that prescrip-
tion drugs will experience post-approval regulatory action, extant research has
identified salient variation – albeit contradicting at times – in a range of condi-
tions in the pre-approval stages of a prescription drug’s life-cycle. While this
research has provided insights into the question of if safety problems will oc-
cur, it has not been able to answer the question of when safety problems will be
identified. In other words, while we now know some of the risk factors pre-
dicting safety problems, we do not know what accounts for variation in when
the regulator learns about a safety problem associated with a prescription drug.
This dissertation is a first step in answering this question.
Understanding when safety problems are identified – rather than if they are
identified – is an important public health question. First, understanding why
safety issues are detected later rather than sooner may save lives. Recent drug
disasters such as those of Vioxx and Avandia provide clear examples of why
early detection is important. Vioxx had been on the U.S. market for about five
years before the FDA decided to withdraw approval for the drug. During those
years on the market Vioxx is claimed to have caused 27,785 acute myocardial
infarctions and sudden cardiac deaths.4 Avandia is another case of a prescrip-
tion drug that killed many people. Avandia was a blockbuster drug treating
diabetes and was approved for marketing by the FDA in 1999. After being on
the market for 7 years, the drug was shown to cause cardiovascular disease
and the drug was withdrawn from the EU market and was put under signifi-
cant restrictions in the U.S. FDA researchers have found that in its 7 years on
4 This estimate is based on a relative risk of 1.5 to 3.7 – depending on the dosing. More infor-
mation can be found in a document by David Graham, M.D., M.P.H. (1.usa.gov/1CbWQvh) who
works for the FDA.
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the market, Avandia has caused a total of 131,000 acute myocardial infarction,
strokes, and deaths in the U.S. alone.5 Thus, since the number of casualties
can rapidly increase within a limited amount of time, early detection of safety
problems may save lives.
A second reason why studying the “when” question is important is that
doing so forces the researcher to take seriously the evidence that is produced
about the safety of prescription drugs after a drug is approved by the FDA.
Unless the regulator decides to revisit and reinterpret evidence that was already
available prior to approval (which virtually never happens), regulatory action
is based on evidence produced after approval of a prescription drug.
This second argument is especially salient because the sample population
on which a drug is tested in pre-approval clinical trials and the population to
which the drug is prescribed differ greatly (Psaty and Burke 2006). Prior to
approval by the FDA, prescription drugs are tested in several stages of clinical
trials and while some large trials have several thousands of human subjects in
them, the population to which a drug is prescribed post-approval is typically
much larger and so is the diversity of human bodies exposed to the prescrip-
tion drug. Moreover, dosing and indication are no longer controlled once the
drug hits the market and are therefore likely to introduce additional variation in
treatment. This additional variation introduced once a drug is released on the
market increases the probability that previously unknown pharmacodynamic
and pharmacokinetic6 processes will reveal itself during treatment with a pre-
scription drug. Therefore, much of the evidence that will determine the safety
profile of a prescription drug can only be constructed after the substance is ap-
5This estimate is based on a relative risk of 1.4 for cardiovascular events obtained from a
Rosiglitazone (Avandia) meta-analysis and the DREAM trail. More information can be found in the
slides of David Graham, M.D., M.P.H. (http://1.usa.gov/1c3fYU3), presented at the “Endocrino-
logic and Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee and the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advi-
sory Committee Meeting” on July 30, 2007.
6The term pharmacodynamics refers to the effect of a drug on the body while the term phar-
macokinetics refers to the effect that the body has on the drug.
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proved. In that sense, prior research on variation in drug safety adheres to the
somewhat outdated belief that the safety profile of a prescription drug can be
established prior to approval of the prescription drug (Psaty and Burke 2006).
The study by Olson (2013) is obviously an exception. She acknowledges the
idea that market experience of a drug is likely to generate information that has
not been revealed in the clinical stages of drug testing. However, she does not
hypothesize about the relation of foreign experience of a drug and the temporal
pattern that describes when safety problems emerge.
Perhaps the need for serious attention for post-approval evidence about the
safety of a prescription drug is most strikingly paraphrased by the authors of
an influential study about COX-2 inhibitors (including Vioxx) published just
before Vioxx was taken off of the market:
What are the implications of the COX-2 inhibitor story in terms of pharma-
coepidemiology? It illustrates the fact that new risks will become apparent
only when a drug is in widespread use. After a new drug is approved,
the dosing and indications in routine use are likely to differ from those in
the pivotal studies leading to registration. One question is whether pro-
active surveillance should begin with the first routine use of a new drug,
with the aim of shortening the lead time before potential adverse effects
are identified and minimizing the propagation of risk. In an era of block-
buster drugs, do we also need blockbuster pharmacoepidemiology? There
is a growing disequilibrium between the efficiency of the drug approval
process and that of post-marketing surveillance. Perhaps mandated, proac-
tive, post-marketing surveillance, based on informed assessment of poten-
tial risks, should become a routine part of the drug approval process in the
future (Ray et al. 2003)
This quote indicates that besides the lack of scientific progress made to un-
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derstand the post-approval evidence production processes, regulatory exper-
tise on this stage of the drug life-cycle is also lacking. This idea is widespread;
in 2006, the Government Accountability Office stated in one of its reports that
“the FDA lacks clear and effective processes for making decisions about, and
providing management oversight of, postmarket safety issues.”7
Although the aim of this dissertation is not to understand the lack of at-
tention for post-approval regulatory processes, several interrelated reasons are
plausible. First, the number of actors in the pre-approval stage of a drug’s
life-cycle is limited and the level of standardization, regulation, and bureau-
cratization is high. As a result variance in those regulatory processes can be
somewhat cleanly defined (Luke and Stamatakis 2012). Second, since the FDA
regulates both the pre- and the post-approval processes, any post-approval reg-
ulatory action is essentially signals that prior regulatory behavior was not in
the best interest of public health. This is one of the reasons why, in many Euro-
pean countries, pre- and post-marketing regulation is done in separate organi-
zational entities. Third, the support that the FDA has received for proposed im-
provements on its post-marketing regulatory processes has been very limited.
An example of this is a negotiated exception in the 1992 Prescription Drug User
Fee Act (PDUFA). The PDUFA did not only include deadlines as a new provi-
sion; it also included the provision of user fees contributed by pharmaceutical
companies that are supposed to make the FDA a better regulator. However, the
PDUFA prohibited the FDA from applying user fees to improve post-approval
drug surveillance (Psaty and Burke 2006).
7See http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-402
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1.3 Post-Approval Evidence Production as a Com-
plex Social System
Besides the additional variation in patient characteristics and treatment, an-
other major change going from the pre- to the post-approval setting is its ev-
idence production process: while procedures, behavior, and conditions that
guide evidence production in the pre-approval stage are standardized, con-
trolled (e.g. protocols describe what study designs should look like, Random-
ized Clinical Trials (RCT) are the de facto method of evidence production, and
the behavior of the sponsor of the drug is heavily regulated), and centrally man-
aged by the sponsor of a drug, the post-approval stage is characterized by much
less regulation and a much more diverse set of stakeholders who produce the
evidence. For example, neither the behavior of patients and physicians nor the
professional behavior of medical scientists writing about drug safety is strictly
regulated. Moreover, whereas RCTs dominate the pre-approval evidence pro-
duction process, the post approval stage is characterized by patients, physi-
cians, and medical scientists contributing large amounts of case reports, obser-
vational studies, smaller RCTs, comparative RCTs, and adverse event reports.
Building on these differences, the argument that I will advance in this dis-
sertation is that the post-approval evidence production system is a complex
social system. Agents are heterogeneous, they interact with one another in
the process of producing evidence, and jointly they produce emergent effects
(Smelser 2011) that are different from the effects that the individual actors would
have produced in isolation (Luke and Stamatakis 2012). As a result, each indi-
vidual piece of evidence derives its meaning from its embeddedness in a larger
collection of claims and in order to extract this meaning one needs to iden-
tify the structural patterns that guide evidence production. Such a setting in
which heterogeneous agents interact with one another to collectively produce
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a body of evidence warrants sociological inquiry that pays particular attention
to structures that guide evidence production. Hence, this dissertation studies
how patients, physicians, and medical scientists go about in producing the ev-
idence about drug safety – based on which the FDA has to build its regulation.
In doing so, this dissertation builds on recent literature that scrutinizes how
the structure in which social actors are embedded affects their evaluation of an
object, person, phenomenon, or context.
In recent years, an increasing volume of scholarly work in sociology has
examined how people make evaluations and produce claims, especially in set-
tings characterized by high levels of uncertainty. This diverse body of research
embraces the inherently sociological question of how interactions and observa-
tions inform social actors in the process of attributing value. The contexts of
these studies range from science (Collins 1998; Shwed and Bearman 2010) to
symbolic goods (Lieberson 2000; Salganik et al. 2006) and finance (Beunza and
Stark 2004; MacKenzie 2011) and they contribute theoretically to the under-
standing of diagnosis and social influence (Liu et al. 2010; King and Bearman
2009; Rossman 2014), status and honor (Gould 2002), popularity and fashion
cycles (Lieberson 2000; Strang and Macy 2001), classification and categoriza-
tion (Durkheim 1963; Zuckerman 1999; Hannan 2010), and expertise (Collins
1992; Eyal 2013).
Following this work, the aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate that in
order to understand the evidence produced in the post-approval stages of a
drug’s life-cycle, one needs to identify the patterns that guide processes of eval-
uation. That is, I argue that evidence production is ultimately an act of evalu-
ation and that extracting meaning from aggregated evaluations requires one to
identify the mechanisms by which individuals construct their evaluations. As
a result, this dissertation is a study about the sociology of evidence production,
not a study about drug safety.
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To be explicit about the structures that I am referring to and the way in
which I think they can help to understand the meaning of an aggregate pattern,
I will briefly introduce two papers, each of which sets a precedent for the two
empirical chapters of this dissertation.
The first paper by Salganik, Dodds, and Watts (2006) describes an experi-
ment in which subjects are asked to evaluate songs from unknown bands. The
paper presents evidence that demonstrates that exposure to the evaluations of
others who have listened to the same songs increases inequality in evaluations.
In particular, positive evaluations concentrate in few songs while the major-
ity of options receives a less positive evaluation. The authors argue that this
outcome is observed because in conditions of uncertainty others are likely to
serve as cues for one’s own evaluation. Obviously, the tendency of individ-
uals to align their evaluation with the evaluation of others, thereby reducing
the perception of uncertainty associated with subjective judgments has been
prominent in the sociological literature on inequality within reward systems
since the introduction of the “Matthew Effect” (Merton 1968; Zuckerman and
Merton 1971). Essentially, this effect implies that objects, people, organizations,
or events of similar quality attract disproportionally positive judgments when
its status is high and disproportionally negative judgments when its status is
low, regardless of its underlying quality.
Although the literature on how relational cues are used to make evaluations
is vast and further expanding, at least two questions remain unanswered. First,
do individuals differ in the ways in which they use evaluations contributed by
others? And if they do, how and why do they differ? Salganik et al. (2006) do
not identify causes of variation in the degree to which individuals use relational
cues and they therefore cannot answer the question of how this would trans-
late into different outcomes of the evaluation process. And second, given that
many social contexts are characterized by a variety of different relational cues,
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how do individuals select the ones that guide them? For example, the findings
by Salganik et al. (2006) have mostly been cited by research on the role of social
influence in the diffusion of behavior. That body of research argues that indi-
viduals are embedded in social networks and that the relations that make up
those networks serve as the conduits that enable diffusion. However, as Ross-
man (2014) recently argued, under some conditions behaviors do not diffuse
because its adopters engage in social interactions, but because the behavior is
embedded in a legitimized category. He argues that categorical legitimacy can
alleviate the problem of uncertainty and could cause diffusion patterns that
bear resemblance to the social influence diffusion pattern.
A second study, conducted by Shwed and Bearman (2010) sets a precedent
for Chapter 4, which describes the second empirical study of this dissertation.
In their paper, Shwed and Bearman (2010) argue that through the identifica-
tion of structure in citation networks one can extract meaning from a body of
evidence. In particular, using network analytic techniques, they show that net-
work modularity in citation networks can reveal the consensus within a scien-
tific debate. Building on Pinch and Bijker (1986) and their notion of closure,
they quantitatively follow scientific debates to detect temporal variation in the
modularity in the citation networks over time. They link this variation to expert
reports on consensus and show that their modularity score detects scientific
consensus even before the expert reports claim that there is consensus. More-
over, Shwed and Bearman (2010) use their strategy to identify three trajectories
in which science is conducted: 1) spiral, in which substantive questions are an-
swered and revisited at a higher level; 2) cyclical, in which similar questions
are revisited without stable closure; and 3) flat, in which there is no real scien-
tific contestation. Using their network modularity score and linking it to these
different scientific trajectories should enable outside observers without deep,
substantive expertise to assess the status of a scientific debate. The paper pro-
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vides an important example of how the identification of a structure allows one
to extract meaning from a body of evidence.
The paper also gives rise to a series of questions: why do debates differ in
terms of the trajectory in which arguments are made? To my knowledge no re-
search has shown why some scientific debates unfold by answering questions
and revisiting them at a higher level, while in other cases similar questions
are revisited without scientific closure. Another question that the research of
Shwed and Bearman (2010) gives rise to relates to ways in which the consump-
tion of science is affected by the patterns by which scientific debates unfold. For
example, some academic disciplines are heavily drawn from to inform policy
and regulation. If there is variation in the structure in which debates unfold,
one expects that this affects the implementation of regulation and policy.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I will further build on the two papers briefly
discussed above and I will demonstrate how the research presented in this dis-
sertation starts to provide answers to some of the questions that those papers
give rise to.
The structure of the dissertation is as follows: The next chapter first de-
scribes the emergence of the FDA as an expert regulator and it describes the
salient components of the process of evidence production in the context of
drug safety. I will describe how the FDA assumed its position as a strong pre-
approval regulator and I will then show how the FDA’s expertise in guiding
evidence production pre-approval does not translate well to the post-approval
stages of a drug safety debate. In Chapter 3, I will present an empirical study
of the production of evidence by patients and physicians. I do so by analyz-
ing data on reports filed by patients and physicians about ADRs that they have
experienced. The temporal variation in the number of reports filed by patients
and physicians provides useful information for the regulator to take regulatory
action. Yet, this data is also strongly ambiguous. I’ll explore how cycles of in-
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creased reporting are produced and I’ll explain how those cycles are generated
through mechanisms other than an increase in the number of ADRs. In Chapter
4, I turn from evidence produced by patients and physicians to evidence pro-
duced by medical scientists. I explore how the academic debate about the safety
and efficacy of prescription drugs changes over time and I examine how those
changes relate to post-approval regulatory action. In Chapter 5, I synthesize
the main findings from this dissertation and I discuss them.
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Chapter 2
Structure as the Guiding
Principle in Evidence
Production
Since its founding in the early 1900s, the Food and Drug Administration
has become the expert organization in regulating and evaluating evidence
production in the pre-approval stage of a drug’s life-cycle. The regulation
and evaluation of post-approval evidence production, however, has proven
to be an elusive quest. This chapter first describes the emergence of the
FDA as an expert organization. It then discusses the discrepancies between
pre- and post-approval processes of regulating drug safety and it shows
that the tools that make the FDA an expert in regulating the drug approval
process fall short when regulating drugs after market approval. Finally,
this chapter advances the argument that evidence production is a complex
social process and that a social theory of evidence production is needed to
extract meaning from the evidence produced. In doing so, I propose that by
identifying social and cognitive structures that guide evidence production,
ambiguity about the interpretation of evidence reduces.
2.1 The Emergence of Regulation and Jurisdiction
Although therapeutic substances have been regulated since the birth of the re-
public, early regulation was minimal, incoherent, and scattered across many
different regulatory levels including the municipal, state, and federal level. The
first real step towards a centralized national regulation came when the Biologics
Act of 1902 and the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 were adopted (Carpen-
ter 2010). Provisions in the Biologics Act required manufacturers of vaccines to
be licensed and they authorized inspection of manufacturing facilities by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).1 The Pure Food and Drugs Act gave
the USDA the power to financially penalize manufacturers of therapeutic sub-
stances for adulterating or misbranding those substances (Law 2006).
These provisions were deemed necessary given the total lack of control over
those who were manufacturing and selling medicines to patients. Druggist’s
Circular, a commercial publication that targeted pharmaceutical retailers, listed
about 50,000 therapeutic substances in 1906 and estimates suggest that the total
market for those substance was worth between $75 million and $110 million
annually (Adams 1907; Carpenter 2010) which would be between $1.9 billion
and $2.8 billion in 2014 dollars2. The wide availability of this large number of
substances was problematic for two main reasons: First, many of these drugs
were toxic and they either made people sicker or they actually killed the patient.
Second, the vast majority of these substances did nothing in terms of treating
the condition that triggered the use of the substance – meaning that potentially
1See 1.usa.gov/1kBtBfr for other significant dates in the history of drug regulation in the U.S.
2Although these numbers are very large, they dwarf compared to the size of the U.S. pharma-
ceutical industry today. In 2014 the U.S. pharmaceutical industry was worth more than $377 billion.
See theimsinstitute.org.
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available and beneficial treatment was foregone by their consumption (Carpen-
ter 2010). Figure 1 shows one of the advertisements for therapeutic substances
as found in the Druggist’s Circular. The pills in the second bottle from the left
were recommended as a treatment for liver inflammation (and many other con-
ditions). Note that the pills were sugar coated and that they did not come with
a “stereotyped form for printing”, because “each lot is distinctive in style.”
Figure 2.1: Advertisement for therapeutic substance in Druggist’s Circular
Note: This advertisement from the April 1892 Druggist’s Circular shows some of the pills sold by
Warner. Please note that Warner is one of the few manufacturers of therapeutic substances that
survived well into the 20th century (Warner-Lambert was acquired by Pfizer in 2000).
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The problem of widespread consumption of many unsafe or ineffective drugs
on the U.S. market was further accentuated by the fact that virtually none of the
stakeholders in the domain of medicine – including physicians, patients, reg-
ulators, drug manufacturers, or scientists – could legitimately claim to hold
expert knowledge. Virtually no stakeholder group would be granted the status
of expert by any other stakeholder group (Parascandola 1992) and each inter-
action between members from different social groups or professions created
conflicts over jurisdiction and expert knowledge (Abbott 1988).
The lack of hierarchy in the expertise distribution and the systematic dis-
agreement over the boundaries of expertise is perhaps most clearly illustrated
by the attitude and behavior of many consumers of therapeutic substances.
They expressed serious concerns and heavily opposed the 1906 Pure Food and
Drugs Act arguing that it was their right to engage in self-medication and auto-
therapy (Young 2015). Although these votaries of self-medication strongly op-
posed a government that limited their access to any therapeutic substance, at
the same time they were actively lobbying to get more information disclosed
on drug labels arguing that information would allow them to make a well in-
formed decision. These patients strongly believed in the layman who could,
given access to full information, make a well informed medical decision (Paras-
candola 1992; Carpenter 2010). Obviously, one of the main results of a gen-
eral lack of expertise was that it was virtually impossible for patients to be
guided by a reliable source to select only those medicines that were not toxic
and treated their condition effectively.
Organizationally, the Biologics Act of 1902 and the Pure Food and Drugs Act
of 1906 were enforced by the Bureau of Chemistry which was situated within
the USDA. The bureau had been active in a wide range of activities within the
domain of agriculture, but by the end of the 1920s the agency decided that drug
regulation had become so differentiated from agricultural regulation – which
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obviously was at the core of the USDAs activities – that a separate agency was
established called the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration. Three years
later, in 1930, the name of the agency was changed again to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).3
Although the new regulation of the early 1900s provided the FDA with
some legal power, in practice the two acts did little to redefine and clarify the
boundaries of expertise and jurisdiction. The Pure Food and Drugs Act for-
mally gave the USDA/FDA the power to seize fraudulent or falsely advertised
substances, but the fines were small and the resources available to the USDA
to prosecute those who falsely advertised were minimal. Moreover, both acts
contained many loopholes and the majority of manufacturers of therapeutic
substances were able to essentially continue operations in the same way as
they had done for years. Rexford Tugwell, a former Professor of Economics at
Columbia University who went on to become the Assistant Secretary of Agri-
culture under Roosevelt, explains the power that could be derived from igno-
rance under the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act:
The old bill of 1906 (...) had put on the Administration not only the obliga-
tion to prove that damage had been done by adulterated (...) or dangerous
(...) drugs, but also to show that it had been done with malicious intent.
Well, of course, this was impossible to do and it had the absurd effect of
making the person who did it practically free of any obligation because all
he had to prove was he didn’t know he was doing it. The more ignorant he
was, the safer he was, and this was a situation that naturally the Food and
Drug people found frustrating, because every time they went into court
the lawyers on the other side proved to a jury’s satisfaction that what was
done might have been damaging, but their client, they were sorry to say,
3See John Swann’s writing (1.usa.gov/18Z18fz) for a more elaborate discussion of organiza-
tional changes within the FDA in the early 1900s.
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didn’t mean it, didn’t even know about it and had no intention of hurting
anybody. So they went free.4
Meanwhile, officials within the FDA – who recognized their limited juris-
diction – developed several strategies to strengthen its position and to become
more effective and credible as a regulator of medicines (Carpenter 2010): First,
to get drug regulation on the national agenda at all, the FDA started to ally with
key players in the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration. Although Roosevelt
himself was not particularly supportive of the FDAs efforts, some officials in
the administration certainly were. One of them, Rexford Tugwell, was closely
tied to the main directors of the FDA and he was actively involved in drafting
bills that would strengthen the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act.5
Second, the FDA launched a campaign to prevent the public from consum-
ing just any therapeutic medicines citing its lack of proof of safety and effi-
cacy. Although the FDA had been prevented from exercising publicity efforts
by means of the Deficiency Appropriations act of 1919, the agency had found
ways to reach the American public. Such efforts included the publication of a
book titled American Chamber of Horrors by one of the FDA officials.
A third channel through which the FDA tried to strengthen its position as
a national regulator was through initiating and strengthening ties to women’s
organizations and consumer unions. These organizations experienced balloon-
ing member counts and their values and concerns showed strong overlap with
the values and concerns within the FDA (Carpenter 2010).
While the FDA received support from an important set of stakeholders,
there were strong counterforces too. For example, organizations representing
the pharmaceutical industry – including the Proprietary Association (PA) and
the United Medicine Manufacturers of America (UMMA) – were very active in
41.usa.gov/1ACVWFC.
5See 1.usa.gov/1ACVWFC for an interview with Rexford Tugwell about his close ties to the
FDA and his activities to strengthen the regulation of therapeutic substances.
24
trying to maintain the status quo through advertisements and lobbying. An-
other important counterforce was the fact that the supporters of the FDA in
the Roosevelt administration (mostly prominently Rexford Tugwell and Sena-
tor Royal Copeland) were unpopular figures in the regulatory domain. These
two counterforces were so strong that several bills that would strengthen the
position of the FDA and that were voted on in congress did not get majority
support (Jackson 1970; Carpenter 2010).
Although it is not clear how and whether it affected the FDAs attempts to
strengthen its position as a regulator, another organization was also actively
trying to position itself as one of the main voices in the drug regulation do-
main: The Council on Pharmacy and Chemistry of the American Medical As-
sociation (AMA) was actively engaged in discussions about drug safety and
explicitly portrayed itself as an expert organization. The AMA was strongly
tied to physicians and manufacturers of therapeutic substances through their
journal, the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) and JAMA
published articles that were read by physicians nationwide (Carpenter 2010).
Moreover, drug retailers heavily used JAMA as an advertising outlet. The dual
role of protecting the public interest and commercially publishing a journal cre-
ated conditions that were difficult to navigate for the AMA. In particular, the
AMA walked a fine line between striving for expertise and striving for prof-
itability. In 1930 the AMA made an additional bid for being accepted as a main
expert by creating a “Seal of Acceptance” for drugs that were deemed safe and
effective according to the standards of the AMA. And while certification by an
expert organization could certainly benefit the safety level of drugs available on
the U.S. market, the seal also required its recipients to advertise their products
in AMA publications.
In sum, the years following the newly introduced drug acts of 1902 and 1906
were characterized by bids for expertise. Patients tried to force manufacturers
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to add more information to a label to be able to make well informed decisions,
the AMA introduced a seal to certify the quality of a drug, drug manufactur-
ers united in order to maintain the status quo, and the FDA sought allies to
generate legitimacy for their claims about drug safety. Yet, the fact that the
knowledge system underlying claims of expertise was largely underdeveloped
and the fact that the development of scientific standards was nascent prevented
an efficient evidence production process from emerging.
2.2 A Discontinuous Shift in the Boundaries of Ex-
pertise
The late 1930s represent an important episode in the strife over expertise about
drug safety. In September and October of 1937 reports came in at several or-
ganizations including the FDA and the AMA about people in Tulsa, Oklahoma
who were dying unexpectedly. Many of the reports6 linked these deaths to
treatment with a therapeutic substance called “Dr. Massengill’s Elixir Sulfanil-
amide.” Since sulfanilamides were widely used – without problems – for a va-
riety of indications including colds and pneumonia, FDA inspectors suspected
the specific substance to have caused patients in Tulsa to die. Laboratory tests
confirmed the FDAs hypothesis: it turned out that “Dr. Massengill’s Elixir Sul-
fanilamide” did not only contain sulfanilamide; it also contained the highly
toxic substance called diethylene glycol. Massengill’s chief chemist mixed up
a solution containing 10 percent sulfanilamide, 72 percent diethylene glycol,
and 16 percent water. The solution was also flavored with raspberry extract,
saccharin, and caramel making it a popular drug (Geiling and Cannon 1938;
Wax 1995; Barley 2007). The total number of deaths caused by exposure to the
6Since there was no standardized system in place yet to collect reports and complaints about
therapeutic substances, these reports came in through traditional means of communications includ-
ing telephone, telegram, and regular mail.
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elixir is at least 76 while most sources argue that the number exceeds 100 (Geil-
ing and Cannon 1938). Compared to more recent episodes of casualties caused
by unsafe drugs these absolute numbers are not exceptionally high. However,
given the fact that only 633 shipments of the elixir had been distributed across
the U.S. and that many of them were still intact, the number is very high.
The tragic sulfanilamide episode exposed some interesting details on how
drugs were regulated in the U.S. One of the outstanding features of the episode
that was picked up in newspaper reports and other accounts of the tragedy was
that the FDA handled the cases swiftly and strongly (Young 2015). The organi-
zation started investigations about the causes immediately after the first reports
came in and it sent out field agents to track down all batches of the elixir that
had been shipped around the country. In the media, these organizational inter-
ventions were portrayed as acts of strong and well-informed leadership on be-
half of the FDA. Moreover, this image of the FDA was only strengthened when
it became clear how large the crisis would have been had the FDA not inter-
vened. Many reports about the episode contained details on the counterfactual
outcome which suggested that if the FDA had not been as fast in recovering
the elixir, the tragedy would have taken the lives of at least 4,500 Americans
(Jackson 1970).
The episode also showed that despite the strong performance of the FDA,
there was no legal mandate to act forcefully upon these new findings. Accord-
ing to the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs act, Massengill’s only fraudulent action
was calling the medicine an “elixir”, a designation that was reserved only for
compounds containing ethanol (Wax 1995). However, although the FDA was
tied in its actions and many people had died, the fact that the episode was
picked up by the media had created a strong and lasting support for increased
regulation of drugs. Existing ties, such as those to women’s organizations, were
strengthened and prior competitors reached out to the FDA. For example, Mor-
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ris Fishbein (the director of the AMA and editor of JAMA) put in strong words
of support following the episode despite the fact that the relationship between
the FDA and AMA had been one of friction and competition (Carpenter 2010).
As a result, bills that had not been a priority for years in U.S. congress sud-
denly became salient following a public outcry about the abysmal state of the
drug regulation system.
In addition to support for the efforts of the FDA, the sulfanilamide episode
also provided the FDA with a platform to further expose stakeholders to the
proposed changes that were seen as necessary to make the marketplace for
drugs a safer one. Walter Campbell, the director of the FDA at the time, took
the occasion to detail one of the main proposed changes:
In the interest of safety, society has required that physicians be licensed
to practice the healing art. Pharmacists are licensed to compound drugs.
Even steamfitters, electricians and plumbers are required to have licenses.
Certainly a requirement that potent proprietary medicines be manufac-
tured under license can be justified on the ground of public safety.7
The idea underlying this statement was obviously to push legislation to
move from a system in which the FDA had very limited post-approval jurisdic-
tions to a system in which a drug’s therapeutic effects were critically scrutinized
before a drug became available to patients. Following this statement, Walter
Campbell put out a report in which the idea of further regulating drugs before
they could reach the market was laid out. The report contained four recom-
mendations that were intended to be used to draft new regulation: First, drugs
should be regulated by subjecting them to a pre-market review and notifica-
tion. Second, the FDA should be given the power to prohibit the marketing of
dangerous drugs already on the market. Third, manufacturers of prescription
7This quote appeared in Campbell to Copeland, October 29, 1937: NA, RG 46 HR75A.
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drugs should be forced to disclose ingredients used in the drug both including
the active and inactive substances. Fourth, claims about the therapeutic bene-
fits of the drug should be regulated (Carpenter 2010). Although these changes
in regulation had been proposed before and although the FDA had pushed the
administration several times to adopt these rules, the context, support configu-
ration, and urgency had never been as favorable. Adopting these rules would
provide the FDA with significant jurisdiction. It would also hand the FDA a
monopoly over legal claims about drug safety.
On June 25th 1938 Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metics Act, which required manufacturers of therapeutic substances to get FDA
approval before being allowed on the market. The other proposals were also
more or less integrated into the bill, but a salient detail was that the criteria
upon which the FDA could deny a substance access to the market was safety,
not efficacy (Cavers 1939). In other words, legally the FDA could stop drugs
from entering the U.S. market if they posed harm for patients, not if they were
not effective as a treatment.
While the role of the FDA and its relations to other stakeholders in the drug
safety debate had slowly taken shape before the sulfanilamide case, the tragedy
is likely to have formally established the boundaries of expertise and jurisdic-
tion. The result of this new hierarchy was that the stakeholders in the drug
safety debate, led by the FDA, had to develop an entirely new system to process
and evaluate evidence about drug safety (Carpenter et al. 2010). This showed
when the first drugs were submitted for approval under the new law. The main
problem was that there was no structured protocol that could be followed that
would allow for the acceptance of safe drugs and the rejection of unsafe ones.
Such standardization would provide the basis upon which claims could be built
(Bowker and Star 1999; Timmermans and Berg 2003). Since this structure was
missing, the early approval process could be described as highly experimen-
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tal. It was characterized by very few rejections of submitted drug applications,
but a large number of serious efforts to force the manufacturer of the drug to
revise the label and the claims made on a label. For example, if the research
done by the FDA investigator indicated that a drug would be unsafe in certain
quantities, the FDA suggested that the manufacturer of the drug included this
information on the drug label.
The years following the 1938 regulation were characterized by ambiguity,
experimentation, and renewal. An entire agency, an entire profession, and an
entire scientific community had to reinvent itself (Parascandola 1992). Histori-
cal accounts of this era are a good example of this ambiguity. While some au-
thors portrayed the FDA as an organization that was too closely tied to indus-
try, resistant to change, and unable to respond to the new complexities imposed
by rational pharmacological evaluation, others stress the reflexive nature of the
agency and see the work done in the years following the new law as necessary
steps for the regulatory victories that followed (Carpenter 2010).
The years following the introduction of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
also involved a great deal of precedent-setting work being done at the FDA.
One of the divisions that contributed strongly to the emergence of a system of
drug evaluation was the Division of Pharmacology. This division was founded
just before the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act was adopted and it grew rapidly
in its first few years. The division became known for its innovations in devel-
oping standards, tools, designs, and procedures for testing drugs for their tox-
icology. A major innovation initiated and further developed by the Division of
Pharmacology was to change the meaning of the concept of toxicity. Whereas
the debate had been mostly about acute ADRs, the Division of Pharmacology
started started doing research on chronic toxicity (the toxic effects following the
continuous or repeated exposure to a substance) (Parascandola 1992; Carpen-
ter 2010). Another change in which the Division of Pharmacology at the FDA
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played an important role was the erosion of the boundaries between the Divi-
sion of Pharmacology and the Division of Medicine which allowed for phar-
macological practices to be merged into the procedures guiding the medical
evaluation of drugs.8
The Division of Pharmacology was also actively involved in creating stan-
dards to reduce the ambiguity involved in evaluating therapeutic substances.
Geoffrey Woodard, one of the FDA pharmacologists at the time, credits Arnold
Lehman, the head of the division, for his influence on these efforts:
Well, I think that this was probably Dr. Lehman’s main contribution, well
maybe not main, but a major contribution by Dr. Lehman. He recognized
that there were all these various industrial groups coming in and asking
for consultation and getting advice but, depending on who happened to be
at the conference, the advice wasn’t always very uniform. And he realized
that there ought to be a book or a source that would have all these things
spelled out. So he was instrumental in getting all of us to write about what
was known as the “Bible” in the industry.9
The “Bible” to which Woodard refers is the book “Procedures for the Ap-
praisal of the Toxicity of Chemicals in Foods” which was published in 1949 by
scientists from the Division of Pharmacology, with Lehman as principal author.
This publication began to codify the practices that scientists of the Division of
Pharmacology discussed with industry representatives when they met (Stirling
and Junod 2002).
8The rise of pharmacology as one of the main disciplines involved in evaluation drug safety
also created conflict over turf. FDA physicians and others who were not trained in pharmacology
began to resent the dominance of pharmacologists in FDA decision making processes. For example,
Robert P. Fischelis – the former Secretary of the American Pharmaceutical Association – wrote up
an essay that was published in the American Druggist with the title “Who should decide to release
a drug?” In the essay, Fischelis made the argument that it should be a medical decision (Carpenter
2010). However, pharmacology had assumed such a pivotal role in the drug evaluation system that
without its expertise the carefully created dependence structure would most likely collapse.
9See 1.usa.gov/1BmrgaS.
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Besides interaction with industry to discuss standards of drug evaluation,
the late 1940 and 1950s were also characterized by the formation of network
ties with other stakeholders. For example, Carpenter (2010, pp. 309-313) lists
59 external committees in important organizations (including – but not lim-
ited to – the World Health Organization, the American Chemical Society, and
the American Medical Association) at which the FDA was represented by at
least one FDA official in the mid 1960s. These memberships had been part of
the effort of the FDA during the previous decade to engage stakeholders in its
quest to improve the safety and efficacy of prescription drugs on the U.S. mar-
ket. In addition to these committee memberships, the FDA became closely tied
to pharmacology departments at prominent universities including the Univer-
sity of Chicago, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, and Cornell. Initially these networks
were informal and ties were activated ad hoc, but later these ties were active
constantly, not the least caused by the changed hiring practices of the FDA. In-
creasingly, the FDA became a popular employer among academically trained
pharmacologists and mentor-student relationships often translated themselves
into relationships of co-workers.
These hiring practices did not go unnoticed by pharmaceutical firms that
were trying to get their products approved for marketing. In an attempt not to
fall behind, pharmaceutical firms also built extensive ties with pharmacology
departments in American universities and were responsible for hiring many
of its students (Furman and MacGarvie 2012; Carpenter 2010). Furman and
MacGarvie (2012) use a publication of the National Research Council, Industrial
Research Laboratories of the United States, to describe the emergence and strength-
ening of network ties between industry and pharmaceutical companies. They
show that pharmaceutical research labs set up without industry collaborators
grew much less than those with industry collaborators in terms of the number
of R&D workers, the number of patents, and the size of the laboratory. The
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formation of these networks generated a structure in which sets of people and
practices from the market, state, and science interacted.
While rules, procedures, and routines were carefully designed to provide
a robust drug safety evaluation system, officials within the FDA increasingly
discussed the provision of drug efficacy that was left out of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetics Act of 1938. Through discussions about dosing of a drug, FDA
experts started to agree on the fact that the line between safety and efficacy was
very fine. Obviously, at a dose that is too high, virtually all drugs are unsafe.
This idea then led to the question of how much is needed for a drug to be effec-
tive? The main conclusions from these debates was that safety of a drug cannot
be studied without paying attention to efficacy considerations. Since the for-
mal mandate outlined in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938 allowed
the FDA to only to reject drugs on the basis of safety, the organization adopted
another strategy that would allow them to take efficacy into account when eval-
uating drugs. By means of a paper, published in 1944 and co-authored by Wal-
ton van Winkle, Robert Herwick, Herbert Calvery, and Austin Smith – the first
three who were FDA officials and the latter being the Secretary of the Council
on Pharmacy and Chemistry (AMA) – the FDA essentially notified manufactur-
ers of therapeutic substances that it would also take efficacy into account when
evaluating new drug applications (Van Winkle et al. 1944).
Towards the end of the 1950s, review practices at the FDA changed. Since
the approval of a drug by the FDA was increasingly seen by consumers as a
signal about safety – not the least because manufacturers used approval to con-
vince consumers of its quality – FDA officials started to internalize those ex-
pectations. In doing so, several changes were brought about. One of them was
the publication of the Form FD 356 in the Federal Register. This was the form
that manufacturers – seeking approval for their therapeutic substances – had
to fill out when submitting their application. Once the form was submitted, a
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case for a New Drug Application (NDA) was opened. While the FD 356 form
had been distributed before, it had never been made public. The effect of pub-
lishing the form was that expectations about what it was that the FDA could
provide were managed. A second major change in the review process was the
increased scrutiny by FDA reviewers. Whereas prior to 1955 the majority of
all drugs was approved within 3 months, in the early 1960 the approval time
increased to more than 18 months for the majority of the drugs submitted to
the FDA (Carpenter 2010). What gave the FDA the mandate to do so was the
fact that regulation was clear in its goal – drug safety – but was ambiguous and
broad enough for the FDA to exercise discretion in determining how compa-
nies were to comply with the regulation. One may argue that this discretion
allowed the FDA to develop new and innovative practices that could be used
to evaluate prescription drugs.
Despite the increased scrutiny during the drug evaluation process, the FDA
did not have the authority to regulate what happened before an NDA was
submitted. During the investigational stages of drug development companies
where not bounded in terms of the type of evidence that they produced. What
is more, increasingly accounts started to emerge claiming that pharmaceutical
firms were commercializing the clinical testing process. These firms would es-
sentially use the investigational stages of the drug approval process to let the
drug penetrate the market well beyond the legitimate set of clinical investiga-
tors10 (Carpenter 2010). Moreover, since the FDA had little to say about the
stages prior to NDA submission, very few studies included randomized ex-
periments. While randomized experiments had been proven in the statistical
literature to provide a superior design in causes where causal claims were to be
made (Peirce and Jastrow 1884), most evidence about drug safety that FDA re-
10Pharmaceutical firms would essentially give out the drug to physicians who would clinically
investigate the drug in a clinical trial. However, since regulation was so weak, the drug was often
given out to a large number of physicians.
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viewers had to base their evaluation on in the 1940s and 1950s, came in the form
of testimonials. Often, these testimonials were provided by physicians who
had received a batch of the drug under investigation and had – non-randomly
–prescribed the drug to the patient. Towards the end of the 1960, FDA review-
ers and officials increasingly started to raise their voice over the poor quality of
evidence presented to them in NDAs (Carpenter 2010).
2.3 The Thalidomide Episode, the Kefauver-Harris
Amendments, and the Birth of Modern Drug Reg-
ulation
By the end of the 1960s, senator Estes Kefauver from Tennessee, commenced a
series of congressional hearings that were intended to scrutinize drug pricing
and monopoly profits within the pharmaceutical industry. Kefauver had not
intended to touch upon other issues than pricing and profits, but inevitably the
discussions hit the topic of drug regulation and drug safety. What stood out in
the hearings was that drug regulation had changed substantially since 1938 and
that the system had many features in place that were not incorporated in laws
(Peltzman 1973). The hearings were one of the first highly publicized events
in which the fact that drug regulation practices had changed was receiving so
much attention (Carpenter 2010). One of the main changes discussed during
the hearings was the inclusion of efficacy as one of the criteria upon which
drugs were evaluated. Although the 1938 act mentioned only safety as the
criteria that could be used by the FDA to review NDAs, it was widely acknowl-
edged that efficacy was strongly entangled with safety and should therefore
take a prominent role in drug approval processes.
The Kefauver hearings also exposed the strong connections between the
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FDA and very well respected and high status academic pharmacologists. Phar-
macologists from Harvard, the University of Chicago, and Cornell testified in
the hearing and explicitly supported the FDA in its actions and behavior. Joel
Podolny (2001) describes a social network, and in particular the ties that ego has
to alters, as a prism through which ego can be evaluated. In this framework,
outsiders seeking to evaluate some characteristic of ego may use ego’s alters to
inform the evaluation. Moreover, some alters are likely to provide beter quality
information based on their status, credibility, or expertise. So while the FDA
would have probably benefited from positive evaluations from any testimony
during the Kefauver hearings, the positive evaluation of those with high sta-
tus can be argued to be even more beneficial to an agency who’s actions and
behaviors are under scrutiny.
During the Kefauver hearings, a tragic but pivotal episode unfolded at the
FDA. The story started when the William S. Merrell Company of Cincinatti,
Ohio submitted an NDA for a drug called Kevadon (generic name: thalido-
mide) in the first half of 1960. The FDA reviewer who was assigned to the case,
Frances Kelsey, had just joined the organization after having previously been
employed as a Professor of Pharmacology at the South Dakota State Univer-
sity (Kuehn 2010). Thalidomide was argued by Merrell to be a mild sleeping
pill that would effectively help pregnant women combat symptoms associated
with morning sickness. Thalidomide had already entered a number of Euro-
pean markets and Joseph Murray, Merrell’s scientific officer, hoped that Euro-
pean approval would make a strong case for fast approval for marketing on the
US market. Like the other NDA reviewers in her cohort, Kelsey’s work style
was one that was characterized by a scientific approach; questioning assump-
tions and claims and comparing results to prior results published in the medical
literature. She thoroughly scrutinized the statistics and research design of the
studies in the application, she consulted the medical literature in detail, and she
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was critical of any friction between the claims of the company and the results
of the studies (Stephens and Brynner 2009).
Kelsey’s first response letter is a good example of this careful scrutiny as
it questions nearly every claim and argument made by Merrell in its NDA.
What further reinforced Kelsey’s negative stance towards the NDA of Kevadon
was the response of Merrell officials. Some negative evidence was clearly and
purposefully withheld from the application and when Kelsey met with Mer-
rell officials early 1961 she “had the feeling throughout the day that they were
at no time being fully frank (...) and that this attitude has obtained in all (...)
conferences etc. regarding this drug.”11 The fact that the organizational prac-
tice of careful scrutiny was well accepted, legitimized, and widespread was
shown when Merrell officials refused further interaction with Kelsey and in-
stead approached higher FDA officials. Their response was perfectly in line
with Kelsey’s (Stephens and Brynner 2009; Carpenter 2010).
While the NDA for thalidomide was further delayed by the additional de-
mands that Kelsey forced upon Merrell, reports came in from European coun-
tries – and from Germany in particular – about the potential relationship be-
tween treatment with thalidomide and birth defects in children of mothers
treated during pregnancy (Stephens and Brynner 2009). Many of the babies of
mothers that had used thalidomide during pregnancy were born with deformi-
ties including missing or seriously deformed limbs. Current estimates suggest
that pregnant women in about 48 countries were treated with thalidomide, re-
sulting in the live births of more than 8,000 babies with deformities. Of the
babies exposed between days 35 and 48 after the last menstrual period, 20% to
30% had severe limb defects and other organ defects (Annas and Elias 1999). As
the evidence about the link between drugs and defects became stronger, Merrell
quietly withdrew the NDA for Kevadon in March 1962 (Carpenter 2010).
11nyti.ms/1ukFtYA.
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So while the Thalidomide episode was one of absolute tragedy for patients
worldwide, the episode had also revealed the strengths and weaknesses of drug
regulation systems worldwide. For example, Frances Kelsey’s critical stance
towards the NDA of Merrell and the fact that her behavior was in line with FDA
norms, rules, and practices caught widespread attention. Moreover, the fact
that the episode took place during the Kefauver hearings completely changed
the topic of the conversation. No longer were the hearings about pricing and
monopolies; the focus of the hearings was now drug regulation (Lasagna 1989).
In October 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments,
requiring companies to provide evidence of efficacy, in addition to safety, for
drug approval. Moreover, in 1963 an additional bill was passed that intro-
duced an Investigational New Drug (IND) license. This license was necessary
for pharmaceutical companies to start testing the safety and efficacy of a pre-
scription drug and it gave the FDA more authority over the pre-approval stage
of the therapeutic substance. For example, the IND amendment included the
provision that drugs should go through three stages of trials. In phase I trials
the drug is introduced in humans (only animal and in vitro studies are avail-
able) with the purpose of determining: human toxicity, metabolism, absorption,
elimination, preferred route of administration, and safe dosage range. In phase
II trials the number of patients is increased plus the methods, research design,
etc. are identified. Finally, in phase III subjects that have a certain disease or
condition are treated with the drug to evaluate its safety and efficacy. Pharma-
cologists were hired to conduct those trials, statisticians were hired to analyze
the data, and engineers were hired to provide the digital infrastructure to seam-
lessly connect the dots. More changes happened; pharmaceutical firms trying
to get their substance approved were no longer “manufacturers” but “spon-
sors” of drugs. They would only become manufacturers of medicines once the
FDA approved an NDA.
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While the thalidomide case can be seen as the episode that generated ur-
gency, virtually all of the newly adopted laws where proposed explicitly in
earlier years by FDA representatives. So the regulatory changes from 1962 and
1963 did not appear out of thin air; rather, the salience, boundaries, and juris-
diction that had been in place as fuzzy concepts for years, now became crystal-
lized.
With the 1962 and 1963 amendments in place, a new era of drug regulation
had arrived. Many of the formal structures that allowed the FDA to operate
as a regulator of the pre-approval process were laid out. This new and robust
structure also allowed stakeholders to further carve out the definitions of the
main concepts upon which their work was focused. For example, in the early
1960s there was still little consensus over the meaning of terms such as “new
drug”, “efficacy”, “adequate”, “well-controlled”, and “scientific training and
experience” (Carpenter 2010, p. 269). A simple plot (shown in Figure 2.2) of the
use in American English literature of three of the most salient terms is consis-
tent with the hypothesis that the new amendments had provided stakeholders
in the drug regulation debate with a platform to start a meaningful dialog.
In the years following the adoption of the new amendments the meaning
of these terms started to crystallize and it did so in interactions between a di-
versity of people and professions. For example, efficacy became understood as
a positive effect of treatment as shown in a Randomized Clinical Trial (RCT).
However, FDA officials recognized that in some instances RCTs were impos-
sible either because they were infeasible or ethically inappropriate and they
would turn to its experts to determine appropriate testing for the prescription
drug. In those cases the quality of the drug review was not so much captured
by the quality of the study but by the expertise and status of the people car-
rying out the drug review. As a result of the powerful position of the FDA, in
which FDA employees had the jurisdiction to carve out the details of pharma-
39
























Note: This plot is based on data from the Google ngram project and shows that the terms “drug
safety”, “drug efficacy”, and “placebo” started to emerge in the early 1960s in American litera-
ture. After a gradual increase up and until the 1990s, the use of the terms “drug safety” and
“placebo” have increased exponentially since the early 2000s. The use of the term “drug efficacy”
has increased steadily since the early 1960s. Data to replicate the plot can be downloaded from
bit.ly/1gfTzNG.
ceutical evaluation, scientific standards changed and in a way, the FDA shaped
the meaning of scientific expertise, it shaped hiring practices at major phar-
maceutical companies, and it shaped the curricula of prominent medical and
pharmacology departments.
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In sum, the adoption of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act in 1938 marked
a big step in extending jurisdiction and in removing ambiguity about bound-
aries of expertise. The FDA slowly started to change from an organization with
limited jurisdiction to police drugs that were sold on the U.S market to an or-
ganization with directive authority. By forming ties to other groups and orga-
nizations that provided them with political robustness, the FDA was successful
in generating legitimacy for its cause. At the same time, the FDA formed ties
with scientific pharmacological experts from prominent universities. Through
these ties, the FDA slowly and informally diffused its expectations regarding
the quality and quantity of evidence needed to get an NDA approved. Those
organically grown sets of expectations, behaviors, and interactions crystallized
during the Kefauver hearings. The fact that the thalidomide episode coincided
with those hearings allowed the FDA to formalize some of the innovations that
had been developed and a new era of modern regulation had arrived. Although
some changes in the regulatory process have happened in the 70s, 80s, and
90s, none of those changes were nearly as drastic as the amendments that had
passed in the early 1960s.
2.4 The Science of Post-Approval Regulation
Amidst all the changes in the regulation of pre-approval practices, a discrep-
ancy was borne between the pre- and post-approval regulatory expertise and
behavior of the FDA. The FDA had been very successful in expanding its exper-
tise and jurisdiction to gain control over the pre-approval evidence production
system, yet it also failed to develop a coherent set of practices to continue to
evaluate drugs once they hit the market (Ray et al. 2003; Psaty and Burke 2006).
The introduction of this dissertation provided a set of possible explanations
for why the main focus of regulatory expertise shifted to the early stages in a
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drug’s life-cycle. However, regardless of its cause, the salient consequence is
that an increasingly complex post-approval evidence production system needs
to be monitored and interpreted with a limited set of tools.
The production of post-approval evidence is essentially accounted for by
two sources. The first source comprises the patients who are treated with a drug
and the physicians who prescribe a drug. If patients or physicians think that
a drug has been responsible for an ADR they can report the event to the FDA.
The decision to report is entirely voluntary; neither physicians, nor patients are
obliged to report an ADR. The FDA has developed a system called the Adverse
Event Reporting System (AERS) to collect those reports and it uses the reports
filed in the system to detect unsafe drugs. The second source that generates
evidence and evaluations about the safety of prescription drugs is the medical
literature. Each year thousands of research papers are published that study the
relationship between a drug and some safety aspect of that drug and the results
of those studies are used by the FDA to guide its post-marketing regulatory
behavior.
There are two main reasons why the evidence produced after the approval
of a prescription drug introduces complexity that the regulator has to under-
stand and account for when making interpretations. First, the evidence that
is produced after approval of a prescription drug is massive. Each day the
FDA receives more than 2,000 reports of ADRs that are submitted to the AERS.
Moreover, the rate at which academics publish on the safety of the 1,500+ drugs
that are available on the U.S. market is staggering too. For some drugs, more
than 15,000 publications have been published in academic journals and assess-
ing and interpreting the differences between large number of scientific claims
about drug safety is a daunting task. Second, whereas prior to approval the
FDA has to interpret the claims of one actor whose behavior can – to a certain
extent – be directed and disciplined and who is incentivized to comply with
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FDA requests, the post-approval setting is characterized by a much larger set
of constituents over which the FDA has much less control. Moreover, these con-
stituents produce a much greater variety of evidence that builds on a diverse set
of beliefs, methods, and theories. Not only does this introduce uncertainty for
the regulator but it also introduces uncertainty for those who produce evidence,
especially when claims about safety are build on prior claims about safety.
To deal with this complex and uncertain context, the medical profession has
introduced a set of heuristics aimed at providing guidance for action in the
healthcare domain. For example, the emergence of “evidence-based-medicine”
(EBM) has brought about a series of standards that are used to evaluate medical
evidence. Evidence-based-medicine has been defined as “the conscientious,
explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about
the care of individual patients” (Sackett 2005, p. 1) and it has been a dominant
force in guiding healthcare practices over the past decades (Timmermans and
Berg 2003; Timmermans and Mauck 2005). EBM also has had its impact on
how evidence about drug safety should be judged. For example, a highly cited
article in the British Journal of Medicine (Harbour and Miller 2001) proposed a
ranking of the quality of the types of evidence that should serve as a guideline
when evaluating the validity of the evidence. This ranking – which is shown
in Table 2.1 – is intended as a guideline for the evaluation of post-approval
evidence. The ranking shows that the more control is exerted on the design of
the study the higher the validity of the claim that is advanced.12
This ranking also makes explicit some of the complexities and uncertain-
ties associated with evidence of a certain type. For example, there are several
reasons why case reports are placed at the bottom of the hierarchy. First, it is
12While EBM has gained tremendous support throughout the world, it remains contested by
many (Timmermans and Mauck 2005). Timmermans and Mauck (2005) explain the support and
contestation of EBM using the sociology of professions (Abbott 1988). Supporters of EBM, on the
one hand, argue that the legitimacy of a profession is eroded if there are high levels of variation
within the practices that define the profession. Critics of EBM, on the other hand, claim that large
scale adoption of guidelines undermines the expertise of healthcare providers.
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Table 2.1: The evidence hierarchy
Level Criteria
1++ High-quality meta-analyses, systematic reviews of RCTs, or RCTs
with a very low risk of bias
1+ Well conducted meta-analyses, systematic reviews of RCTs, or
RCTs with a low risk of bias
1- Meta-analyses, systematic reviews of RCTs, or RCTs with a high
risk of bias
2++ High-quality systematic reviews of case-control studies or cohort
studies; or high-quality case-control or cohort studies with a very
low risk of confounding, bias, or chance
2+ Well conducted case-control or cohort studies with a low risk of
confounding, bias, or chance
2- Case-control or cohort studies with a high risk of confounding,
bias, or chance
3 Non-analytic studies (e.g. case report, case studies)
4 Expert opinion
Note: This table first appeared in Harbour and Miller (2001). It classifies different types of evidence
based on the method by which that evidence is produced and then ranks them according to the
amount of control that the researcher had on the design of the study.
difficult to identify a causal relation between taking a drug and experiencing
an ADR. Drugs are not administered randomly, they are not administered in
a controlled environment, and the number of cases to which a physician pre-
scribes a drug is typically too low to generate a precise estimate of an effect.
Second, not all patients and physicians recognize an ADR as being the result of
treatment with a specific drug.13 Moreover, even if patients or physicians are
able to identify a cause-and-effect relation, few of them file a report of the ADR
with the FDA (Inman 1985).
What the evidence hierarchy shown in Table 2.1 does not account for are
the relationships between the claims in a body of evidence. Sociologists have
13Despite these shortcomings, AERS contains a valuable collection of evidence. One of its
strengths is its size; each day thousands of reports are filed into the system and since 1997 more
than 4 million reports have been filed. A second big advantage of AERS over RCTs is that they
contain evidence about the treatment with prescription drugs outside a controlled setting. AERS
contains a large variety of patients – each of which is exposed to a drug under different conditions.
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demonstrated (Gould 2002; Podolny 1994; Salganik et al. 2006; Shwed and Bear-
man 2010) that when social actors evaluate objects, people, or phenomena, they
do so by using relational cues. Especially when uncertainty is high individuals
are argued to increasingly rely on those relational cues to form their opinion
and guide their judgment. As I have made clear in the introduction, the argu-
ment advanced in this dissertation is that by identifying those structures that
inform the evaluations made by individuals, uncertainty in a body of evidence
can be reduced and meaning can be derived from a body of evidence. In the fol-
lowing chapters, I will identify some of the social and cognitive structures that
guide evidence production and I will show how they are instrumental in guid-
ing the evidence that is produced about the safety and efficacy of prescription
drugs.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has explored the emergence of the laws, rules, practices, and stan-
dards that have allowed the drug regulation systems in the U.S. to become a
state-of-the-art bureaucracy. In particular, the FDA and the web of stakeholders
with which it interacts have transformed from a loosely coupled system char-
acterized by ambiguity in interaction to a tightly coupled, highly structured
system. The ultimate goal of developing this system is and has been to define
what a safe and effective drug looks like and how one should go about in terms
of making a drug accessible to the American public. Yet, while this system has
proven to be successful in defining safe drugs before they hit the market, that
same system has been less successful in rapidly identifying potential errors ex-
post. Generating an understanding of why it is so difficult to be a powerful
regulator in the post-approval context and why it sometimes takes a long time
before drugs are taken off of the market is at the core of this dissertation.
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This chapter has also argued that evidence about the safety of prescription
drugs is created at the intersection of multiple social groups including patients,
regulators, physicians, scientists, etc. The evidence about safety, advanced by
these groups, varies in content and the content of this evidence also varies
within actors over time. I have argued that, in order to make sense of the evi-
dence produced by the stakeholders in the drug safety debate, making evalu-
ations is and inherently social process and that we need to better understand
how evaluations are made. Since the comprehension of medical evidence is
often assumed to require deep medical knowledge, few social scientists have
immersed themselves into a field. However, I will show in the following chap-
ters that social scientists can develop methods and propose designs, such as
those developed by Shwed and Bearman (2010), that allows one to evaluate
evidence without a need for the context specific knowledge.
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Chapter 3
Cognitive Structures and the
Effect of Events on the
Reporting of Adverse Drug
Reactions
This chapter develops and tests a theory that can account for the lengthy
market presence of unsafe drugs. The analyses are based on one of the pri-
mary data sources used to identify drugs as unsafe – the set of complaints
about drugs filed by patients and physicians. The main argument devel-
oped in this chapter holds that reporting behavior is guided by the cog-
nitive structure in which the drug implied in the complaint is embedded.
This structure stems from similarity in the health condition that a drug
treats and is invoked when new information about the safety of drugs is
released. The fact that physician behavior is guided by this structure while
patient behavior is not and the fact that this structure is temporarily in-
voked are sources of ambiguity for the regulator, responsible for monitoring
drug safety. The findings in this chapter suggest that an understanding of
how and when patients and physicians attribute an effect to a cause may
reduce the lengthy market presence of unsafe drugs.
3.1 Introduction
The average drug that has been withdrawn from the U.S. market as a result of
serious safety problems has been on the market for more than 10 years, while
the median drug that was withdrawn is more than 6 years old. How is it pos-
sible that drugs, killing and injuring many people, are on the market for years
without the problem being detected earlier? This chapter takes up that ques-
tion and points to ambiguity in the data that the FDA uses to detect safety
problems. The argument developed in this chapter holds that a social theory
of how this data is generated is needed to understand why regulatory action is
slow to materialize.
The primary data used by the FDA to detect unsafe drugs are the complaints
that it receives from patients and physicians about an adverse health effect1 that
they have experienced and that they attribute to a prescription drug. The FDA
monitors this data to detect drugs that are linked to ADRs in disproportionately
high numbers.
While the set of complaints of patients and physicians is one of the richest
resources for studying drug safety2, it comes with several drawbacks. First,
the data is known to be plagued by high levels of underreporting (Martin et al.
1Throughout this dissertation I will use the term Adverse Drug Reaction (ADR) for all instances
in which an actor claims that a drug has caused a negative effect on one’s health. The term “adverse
health effect” is used to describe the case in which drugs are not (yet) seen as the cause of the
negative effect on one’s health.
2The data have been used in hundreds of scientific studies and it is the primary resource used
by the FDA to detect unsafe drugs (Wysowski and Swartz 2005).
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1998). Several studies suggest that only 5% of all ADRs are reported and that
this percentage is likely to vary by drug and over time.3 A second major prob-
lem is the potential of misattribution. Patients and physicians who report a
complaint think that a given drug caused an ADR, but it is difficult to estab-
lish that the causal relation truly exists. Patients often take multiple drugs, and
the lack of formal training in pharmacology for both patients and physicians
makes it difficult for them to identify the true cause (Tavory and Timmermans
2013). Finally, every drug causes ADRs and there is no commonly agreed upon
threshold for the number or the severity of ADRs that is considered acceptable.
The FDA has the discretion to move from case to case to decide beyond which
level a drug is considered to be unsafe. These three drawbacks are further ac-
centuated by the fact that the number of patients that takes a given drug is often
unknown. Although drugs are sold through licensed pharmacies, there is no
centralized system that records the number of patients to which a drug is sold
and in which quantities.
The drawbacks of the data, joined with the absence of information on the
population exposed to the drug, create high levels of ambiguity when identify-
ing patterns from complaint reports and when formulating subsequent regula-
tory action. In this chapter I will show that the crux in interpreting dispropor-
tionality in complaint data is to distinguish between disproportionality caused
by an increase in the number of ADRs for a given drug and disproportionality
caused by an increase in the number of complaints filed for a given drug and for a
fixed number of ADRs.
I will do so by showing that through the identification of the social process
by which patients and physicians report their complaints, ambiguity in the in-
terpretation of the data can be reduced. In particular, I develop and test a theory
3Obviously, if this 5% was accurate for each drug, and stable over time, one could simply infer
the true population of ADRs for each drug. Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing when and
for which drugs this 5% rule holds.
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about how and when patients and physicians attribute an adverse experience
to a prescription drug.
For the analyses in this chapter I identify 12 events – the recalls of 12 pre-
scription drugs – and I observe how patients and physicians respond in terms
of their reporting behavior to the new information about drug safety that the
recall reveals. In developing hypotheses about the behavior of patients and
physicians following the recall of a prescription drug, this chapter builds on
research on the sociology of cognition and social psychology which shows that
individuals use cognitive schemata to make sense of their experiences (DiMag-
gio 1997; Cerulo 2010; Negro et al. 2010). These schemata are knowledge struc-
tures that represent objects or events and the relations between these objects
or events. I contribute to this literature by showing how the effects of a recall
spread beyond the drug implied in the recall and by accounting for the dif-
ferences between patients and physicians in terms of the schemata that guide
their behavior. Informed by research on medical sociology I operationalize the
schema that guides the attribution process as a network of drugs structured by
disease categories (Rees 2011).
The results from my analyses show that immediately following the recall of
a prescription drug, a sharp increase can be detected in the number of reports
that are filed for the drug implied in the communication of the recall, as well
as for a set of drugs that treat the same disease. This increase in the number
of reports comes from patients and physicians who would not have reported,
had the recall of the focal drug not been communicated. Moreover, the findings
indicate that the second pattern, an increase of complaints filed for drugs that
treat the same disease, is only found for physicians. Based on the differences
in the attribution patterns observed for patients versus physicians, this chapter
shows that audiences can be partitioned based on the cognitive schemata to
which they are tied. Finally, I examine the time it takes for the FDA to take
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regulatory action after a signal has been detected. In particular, I estimate the
size of this lag and compare the lag in periods where a recall had taken place
to the lag in periods where no recall had taken place. Preliminary findings
show that the lag is larger in the period where the recall had taken place. These
results are consistent with the argument that recalls produce noise in reporting
which delays the evidence interpretation process at the FDA.
The stakes of detecting safety issues earlier are high. Every day, the FDA re-
ceives more than 2,000 reports from patients and physicians about the adverse
effects of prescription drugs. And estimates suggest that these 2,000 complaints
represent only 5% of all ADRs. Moreover, the problem of high levels of ADRs
extends beyond the patient: Costs of ADRs for national health care systems are
tremendous (Rodriguez-Monguio et al. 2003), physicians that fail to identify
them become uncertain about their expertise (Wears and Wu 2002), sponsors of
drugs associated with disproportionately high numbers of ADRs may be held
responsible, potentially leading to severe financial consequences (Sarkar and
de Jong 2006), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may suffer se-
rious reputational damage when a drug that was approved is found to cause
large numbers of ADRs (Carpenter 2010).
By identifying the social process of attributing an effect to a cause, this chap-
ter shows how noise in a set of data points can be transformed into a predictable
pattern. In doing so, it reduces ambiguity when interpreting signals contained
in the reports of complaints filed by patients and physicians. This problem of
making sense of data that is voluntarily contributed and that is based on in-
terpretations of an object or event is very general (Langley 1999). Examples
include data used for the early detection of food-borne illnesses4 or technical
defects in cars5. Besides its substantive contribution, this chapter contributes to
4See for example bit.ly/1uJOZjV.
5See for example nyti.ms/1qCq43B.
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the literature on cognitive sociology and organization theory by showing how
cognitive schemata guide evaluation processes and how audiences can be par-
titioned based on the schemata that they use. While this literature provides
many examples of how variation in evaluations can be explained by character-
istics of those who are evaluated, relatively little is know about the audience
that provides the evaluations. This chapter addresses that issue.
In section 2, I describe the context of post-approval evidence production
in further detail and I explain why accounting for the social conditions under
which patients and physicians report their complaints is important. In section
3, I introduce and develop a theoretical framework that provides guidance in
the understanding of ADR reporting patterns and in section 4 I develop and
state the hypotheses tested in this chapter. In section 5, I provide a rationale
for the analyses conducted in the chapter. Section 6 to 8 present the data, the
empirical strategy, and the results respectively. In Section 9, I summarize and
discuss the findings.
3.1.1 Post-Approval Learning About Safety and Regulating Pre-
scription Drugs
In order to assess whether a prescription drug is safe, it goes through many
rounds of evaluation. The first rounds of evaluation are comprised of a series
of clinical trials conducted by the sponsor of the drug. If these trials indicate
that the drug is an effective and safe treatment for the disease it is developed
for, the drug is likely to be approved by the FDA and admitted access to the
market.
Once a drug is admitted to the market, physicians start prescribing the drug
and patients start using the drug. The conditions under which patients are
treated with a drug in the pre-marketing stage are radically different from the
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conditions in the post-marketing stage. First, heterogeneity among patients
exposed to a given drug in the post-approval stage is much higher than hetero-
geneity among patients in the clinical trial stages of drug development (Epstein
2007; Timmermans and Epstein 2010). As a result, the newly approved chem-
ical compound is released on a much more diverse set of biomedical human
bodies and it is likely that some of these new combinations of chemicals on the
one side and human bodies on the other will result in ADRs. Although various
public health advocacy groups have successfully lobbied for increasing hetero-
geneity in sex, race, ethnicity, and age among subjects in biomedical research
(Epstein 2007), including the full range of heterogeneity among human bodies
in clinical trials is financially and practically infeasible. A second complication
that is typically not accounted for in a clinical trial is the concomitant use of
prescription drugs. In order to increase the treatment efficiency or to treat dis-
eases occurring simultaneously, drugs are prescribed concomitantly and often
the chemical interaction between the multiple drugs has not been studied in a
clinical trial. Evidence suggests that the negative consequences of these inter-
actions are substantial and some estimates suggest that they account for about
30% of all ADRs (Tatonetti, Fernald, and Altman 2012). Finally, clinical trials
are conducted under controlled conditions. For example, food, temperature,
physical exercise, and use of the medicine are controlled by the medical staff.
This controlled environment allows researchers to isolate mechanism of action,
but it fails to account for interactions between the drug and external conditions.
These three differences make it virtually impossible to detect or identify all po-
tential ADRs before a drug is released on the market. Therefore, the FDA aims
at the early detection of post-marketing signals that indicate a relation between
a drug and an ADR.
Given the fact that virtually all drugs cause ADRs once they are released
on the market (Lazarou and Pomeranz 1998; Pirmohamed et al. 2004), the FDA
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aims to intervene whenever drugs become associated with disproportionately
high numbers of ADRs. The FDA uses various strategies to minimize the likeli-
hood that drugs will seriously compromise public health. One of the most often
used strategies is the request for a label change. In such cases, the FDA finds
that there is enough evidence to warrant a change in the label of the drug that
indicates a new side effect of the drug or that provides further detail to a side
effect that is yet known. A far more serious regulatory tool is the request for a
Boxed Warning. This tool also involves a label change but rather than adding
or adjusting some text on a multi-page label, the Boxed Warning appears at
the beginning of the label and is accentuated by a black box. This regulatory
tool is reserved for cases in which the drug, under certain conditions, can cause
ADRs that are a fatal, life-threatening, or permanently disabling (Murphy and
Roberts 2006). In some cases, the Boxed Warning is directed at specific demo-
graphic characteristics of the patient and does therefore exclude that patient
from treatment with the drug. Finally, the most severe regulatory action that
the FDA can take is the withdrawal of a prescription drug. In such cases, the
FDA decides – together with the drug sponsor – to take the drug of the market
indefinitely. These most severe interventions (Boxed Warnings and drug with-
drawals) pose a challenge for the FDA; each regulatory action should be aimed
at minimizing the risk of ADRs without denying access to the drug for patients
that benefit from it (Eichler et al. 2013). Despite the large numbers of ADRs,
there is ample evidence that the FDA is a strong regulator and that their actions
benefit public health tremendously (Carpenter 2010).
The primary source of evidence that the FDA uses to detect unsafe drugs
after approval is the Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS). This system is
maintained by the FDA and allows patients and physicians to file their com-
plaints about prescription drugs directly or via the manufacturer of the drug
who is then obliged to submit the information to the FDA. As mentioned ear-
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lier, while the data in AERS is a valuable resource for detecting safety problems
with prescription drugs, it suffers from underreporting, misattribution, and an
undefined baseline of acceptable ADRs. Recent years have been characterized
by efforts of the FDA to increase the quality of the data by increasing aware-
ness and ease of reporting and by providing clear guidelines of what and when
patients and physicians should report (McClellan 2007). But while these ef-
forts are likely to have improved the quality of the data in AERS, they have not
eliminated its problems.
To understand why the drawbacks in AERS are such a problem for the reg-
ulator using the complaints from patients and physicians to identify unsafe
drugs, I will briefly review how the FDA uses the data in AERS to detect sig-
nals.6 The FDA monitors complaint data to detect disproportionality in the
occurrence of a given drug-ADR pair vis-a-vis all other drug-ADR pairs. They
do so through a case/non-case methodology. In a case/non-case approach the
population of reports is split into two samples; one that contains all reports that
name drug i as the potential cause of an ADR (cases) and one that contains the
complement of the reports that name drug i (non-cases). These two subsets can
then be further partitioned into the reports that report ADR a – for example
arrhythmia – and the reports that report all other ADRs – all ADRs but arrhyth-
mia. They then employ various statistical methods to compute the proportion-
ality of the occurrence of an ADR in those being treated with drug i and the
occurrence of that same ADR in those treated with other drugs. If the number
of reports for a focal drug increases disproportionately relative to the number
of reports for other drugs, the FDA “detects a signal”. The assumption is that
this increase in the number of reports for a focal drug relative to the number
of reports for other drugs is an indication that the focal drug might be unsafe.
6Appendix A in this chapter contains a more detailed description of the methods used by the
FDA to detect unsafe drugs from data in AERS.
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This chapter shows that this assumption does not always hold. The argument
advanced in this chapter is that the social process by which patients and physi-
cians are induced to report into AERS may both cause true safety problems to
be masked and “socially constructed” signals to be detected. The next section
further develops this argument by theorizing the processes through which pa-
tients and physicians identify the cause of an effect.
3.1.2 Sense Making, Relational Structures, and Heterogeneity
within Audiences
Despite the importance of understanding the data used to detect these unsafe
drugs, very little research has been done on the process by which patients and
physicians decide to file a complaint about a prescription drug. The fact that
AERS is characterized by high levels of underreporting makes this process es-
pecially salient. If each ADR that ever occurred could be perfectly identified
and if reporting of ADRs was mandatory, one would not need to theorize about
the social factors through which the data was shaped. However, the drawbacks
of the data leave ample room for social processes to work their way in to the
data. Research on other domains of the health care practice has identified a
battery of social factors that predict increased participation. For example, the
use of medical services and the beliefs held about illness and disease has been
shown to be predicted by ethnicity, race, and gender (Jenkins 1966; Suchman
1964; Landrine and Klonoff 1992). This chapter further builds on those ideas
and it stresses the salience of understanding the process by which patients and
physicians end up contributing a complaint to the data.
One of the factors that can account for underreporting is the failure to rec-
ognize an adverse health effect as an ADR. Medical research suggests that both
patients and physicians are often unable to identify an adverse health effect as
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an ADR (Tegeder et al. 1999). Literature in social psychology offers a theoreti-
cal framework that helps us understand how patients and physicians transition
from failing to recognize an ADR to attributing an adverse health effect to a pre-
scription drug. In trying to understand how people make causal explanations,
social psychologists have theorized and tested processes of attribution (Kelley
1973; McArthur 1972). In particular, this literature aims to understand which
information individuals use to answer causal questions and how they trans-
form information to a causal interpretation. Three classes of potential causes
are typically identified: persons, entities, and times (Kelley 1973). To illustrate
how these three classes may be used to understand the process of attributing
adverse health effects to a prescription drug, it is important to stress the scope
conditions under which patients and physicians make their causal interpreta-
tions. A first important condition is that patients who take prescription drugs
are ill in the first place and are therefore likely to experience adverse health ef-
fects that are caused by the illness rather than by the prescription drug. A second
scope condition that is important for the interpretation of adverse health effects
is that when a prescription drug is approved by the FDA, it has been shown
by experts that the drug is safe and effective (Gieryn 1999; Temple and Himmel
2002).
Given these two conditions, the most common scenario in which patients or
physicians make sense of adverse health effects involves a patient who is ad-
ministered a prescription drug and experiences an adverse health effect. Based
on research in other contexts, social psychologists (McArthur 1972) suggest that
if the patient takes a prescription drug and experiences an adverse health ef-
fect, he or she is unlikely to attribute the effect to the prescription drug. Since
the drug was argued to be safe by credible experts and since the patient was
ill in the first place, it is unlikely that the adverse health effect is caused by
the drug. The adverse health effect is much more likely to be caused either
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by some characteristic that is particular to the patient or by the temporal con-
text or circumstances in which the effect was experienced. However, Kelley’s
work (Kelley 1973) suggests that this line of reasoning changes if the patient
gets exposed to other patients who have taken the same drug and experienced
the same adverse health effect. Such an exposure may happen either through
social interaction or through a broadcast event that reveals that more patients
taking the drug have experienced the health effect. A similar line of reasoning
applies to the interpretation made by the physician. Physicians may observe
more than one case in which a patient is administered a drug and experiences
an adverse health effect and it is not unlikely that the co-occurrence of multi-
ple adverse health effects within the same medical practice causes physicians
to report into AERS. However, the increased likelihood of observing multiple
similar cases only increases the baseline rate at which physicians are expected
to make causal claims. It does not eliminate the effect that a broadcast event
may have on the attribution of adverse health effects to a prescription drug.
Given the fact that patients and physicians are likely to attribute an effect
to an external entity if they are exposed to others who link the same effect to
the same external entity, highly publicized broadcasts about drug safety may
induce patients and physicians to report an ADR. The scenario laid out in the
previous paragraph suggests that such a broadcast may even cause individ-
uals to revisit past experiences and make sense of them using the new infor-
mation that highly publicized events reveal. Literature outside the realm of
medical science also theorizes about how the release of new information may
affect one’s evaluations of an organization, person, or phenomenon. For exam-
ple, recent research shows how evaluations of an organization or product are
altered when negative information on the organization or product are publi-
cized (Roehm and Tybout 2006; Jonsson et al. 2009). Audiences, comprised of
consumers or other exchange partners, use the new information to review the
58
status, quality, or morality of the target of the new information and they adjust
their behavior accordingly. Using similar arguments, Adut (2005) shows that
even if the newly released information is not new – but only brings publicity to
commonly held beliefs – repercussions for the target of the negative exposure
may be severe.
This same line of research has shown that newly released information does
not only have an effect on the interpretation of the object or person targeted in
the information but also on others. For example research on stigma has pro-
vided detailed descriptions on how stigma’s associated negative consequences
spread through an entire population even when only a handful of targets are
directly stigmatized (Goffman 1986; Pontikes, Negro, and Rao 2010). Various
modes through which negative consequences – associated with a given stigma,
identity, or status – may spread have been proposed. Pontikes et al. (2010) show
that stigma resulting from adherence to communist ideology was readily trans-
mitted through casual professional associations. Other research has shown that
individuals, organizations, or objects belonging to the same category as the tar-
get of negative information are likely to experience repercussions. For example,
Legewie (2013) shows that attitudes towards immigrants are influenced by ter-
rorist attacks attributed to a group that identifies itself as an Islamist group. The
mechanism responsible for creating and enhancing anti-immigrant sentiments
following such an event involves making associations between the main actor
in the event and immigrants that bear no responsibility for the event. Thus,
observers extract certain critical and meaningful pieces of information from the
behavior of a single social actor and internalize them followed by a (temporal)
revision of their attitudes and perhaps behavior with regards to a large group of
other social actors. Another example is provided by Roehm and Tybout (2006)
in their research on scandals that argues that scandals are – under certain con-
ditions – likely to spill over. In their work, the authors hypothesize about the
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typicality of the target of a scandal for the category that it belongs to. Findings
indicate that negative externalities are more likely to spill over when the tar-
get of the scandal is typical of the category. Conversely, they argue that when
the evaluators of the object are primed to differentiate between two or multiple
objects, the contagion effect will be limited.
Despite the fact that the literature on how evaluations spread typically uses
these evaluations as dependent variables, little is know about those who con-
tribute evaluations and the heterogeneity among these individuals. Recently,
Kocak et al. (2014) have argued that audience members – those who observe
and make evaluations – vary in the heuristics that they employ. Audience mem-
bers hold different sets of prior beliefs, they differ in their vested interests, and
they vary in the level of expertise that they have about the object or organi-
zation that is to be evaluated. Kocak et al. (2014) argue that the heterogeneity
among audience members affects how consensus about the meaning of an ob-
ject, person, or organization is formed and how this consensus is spread among
a wider audience. By making this distinction the authors raise the salient idea
that the outcomes of evaluation processes depend on heterogeneity among au-
dience members. This chapter further builds on the idea about heterogeneity
among audience members. It argues that heterogeneity in expertise is associ-
ated with the ability to generalize from a single case to a more extensive domain
of evaluation. This research builds on the idea that heterogeneity in the formal
expertise of audience members creates variation in the way in which the out-
comes of events may spread. The next section further translates these ideas to
hypotheses and it links theory on attribution, evaluation, and categorization to
the case of drug safety.
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The Release of New Information and the Spread of Increased
Reporting
The hypotheses tested in this chapter are concerned with questions of how pa-
tients and physicians attribute an effect to a cause, what the extent of this attri-
bution pattern is, and how this attribution pattern becomes clustered in time.
To understand why the temporal and categorical clustering of attribution pat-
terns is important, I first show some of the complaint data that the FDA has
had to analyze and I explain the main challenges. After that, I will bring the
literature on attribution, categories, and contagion together with the empirical
case at hand and I will briefly discuss the hypotheses that will be tested in the
remainder of the chapter.
Figure 3.1 shows four episodes – one for each of four prescription drugs –
characterized by a rapid increase in the reports filed for a specific drug. Episodes
like these are what FDA researchers look for when conduction signal detection
studies (Poluzzi et al. 2012). These data come from the Adverse Event Report-
ing System (AERS) and each panel shows the times series data for one specific
drug. The main question that the data plotted in each of these four panels gives
rise to is whether the relative increase in the number of reports is caused by an
increase in the number of ADRs or by an increase in the number of reports for
a given drug.7 This chapter suggests that an understanding of the social pro-
cess by which effects are attributed to causes allows one to distinguish between
these two explanations.
The research in social psychology on causal attribution would predict that
the release of and exposure to new information that indicates that other patients
have also experienced an ADR after taking a specific drug should induce pa-
tients and physicians to revisit past experiences and revise their attribution of
7Please note that in this second case, the number of ADRs that occurs remains unchanged.
61



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: This graph plots the temporal changes in the number of reports that list a specific drug as the
primary suspect of an adverse event. The y-axis represents the percentage of total reports per day
that indicate the specific drug as primary suspect and the x-axis represents time, measured by day.
Orlistat is a drug that treats obesity, Heparin aims to prevent the clotting of blood, Cerivastatin
is prescribed to lower cholesterol and prevent cardiovascular disease, and Levonorgestrel is an
emergency contraceptive pill.
an effect to a cause. Moreover, there are at least two other pathways that should
induce patients and physicians who would otherwise not have reported to re-
port. First, the release of new information about the safety of a prescription
drug makes patients and physicians aware of the possibility to report ADRs to
the FDA. As mentioned before, many patients and physicians are not aware of
the existence of AERS and many potential reports do therefore never material-
ize. The second pathway leading to increased reporting builds on the idea that
the fact that others have expressed that a drug has caused an ADR should serve
as a legitimation device. If patients and physicians were aware of the potential
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causal link between drug and ADR and the option to report to into AERS, but
felt that their report was not warranted, the official statement by the FDA may
have legitimized their claim. In this chapter, I will use the recall of a prescrip-
tion drug as the event that reveals new information about drug safety. A recall
is the most severe tool in the regulator’s toolkit and recalls are often widely
publicized.8 I test the following hypothesis:
H1: The communication about a recall of drug i will cause patients and physi-
cians who would otherwise not have reported to report complaints for drug
i.
Although a recall of a prescription drug targets only one drug, it is not un-
likely that its effects will extend beyond the drug implied in the recall. As
suggested by research on stigma, audiences often use social ties or categorical
similarity between the target of negative attention and other non-targets as the
structure by which inferences about quality, status, or identity can be made.
For prescription drugs, one of those structures is the similarity in the disease(s)
that two prescription drugs treat. Timmermans and Buchbinder (2012) demon-
strate the salience of disease categories in their analysis of newborn screening.
They argue that diseases are prominent categories along which understanding
of conditions and treatments is shaped. Moreover, in communicating a recall
the FDA consistently mentions the disease that the recalled drug is approved
for. In doing so, the FDA focuses attention to the disease category to which the
drug belongs.
Although I expect the increase in the number of reports for drugs that treat
8A recall is unlikely to be the only source that is expected to cause temporal variation in re-
porting. Other events, such as widely publicized academic research, may also force patients and
physicians to re-evaluate prior experiences. Moreover, some social behavior may cause the the
incidence of certain ADRs to go up. For example, David et al. (2010) find that post-marketing
promotional activity may involve the risk of inappropriate drug prescriptions, leading to regula-
tory actions against the firm. They provide some evidence that increased levels of promotion and
advertising lead to increased reporting of ADRs for certain conditions.
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the same disease to be much smaller than the increase in the number of reports
for the drug that is recalled, similar micro processes may underlie the increase.
The fact that a drug that is used to treat the same disease has been shown to
be unsafe may cause some to use this information and revisit the prior causal
interpretation of an experience. This is especially true if the type of ADR that
is caused by the recalled drug is similar to the ADR that is caused by the drug
that treats the same disease. Along similar lines, the legitimation effect may
also extend to drugs that treat the same disease. Mere association to the recalled
drug in terms of disease similarity, plus the fact that the disease is mentioned in
the communication about the recall may result in the legitimation of potential
complaints. Finally, it is unlikely that the awareness effect can account for the
relative increase in the number of reports filed for drugs that treat the same
disease. Although awareness may certainly cause an increase in the absolute
number of complaints filed for drugs that treat the same disease, awareness will
simultaneously increase the absolute number of complaints filed for all other
drugs, thereby keeping the ratio stable. To examine the extent to which the
meaning of newly released information is extended beyond its original context,
I test the following hypothesis:
H2: The communication about a recall of drug i will cause patients and physi-
cians who would otherwise not have reported to report complaints for drug j if
and only if drug j treats the same disease as drug i.
Although making a connection between two drugs that treat the same dis-
ease may seem straightforward, research on the “health literacy” of patients
suggests that this is not per se the case. Research has shown that despite the
large volume of freely available information about diseases, drugs, and other
health related topics, a large number of patients suffers from “health illiteracy”
(Berkman et al. 2011). Broadly speaking, “health literacy” refers to the set of
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skills that people need to understand and navigate the health care environment.
Examples of skills include the ability to read and understand patient labels of
prescription drugs (print literacy); interpret quantitative information contained
of drug or food labels (numeracy); and effective communication about health
topics with health care providers (oral literacy) (Berkman et al. 2011). Health
illiteracy may cause the effect of a recall in the reporting ratios of drugs that
treat the same disease to be stronger for physicians than for patients. Other
findings in the medical scientific literature suggest that physicians are primed
to reason based on disease classifications. For example, Barabasi et al. (2011)
argues that while physicians lack the proper training to understand the chem-
ical dependencies of drugs, their formal training and clinical experience pro-
vides effective guidance in navigating dependencies between diseases. To test
the effect of differences in the use of cognitive schemata between patients and
physicians, I propose the following hypothesis:
H3: The contagion effect will be stronger for physicians than for patients.
The empirical strategy employed in this chapter aims to allow for a causal
interpretation of the observed effects. I therefore briefly review some of the
potential alternative explanations and I show what can be done in the analy-
sis to eliminate these alternative explanations. Essentially, an increase in the
number of reports received by the FDA could arise from three main sources:
First, the sudden increase in reporting of both the focal drug and its neigh-
boring drugs can be caused by a sudden increase in the number of patients to
which the drug is prescribed. Given that a certain percentage of patients will
experience an ADR from taking the medication, the number of ADRs will go
up and this rise could account for the increase in the number of filed reports.
Several mechanisms can be identified that would lead to a sudden increase in
the number of prescriptions. For example, a new scientific insight or the im-
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plementation of new guidelines for physicians might cause the pool of patients
eligible to be treated with the drug to go up. The increase would be further
strengthened if the rise in prescriptions was accounted for by individuals that
have demographics in common. If the new consumers of the drug had a higher
likelihood of experiencing an ADR and the effect-reporting interval9 remained
stable, one might expect to see a sharp increase in the number of reports filed
for a given drug. This source of increased exposure could both cause the num-
ber of reports for focal drugs and the number of reports for drugs that treat the
same disease to go up. Another mechanism that would lead to a sudden in-
crease in the number of patients to which the drug is prescribed, is physicians
switching patients from the withdrawn drug to the related drug. Obviously,
this source of increased exposure would only lead to an increase of the num-
ber of reports for neighboring drugs. To rule out this alternative explanation,
I conduct an analysis that assesses the variance in the interval between experi-
encing the ADR and reporting it to the FDA. If the increase in the number of
prescriptions was sudden and the mean interval would remain unchanged, the
variance of the interval would have to reduce discontinuously right at the time
of the announcement of the recall. A gradual increase in the number of pre-
scription would not cause a discontinuity right at the time of the event given
that the mean interval is continuous at that same time.
Second, the sudden increase in reporting of both the focal drug and its
neighboring drugs can be caused by a sudden increase in the number of pa-
tients experiencing an ADR. For example, both the focal drug and the drugs
that treat the same disease could see a sudden increase in the number of re-
ports filed if the number of ADRs rapidly grew following exposure of patients
to external strain such as stress at specific days of the year. Some ADRs may
9The number of days between the date at which the ADR occurred and the date that it was
reported.
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be more likely to present themselves when the human body is under stress. As
a result, those ADRs have incidence rates that are higher during some days of
the week, and, given a fixed effect-report interval, are more likely to be reported
during some days of the week. If such ADRs are closely related10 to the use of
certain prescription drugs, reports for these drugs are likely to go up. Another
external source of variation in reporting may be seasonal weather changes. If
certain ADRs are more likely to occur during warm weather, the first heat wave
of the summer may increase the incidence of that ADR. And again, given fixed
effect-report intervals, ADRs caused by these seasonal whether changes may
be cause sudden shocks in reporting. To evaluate the second alternative expla-
nation, which holds that an increase in the number of ADRs, leading to more
ADRs being reported could be the cause of increasing reporting ratios, I test
whether the mean event-reporting interval remains stable right at the time of
the cutoff.
The final explanation, and the explanation advanced and hypothesized in
this chapter, holds that the sudden increase in reporting is neither caused by an
increase of prescriptions, nor by an increase in ADRs, but by the reinterpreta-
tion of patients and physicians of past experiences.
3.1.3 Roadmap
The aim of the analyses in this chapter is to determine whether safety commu-
nications by the FDA about the withdrawal of a prescription drug caused the
number of ADR reports filed for the withdrawn drug and the drugs that treat
the same disease to increase relative to the full sample of reports. I do so by
conducting several tests – each of which attempts to disentangle the various
alternative explanations described in the previous section.
10“Closely related” here refers to a co-occurrence of adverse effect x and a drug y that is higher
than chance.
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The first set of analyses focus on identifying the effect of the safety commu-
nication on the number of reports filed for the drug that is withdrawn. I first
estimate the parameters for several Poisson models in which the independent
variables include a treatment dummy, indicating whether the reports are filed
before or after the warning, day dummies, month dummies, the total number
of reports filed at a given day, and the number of days to or from the safety
communication. Each model is estimated for a different window around the
announcement of a recall, ranging from seven days before and after to 35 days
before and after the announcement date.
Limiting the sample to include observations from a relatively narrow win-
dow is important because it helps disentangle the effect of the safety communi-
cation from the effect of other time-varying factors that influence the reporting
ratios into AERS. However, even within a relatively narrow window, unob-
served factors that change over time could be a source of variation. These, in
turn, can cause the error term in a Poisson regression to be correlated with time,
allowing for the potential of biased estimates of the treatment coefficient. A Re-
gression Discontinuity (RD) design can be used to overcome problems caused
by confounding variables. It does so by considering an arbitrarily narrow win-
dow of time around the safety warning. Within this window, the unobserved
factors influencing the reporting ratio are assumed to be similar so that obser-
vations before the event provide a comparison group for observations after the
event. For the case at hand, this implies that patients’ and physicians’ pre- and
post-communication reports are not drawn from samples with different distri-
butions of key variables. One of the major advantages of the RD design is that
this core assumption can be evaluated by examining whether the distribution
of the covariates other than the treatment effect is similar right before and right
after the event. Therefore, I then check whether patients and physicians report-
ing into AERS before and after the event differ in their key characteristics. In
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sum, the reports that form the basis for calculating the reporting ratios are the
same before and after the event, meaning that the characteristics of patients and
physicians do not change in response to a safety communication (Davis 2008).
After estimating the Poisson coefficients, conducting the RD analysis, and
evaluating the other key variables, I probe whether there is a difference between
patients and physicians in the way in which they respond to a safety commu-
nication. I do so by conducting the RD analysis for patients and physicians
separately.
Although the main interest of the chapter is in changes in the reporting ratio,
I use the RD design to estimate the effect on the ratio and the absolute number
of reports. Obviously, an increase in the ratio could be caused both by the de-
crease in the denominator, as well as by an increase in the numerator. And,
although theoretically interesting, an increase in the absolute number of focal
drug reports that is accompanied by the same percentage increase in the abso-
lute number of other drug reports does not cause scientists to detect a signal
(disproportionality in the composition of drug reports).
After analyzing the effect on safety communications on the reporting ratio
of the focal drug, I turn to the effect on the reporting ratios of drugs that treat
the same disease. Essentially, the analyses for the related drugs are replications
of the analyses for the focal drug. They include the Poisson regressions, the
RD design, the evaluation of key variables, and the split into the patient versus
physician strata. In the next section I describe how the data used in this chapter
was obtained and how the raw data was transformed into a workable database.
Then I will briefly return to the details of the empirical strategy before I describe
the results.
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3.2 Data and methods
3.2.1 Study population
3.2.1.1 AERS
The main data used in the chapter is the FDA Adverse Event Reporting System
(AERS). This reporting system is a vital source of information for the FDA in
their efforts of promoting high standards in public health (Robb et al. 2012).
AERS is also used in hundreds of scientific studies and its content has recently
become more accessible through websites such as “adverseevents.com” and
“fdable.com”. The data in AERS from 2003 to 2013 is freely available from
the FDA website, while the data from 1997 to 2003 can be purchased from the
NTIS.
AERS is a longitudinal database comprised of ADR reports of patients, physi-
cians, and other healthcare providers. Reports on ADRs can be submitted to the
FDA either directly by the patient or physician or through the manufacturer
of a drug to which patients and physicians have reported. Manufacturers are
obliged by law to submit the reports that they receive with the FDA. Multiple
reports, each of a different ADR for the same patient, can be linked through
a case number, but it is still possible that one ADR instance is reported multi-
ple times. To circumvent this problem, the FDA recommends a de-duplication
strategy to limit the bias that can be caused by duplication of reports. I fol-
low Poluzzi et al. (2012) and remove reports that are likely to be duplicates of
other reports from the dataset (a full description of the de-duplication strategy
is available from the author). Another implication that follows from multiple
source reporting is that one has to be careful in assigning a date to the report.
Since patients file directly to the FDA and physicians file directly on behalf of
their patients, I code the day at which the report is sent to the FDA from these
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two sources as the date of interest. In the case of reporting by manufacturers,
the day that the report was received by the manufacturer is coded as the day of
interest. Typically, there is a one or two week lag between the date at which the
manufacturer received the reports and the day that the manufacturer forwards
to report to the FDA.
A major challenge in using the data is to correctly assign each report to an
FDA approved prescription drug – with a standardized drug name. The AERS
data contains 20,061,582 fields in which free text is entered to describe the drug
that the reporter has associated with the reported ADR. To meet this challenge
I constructed a dataset of all drugs approved for marketing by the FDA since
1950. The next section further explains how this data was constructed. Using
highly restrictive matching criteria to minimize the number of false-positive
matches I was able to match the drug field to a standardized drug name in
98.5% of all cases – a total that lies roughly 9% higher than the number of
matches in Poluzzi et al. (2012). A total of 97.4% of all fields was matched
against drugs in the database of FDA approved drugs11. The discrepancy be-
tween the sizes of these subsets as shares of the entire set of fields can be traced
back to the fact that, although the FDA clearly states that reporters should limit
their reports to adverse events likely to be associated with U.S. approved drugs,
some reports contain references to drugs that were approved in other countries
but not in the US. In accordance with other studies that use AERS to detect
safety issues, the data was limited to reports that were filed from within the
US. Moreover, I only focus in “primary suspect” drugs. These are the drugs
that reporters name as the likely cause of the ADR.
11 Each field should contain only one drug name. However, in some instances a drug field was
matched against multiple drugs. For example, one drug field names “tipranavir + ritonavir coadm”
as the suspect drug. The FDA has never approved a combination drug that has “Tipranavir” and
“Ritonavir” as its ingredients. However, it has approved both drugs individually. The matching
algorithm therefore splits this drug field up in two drug fields: “Tipranavir” and “Ritonavir”. On
the other hand, the drug field “abacavir sulphate+lamivudine+zidovudine” contains three drugs
that were individually approved by the FDA but also in combination with one another. In such an
instance, the standardized drug name is the combination drug - Trizivir in this case.
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Table 3.1 lists three panels of descriptive statistics for AERS. Panel A de-
scribes the counts and percentages of the main variables in the data. The data
contains more than 3 million cases and some cases are characterized by mul-
tiple reports of ADRs. The majority of patients that experienced an ADR that
was reported to the FDA was female (58%) and the mean age of the patients
for which a report was filed was 52. Patients are the most common reporters,
while healthcare professionals including physicians and pharmacists jointly re-
port about as often as patients. Some health outcomes are extremely severe, but
most of the reports are accounted for by the least severe cases such as “Hospi-
talization” and “Other”. Finally, Table 3.1 shows how much missing data the
sample is characterized by. It shows that Age, Reporter Type, and Health Out-
come are the most common fields to have missing data.
Panel B and panel C show two contingency tables based on the AERS data.
The contingency table in panel B shows the multivariate frequency distribution
of gender by health outcome. Although the distribution of health outcomes
look very similar for men and women, reports for female patients contain dis-
proportionally high numbers of “Other” health outcomes. It is not clear where
this stark difference comes from. In panel C I show a similar contingency table
but rather than subsetting by gender, I subset by reporter type. It becomes clear
from the table that when the health outcome is missing, chances are that the re-
porter is the patients him or herself. Patients dominate the reporter type count,
but physicians more often provide information about the health outcome of the
ADR. Since there is a category “Other”, this difference seems to result from pre-
cision in filling out the report rather than a difference in expertise. Finally, panel
C shows that if the reporter type is missing, the health outcome is unlikely to
be missing too.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for AERS
Database Size




Gender Missing 296,234 (7.1%)
Mean Age (SE) 52.29 (0.012)





Other Health Professional 453,936 (10.8%)







Health Outcome Missing 1,255,407 (25.5%)
Other Missing Data
Unmatched Drug Names (PS) 109,250 (2.6%)
Unmatched ATC Codes (PS) 119,972 (2.9%)
Panel A: Observations by Category
Male Female N/A
Death 209,445 185,788 43,278
Life-Threatening 78,052 88,119 4,697
Disability 64,295 94,916 4,914
Hospitalization 509,151 681,533 34,640
Other 579,390 974,961 109,948
N/A 349,320 786,039 120,048
Panel B: Contingency Table – Gender by Health Outcome
Consumer Physician Pharmacist Other Health Professional N/A
Death 68,692 128,421 19,923 62,240 137,384
Life-Threatening 22,743 37,224 14,747 20,841 72,754
Disability 24,146 34,676 4,214 13,661 55,519
Hospitalization 237,299 281,474 75,187 161,259 417,114
Other 357,906 320,261 67,309 177,593 611,713
N/A 700,889 138,524 42,006 110,130 257,386
Panel C: Contingency Table – Type by Health Outcome
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the demographic variables that are found in
AERS reports. Each report is linked to a case and one case may have links to multiple reports if
a patient experienced multiple adverse events. The demographic variables are counted per report
rather than per case. Also, the baseline for computing the percentages of unmatched drug names
and unmatched ATC codes is the total number of drug fields – which is similar to the total number
of unique reports. The count of unmatched drug names or unmatched ATCs includes drug fields
that are no drugs or drug fields that are ambiguous.
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3.2.1.2 NDAs
In order to match all free text fields in AERS to a standardized name of a drug
approved by the FDA, I constructed a list of all drugs approved for marketing
in the U.S. market since 1950. Although it seems like a trivial task to collect this
data, it is not. Essentially, I have built the dataset from four main resources:
Drugs@FDA12, a 1989 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research publication,
NDA Pipeline, and the 1999 - 2011 Drug and Biologic Approval Reports13.
Drugs@FDA is a database that is freely available from the FDA website and
contains information on approved drugs, including their New Drug Applica-
tion (NDA) number, their trade and generic names, their approval date, their
sponsor, and their histories of regulatory actions associated with the specific
drug. Unfortunately, the Drugs@FDA database does not contain all drugs ap-
proved by the FDA and some of the more problematic cases (those that were
withdrawn from the U.S. market) are missing. Therefore, I developed a strategy
to compare the drugs from Drugs@FDA with the list of approved drugs from
at least one other source in each year since 1950. The first comparator source
consulted was a publication of the FDA (Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search, Office of Management) issued in 1989. This publication lists all drugs
approved by the FDA from January 1950 to December 1989. The second source
was the NDA pipeline publication. NDA pipeline is a yearly publication by
FDC reports (Chevy Chase, MD) and is based on the Pink Sheet, a trade journal
that is also published by FDC reports. NDA pipeline lists all drugs approved
by the FDA in a given year. Through the university library, I was able to access
the 1984, 1986 - 1989, 1991 - 1992, and 1994 - 1998 editions of the NDA pipeline.
Finally, I compared the Drugs@FDA data with the 1999 - 2011 Drug and Bio-




uncovered. For 1990, I manually compared the list of drugs to the drug list in
Kaitin et al. (1994), while for the NCEs approved in 1993 I manually compared
the drug list to the drug list in Kaitin et al. (1994). The final dataset contains
1,341 unique prescription drugs making the coverage higher and the number
of false positives lower than the leading list of prescription drugs (Carpenter
et al. 2010; Carpenter 2010).
3.2.1.3 ATC
After matching the free text against standardized drug names I linked each
drug name to an Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical code. The Anatomical
Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system, initiated and maintained by
the WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology, organizes ac-
tive substances found in drugs into different groups according to the organ on
which they act and their therapeutic, pharmacological and chemical properties.
The systems is hierarchically organized and consists of 5 levels. The first level
comprises fourteen groups and indicates the anatomical main group, with ther-
apeutic subgroups (2nd level), pharmacological subgroups (3rd level), chemi-
cal subgroups (4th level), and lastly the chemical substance further demarcating
the similarities and differences between active substances.14 The complete clas-
sification of Insulin Lispro in Table 3.2 illustrates the structure of the system.
Table 3.2: Levels in ATC
Level Description
1 A - Alimentary tract and metabolism - anatomical main group
2 A10 - Drugs used in diabetes - therapeutic subgroup
3 A10A - Insulins and analogues - pharmacological subgroup
4 A10AB - Insulins and analogues for injection, fast-acting - chemical subgroup
5 A10AB04 - Insulin Lispro - chemical substance
14http://www.whocc.no/atc/structure_and_principles/
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A total of 97% of all fields could be linked to an ATC code. The reason for
the lower number of matches of ATC codes versus U.S. approved drugs is that
the ATC classification system was first initiated in the early 1980s and some
older drugs do not have ATC codes. Moreover, since the assignment of ATC
codes lags behind the approval of prescription drugs, newly approved drugs
often do not yet have an ATC code. The final reason why not every drug can be
found in ATC is that in order for a drug to be included, the WHO requires an
application, typically from the manufacturer of the drug.
In order to define a relational structure of drugs, I move from level 5 (at
which each drug in the dataset is identified) to level 2. Timmermans and Buch-
binder (2012) in their analysis of newborn screening show the salience of dis-
ease categories. Diseases are the most prominent categories along which un-
derstanding of conditions and treatments is shaped. For the current analysis,
this implies that if the main hypothesis is confirmed, patients and physicians
act upon communications about the withdrawal of a drug that are used to treat
the same disease as the disease for which the patient is being treated. That is,
meaning is extracted from the communication about the withdrawal and and
put into action by reporting an ADR for drugs in the same disease class as the
withdrawn drug. This is not to say that the structure of the ATC classification
system is known by physicians and patients, but rather that the ATC classifica-
tion system is meaningful in that it resonates with the understanding of drugs.
By linking prescription drugs that treat the same disease, a network of drugs
can be created. This network is shown in Figure 3.2. Drugs are tied to one
another if they treat the same disease and since some drugs treat multiple dis-
eases, various clusters are connected through one or multiple multi purpose
drugs. Figure 2 also shows the names of the drugs that were withdrawn. In
defining drug i’s neighbors, it must be noted that I exclude drugs that are in
the same chemical subclass. Although unlikely, there is the potential that the
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chemical group is associated with some unobserved confounder that causes the
number of reports for the group to go up. In order to rule this option out as an
alternative explanation, I limited the sample of neighboring drugs to those that
treat the same disease but are in a different chemical group.
3.2.1.4 Drug Withdrawals
The focus is on drugs recalled or withdrawn by the FDA or the manufacturer15
because of safety reasons. The list used in this chapter is constructed by go-
ing through records of regulatory actions taken by the FDA and by identifying
instances in which a drug is withdrawn. The records of regulatory actions are
accessible through Medwatch and can be found through the FDA website. I
code the day at which the FDA communicated (in an FDA talk chapter or a
Public Health Advisory) about the withdrawal as the day of the communica-
tion. In some cases, the manufacturer sent out a “Dear healthcare professional”
letter before the FDA communicated about the withdrawal, but the gap was
never more than a day and given that US mail takes at least a day to be re-
ceived by the recipient, it will not interfere with the exposure of the healthcare
professional to the new information contained in the communication. Figure
3.3 contains an overview of the drugs that were withdrawn between 1997 and
2013.
3.2.2 Empirical Strategy
The main outcome variable of interest in this chapter is the relative increase
in reporting, rather than the absolute increase. While identifying the absolute
15Despite the desirability for clear and transparent categorization of safety issues, many drug
safety communications leave room for multiple interpretations. For example, the difference be-
tween a recall and a withdrawal is not always clear (see this discussion on a consumer advocacy
website). Perhaps as a result of this ambiguity and in an attempt to reduce it, the FDA recently
revised its Regulatory Procedures Manual (RPM) and updated its definition of withdrawals and
recalls.
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Figure 3.2: The Network of Drugs that Treat the Same Disease
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Note: For each withdrawn drug, I looked up the precise date at which the FDA communicated the
withdrawal. This is also the date that will be used in the analyses that follow.
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increase in reporting is interesting, it is essentially meaningless for the detection
of a signal, if all other drugs also experience an increase. However, by only studying
the relative increase in reporting of a specific drug a signal may be detected that
is solely due to the decrease in one or multiple other drugs that are aggregated in
the denominator. Therefore, the analyses in the chapter report both the effects
on the absolute number of reports and the effects on the relative number of
reports.
As noted earlier, I first regress the reporting ratios for the withdrawn drug
and for drugs that treat the same disease as the drug that is withdrawn on the
effect of the treatment variable – being exposed to the safety communication
(1) versus not being exposed to the safety communication (0). I employ a Pois-
son regression with the total number of reports filed per day as the exposure
variable, the number of reports filed for the drugs of interest as the depen-
dent variable, and the treatment variable as the main predictor. I also include
dummy variables for the day and month and I include a variable that captures
the number of days from the event.
To estimate the causal effect of communications of withdrawals on the re-
porting ratios of drugs, I employ the timing of these communications as the
continuous forcing variable X while the date of the communication is used as
the cutoff point that defines the treatment and control group (Davis 2008). The
control group includes daily counts of reports sent to the FDA prior to the com-
munication of the withdrawal and the treatment group includes daily counts
for the same set of drugs after the communication was sent out.
Ti =

1, if x ≥ c.
0, if x < c.
(3.1)
The actual modeling of the data depends on the size of the window around
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the discontinuity (for which values of X do we drop data points from our
sample?) and the statistical model that we use to estimate the treatment ef-
fect (Green et al. 2009). We follow Green et al. (2009) and use local regressions
in combination with the Imbens-Kalyanaraman estimate in order to obtain the
optimal bandwidth (Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2011). To fit the local regres-
sion, the data is sampled to include only observations within a bandwidth
around the cutoff point. Moreover, observations that are closer to the cutoff
are weighted more heavily. Defining a bandwidth poses a trade-off: a narrow
bandwidth minimizes the chance of bias in the estimated treatment effect, but
it also reduces the number of observations and increases the uncertainty in the
estimated coefficients (Green et al. 2009). While there are various strategies to
estimate the optimal bandwidth, the algorithm in Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2011) has been shown to outperform alternatives (Green et al. 2009). Therefore,
following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011), I use a triangular kernel to weigh
the observations closer to the cutoff more heavily so that the weight assigned
to each observation increases linearly from the boundaries of the bandwidth to
the cutoff point16
3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Before turning to the analyses, I briefly review a few descriptive statistics for the
data analyzed in this chapter. AERS is a rich and complex dataset and I there-
fore think that it is useful to share some of its characterizing properties. Figure
16 One of the most salient choices when analyzing data in a RD design is finding an appropriate
regression specification. There are three commonly used approaches, all of which have their pros
and cons. The first is to simply fit a parametric linear regression. The problem whit this approach
is that there is no reason to believe that the true relationship is linear (Lee and Lemieux 2010).
The second commonly used approach is to fit a non-parametric regression with polynomials for
X. While this model allows for more flexibility than the linear regression, it provides estimates of
the function at all levels of X. RD designs, in contrast, are built on the logic that causal effects can
be identified close to the cutoff (Lee and Lemieux 2010). A third approach is to use non-parametric
kernel regressions. Although this approach captures local estimates of Y it runs into problems close
to the cutoff, because to estimate of the local value of Y on one side of the cutoff one cannot be used
to estimate the local value of Y on the other side of the cutoff.
81
3.4 shows the number of reports filed per day. It shows that over time the daily
number of reports filed with the FDA have increased substantially. This also
explains the needs for sophisticated algorithms that continuously monitor the
data for signals that indicate the potential for unsafe drugs. A second interest-
ing feature is that there is considerable variance in the number of reports filed
from day to day. Some of this variation is seasonal or related to the day of the
week, but much of the variation is left unexplained.

























































































































































Note: This graph plots the number of reports filed by patients, physicians, and other healthcare
providers on a daily basis. All reports are included in the graph, including those that have missing
data in one or multiple of the demographic variables.
Table 3.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the reporting intervals per day.
The reporting intervals refer to the difference in the number of days between
the occurrence of the ADR and the day that the patient or physician reported
the ADR. The table shows that in some instances it takes a long time before an
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ADR is reported. Moreover, weekends truly stand out as indicated by the much
shorter intervals.
Table 3.3: Event - report interval per day
Day Min Max Median Mean Std. Err.
Monday 0 1533 64 207.08 0.42
Tuesday 0 1533 63 199.51 0.42
Wednesday 0 1533 60 195.33 0.43
Thursday 0 1533 59 198.79 0.45
Friday 0 1533 58 196.71 0.46
Saturday 0 1533 30 141.75 1.35
Sunday 0 1533 24 132.95 1.55
Table 3.4 tabulates the average number of reports sent to the FDA per day.
The table reveals substantial variation in the number of reports sent throughout
the course of a week. The pattern clearly shows that Saturday and Sunday are
off days and that people are most active early in the week in reporting ADRs.
The standard errors are fairly low and, while not shown in the table, the pattern
of decline in the number of reports throughout the week is stable over time.
Table 3.4: Reports per day








Note: This table shows the average number of reports that are filed per day of the week. The
means are calculated over the pooled data from 1997 to 2012. While the averages in recent years




The regression estimates for the first set of regressions are shown in Table 3.5.
An estimate of the coefficient of 2.54 implies that the number of reports filed
for a drug that was withdrawn from the market were, on average, 251% higher
in the post-removal period than in the pre-removal period, in proportion to the
daily reporting rates. The table shows that the estimate is quite stable, even if
the window around the announcement of a recall is extended to 42 days before
and 42 days after the communication of the withdrawal.
Table 3.5: Point estimate for treatment effect on focal drug using Poisson re-
gression
Interval width Point estimate Lower CB Upper CB
± 7 days interval 2.54 2.43 2.64
± 14 days interval 2.55 2.47 2.64
± 21 days interval 2.57 2.50 2.64
± 28 days interval 2.28 2.22 2.34
± 35 days interval 2.19 2.13 2.24
± 42 days interval 2.16 2.11 2.21
Note: This table shows the point estimates and the upper and lower bounds for the 95% confidence
interval of the estimate. The regressions include three sets of variables: day dummies, month
dummies, and a variable indicating the number of days from the event.
Figure 3.5 shows the graphic representation of the RD analysis. The effect
is large; the effect at the discontinuity for the reporting ratio is 0.12 and is sta-
tistically significant at the 0.001 level. For the absolute number of reports, the
effect is also large – 107.31 – and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This
implies that – if the assumptions of the model hold – the direct increase in both
the relative ratio and the absolute number is more than 1000%. So, besides its
statistical significance, the effect of a communication of a withdrawal seems to
be economically salient too. These results conform hypothesis 1.
Figure 3.6 shows the regression lines for two control variables. The first
variable, which is found in the upper left panel of the graph shows the interval
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Time relative to withdrawal (in days)
Note: The left panel plots the RD graph with “days from event” as the forcing variable and the
daily proportion of reports that indicate the withdrawn drug as the primary suspect as the response
variable. The graph in the right panel shows the alternative response variable: the absolute number
of daily reports.
between experiencing and ADR and reporting it. One of the important ques-
tions is obviously whether an increase in the number of reports comes from (1)
people that would otherwise not have reported or from (2) people that would
have reported at a later day. One way of testing which of the explanations holds
is by studying the effect-report interval. If, at the cutoff (so at the day of the
safety communication), there is also a discontinuous change in the effect-report
interval (there could be a strong decrease if people who would have reported
in at a later stage would start reporting at the data of the communication), it
is likely that people that would have reported at a later day but decided to re-
port today are the cause of the increase. If there is no discontinuous change
at the cutoff, it is likely that the increase comes from people that would have
otherwise not reported. This is precisely what the graph shows.
The graph also provides a check for the argument that the number of ADRs
suddenly increased in a period before the withdrawal. Let’s assume that n
days prior to withdrawal of the focal drug there was a heat wave causing many
ADRs. If all these ADRs were reported at the day of the cutoff, one would ex-
pect an upward discontinuity in the regression line if the heatwave was much
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earlier than the cutoff minus the mean of the interval right before the commu-
nication. The opposite would be observed for the case in which that increase
happened more recently. In case that the ADRs happened right at the mean
interval, one would expect a discontinuous reduction right at the cutoff in the
left hand panel of the graph.





















































































Time relative to withdrawal (in days)
Note: Each panel represents one control variable. The left panel plots the daily reporting interval
(the number of days between the the event date and the reporting date), the right panel plots the
standard deviation of the daily reporting interval.
Although I have not explicitly stated any hypotheses regarding my expec-
tations about the differences between patients and physicians in terms of how
their reporting ratios for the drug that is withdrawn change as a response to
the recall, table 3.6 shows the results from such a comparative analysis. In par-
ticular, the table presents a comparison of the effect of the withdrawal for the
focal drug for healthcare providers – including physicians and other health care
providers – and patients separately. Although the effect is somewhat larger for
patients, both groups are characterized by a significant increase. Please note
that the estimates shown in table 3.6 are generated from AERS data on all re-
ports, not just the reports for which reporter type is non-missing. To fill the
data for the reports on which the reporter type is missing, I build a model that
uses a battery of other variables in the data to predict whether a report is likely
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to be submitted by a physician or a patient. Then, for each report with missing
data, I predict the likelihood that that report was submitted by a patient versus
a physician and fill the missing cells accordingly. The same strategy was used
for the analysis about the differences between patients and physicians in terms
of their reporting behavior for drugs that treat the same disease as the drug that
is withdrawn. Although the estimates (mostly in terms of their precision) dif-
fer between the analyses conducted for the subset excluding missing data and
the full sample including the inferred data, the interpretation is similar (same
direction, both statistically significant).
Table 3.6: RD Estimates
Coefficient SE Z-score P-value
Healthcare Provider – ratio 0.03 0.01 2.17 0.03
Healthcare Provider – absolute 30.47 10.74 2.83 0.00
Patient – ratio 0.07 0.03 2.42 0.02
Patient – absolute 70.24 25.26 2.78 0.01
Note: This table shows the point estimates and the upper and lower bounds for the 95% confidence
interval of the estimate. They show that the increase in the relative and absolute reporting for
“related drugs” is significantly different from 0 for healthcare providers and patients.
I now turn to the analyses for drugs that treat the same disease. In line
with the analyses for the focal drug, I first estimate a Poisson regression. The
regression estimates for these regressions are shown in Table 3.7. The coefficient
for a 14 day window is 42 which implies that the number of reports filed for a
drug that was withdrawn from the market grew by 42% as a result of the safety
communication. As expected, the effect is substantially lower than the effect
for the withdrawn drug. The table also shows that the estimate is decreasing as
the window around the announcement of the recall grows.
Figure 3.7 shows the graphic representation of the RD analysis for drugs
that treat the same disease. Similar to the results from the Poisson regressions,
the analyses show that the effect is positive and significant; the effect at the
discontinuity for the reporting ratio is 0.0035, and is statistically significant at
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Table 3.7: Point estimate for treatment effect on related drugs using Poisson
regression
Interval width Point estimate Lower CB Upper CB
± 7 days interval 0.42 0.36 0.48
± 14 days interval 0.33 0.28 0.37
± 21 days interval 0.22 0.18 0.26
± 28 days interval 0.07 0.03 0.10
± 35 days interval 0.13 0.10 0.16
± 42 days interval 0.15 0.12 0.18
Note: This table shows the point estimates and the upper and lower bounds for the 95% confidence
interval of the estimate. The regressions include three sets of variables: day dummies, month
dummies, and a variable indicating the number of days from the event. The “related drugs” include
those drugs that treat the same disease, but are categorized in a different chemical subclass.
the 0.05 level. For the absolute number of reports, the effect is 2.07 and statisti-
cally significant at the 0.01 level17 Although the estimates for the neighboring
drugs show much smaller effect sizes they still show that the increase in both
the relative ratio and the absolute number is more than 200%. So, besides its
statistical significance, the effect of a communication of a withdrawal seems to
be economically salient too. These results conform hypothesis 2.
Similar to the control variables for the withdrawn drugs, the control vari-
ables for the neighboring drugs are all continuous at the cutoff.
In the final analysis presented here, I compare the effect of the withdrawal
for the neighboring drugs for healthcare providers – including physicians and
other health care providers – and patients separately. The hypothesis stated
that the effect for healthcare providers is expected to be more pronounced be-
cause they differ from patients in terms of their health literacy and because their
formal training has prepared them to observe and recognize relations between
drugs. The table shows that the effect for physicians is positive and significant,
but that the effect for patients is not significantly different from zero. Moreover,
17Since there is considerable variance around the regression line, I also employed another em-
pirical strategy that aims to test whether the observed effect is the result of random variation.
Essentially, I simulated 100 placebo events and checked how the effects lined up. They suggest that
the effect shown in table 3.7 is exceptional and is unlikely to be the result of random variation only.
More details on the estimations can be found in Appendix B.
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Time relative to withdrawal (in days)
Note: The left panel plots the RD graph with “days from event” as the forcing variable and the
daily proportion of reports that indicate the withdrawn drug as the primary suspect as the response
variable. The graph in the right panel shows the alternative response variable: the absolute number
of daily reports.























































































Time relative to withdrawal (in days)
Note: Each panel represents one control variable. The left panel plots the daily reporting interval
(the number of days between the the event date and the reporting date), the right panel plots the
standard deviation of the daily reporting interval.
the two estimates are significantly different at the 0.05 level. This finding is con-
sistent with the argument that physicians use the relational structure between
drugs to guide their ADR reporting behavior while patients do not. These re-
sults confirm hypothesis 3.
Finally, to understand whether the increased reporting of prescription drugs
that treat the same disease as the drug that is withdrawn leads to a slowdown
in regulatory action, I identified all significant increases in the reporting of an
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Table 3.8: RD Estimates
Coefficient SE Z-score P-value
Healthcare Provider - ratio 0.01 0.00 2.77 0.01
Healthcare Provider - absolute 2.77 0.56 4.95 0.00
Patient - ratio 0.00 0.00 1.46 0.14
Patient - absolute 0.40 0.59 0.68 0.50
Note: This table shows the point estimates and the upper and lower bounds for the 95% confidence
interval of the estimate. They show that the increase in the relative and absolute reporting for
“related drugs” is significantly different from 0 for healthcare providers. The effect is not significant
for patients.
ADR for a prescription drug and the regulatory actions taken by the FDA that
are associated with those signals. I then compared those signals that were ob-
served in a window of six months around the time of the withdrawal (three
months before and three months after) and to the signals in a randomly chosen
window of six months that had no drug withdrawn in it. As shown in Figure
3.9 the lags in the affected period are larger than the lag in the non-affected pe-
riod. Although this finding is somewhat speculative, it suggests that the FDA
is delayed in its regulatory decisions making during periods in which noise
enters the AERS.
3.4 Discussion and conclusion
The results presented in this chapter are consistent with the idea that commu-
nications of regulators about unsafe drugs cause an increase in the number of
reports about Adverse Drug Reactions filed to the FDA. I have shown that the
number of ADR reports for a specific drug filed into AERS increases instanta-
neously after the announcement of a withdrawal of a prescription drug. The
increase occurs both for the drug that was originally withdrawn and for drugs
that treat the same disease as the drug that was originally withdrawn. The in-
crease in the number of reports filed for drugs that treat the same disease is ac-
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Note: The left bar in the graph represents the drugs that were affected by an increase in report-
ing as a result of the withdrawal of a prescription drug while the right bar represents unaffected
drugs. The bars and the error bars indicate that the lag between signal and regulatory action for
the affected drugs is significantly larger than the lag for the unaffected drugs.
counted for by additional reports from physicians, not patients. Moreover, the
analyses presented in the chapter indicate that this increase is caused by addi-
tional reports filed by those patients and physicians who would have otherwise
not reported. I employ several tests to show that the results in the chapter are
inconsistent with the idea that the increase in the number of reports is caused
by an increase in the number of ADRs that occurred.
These findings have two major substantive implications. First, the large ef-
fect on the number of complaints filed for the drug that was withdrawn and
the drugs that treat the same disease could mask other signals in the data that
identify unsafe drugs. If the large number of additional reports are included
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in the denominator when calculating the disproportionality of other drugs in
the set of complaints, large effects may seem small and could therefore go un-
detected. It is not unlikely that this masking effect could seriously delay the
detection of some drugs that are later found to be unsafe. A second major im-
plication of the results presented in this chapter is that the increase of 200% in
the number of reports filed for drugs that treat the same disease should not be
interpreted as an increase in the number of ADRs. The increase is caused by
physicians who respond to the release of new information rather than by addi-
tional ADRs. By accounting for high impact events, such as the communication
of new information about drug safety, the FDA can filter out additional reports,
thereby removing ambiguity in the data.
More broadly, the findings presented in this chapter are especially salient
given the prominence of Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) in the medical disci-
pline. EBM has been a dominant force in guiding healthcare practices over the
past decades (Timmermans and Berg 2003; Timmermans and Mauck 2005) and
can be seen as a set of guidelines and hierarchies that guide healthcare profes-
sionals in making decisions about how to improve a patients’ health. EBM is
built on the notion that – given the vast and increasing body of evidence – best
practices can be identified and outcomes in healthcare can be optimized. My
research suggests that the making of evidence is also very much a social pro-
cess and that social processes should be accounted for when identifying best
practices.
This chapter also has implications for research in cognitive sociology and
organizational research. First, the findings confirm prior research that shows
that negative attention directed at an individual, organization, or object results
in repercussions through the expression of lower evaluations. The process by
which this happens, however, is different from what was previously observed
in other contexts. Rather than a fixed audience that acts upon an actor’s status
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or stigma by providing a lower evaluation, this research shows that audiences
of evaluators revisit past experiences and reinterpret them based on the newly
released information. In doing so, the audience grows which raises questions
on how the evaluations of these “new” audience members should be inter-
preted. A second theoretical contribution of this chapter is that it shows that
relational structures may guide the behavior of audiences that are presented
with new information about the quality of a product. It demonstrates that nega-
tive attention for one object may contaminate the status and reputation of other
objects if those objects are categorically related. Given the increased salience of all
kinds of relational structures in social life (Bowker and Star 1999; Timmermans
and Berg 2003), the findings from my research suggest that individuals and
organizations should take seriously their position in a multitude of relational
structures and consider the status and behavior of their “relational alters”. Fi-
nally, this research indicates that differences between evaluators in terms of the
cognitive schemata that inspire their behavior lead to heterogeneity of the pat-
terns in the data that they produce. Organizational research concerned with
evaluation processes is fairly homogeneous in terms of the research design that
it adopts. The most common strategy is to take a pool of evaluations and ex-
plain the variance in these evaluations by accounting for characteristics of those
who are evaluated. However, my research shows that audiences can be parti-
tioned into subsets of evaluators who adhere to different evaluation processes.
Individuals and organizations concerned with obtaining positive evaluations
can exploit these differences between the subsets of audiences members.
This research also draws attention to the question of how new information
induces actors to alter their behavior. Although the data used in this chap-
ter does not allow me to identify the mechanism by which the release of new
information induces audience members to contribute an evaluation, there are
essentially three explanations. First, the release of new information may legit-
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imize the contribution of an evaluation. If patients and physicians were aware
of the potential causal link between drug and ADR and the option to report to
into AERS, but felt that their report was not warranted, the official statement
by the FDA may have legitimized their claim. A second explanation for the
increase in the number of reports may stem from awareness. Several studies
have shown that more and more patients and physicians are aware of the pos-
sibility to report into AERS. Although much of this increased awareness may
come from effective campaigns designed by the FDA to inform patients and
physicians about how they can contribute to increasing public health, safety
communications that are highly publicized may also cause awareness to in-
crease. The third explanation, which I term realization, was introduced earlier
in this chapter and advances the idea that increased reporting is due to patients
and physicians who revisited past experiences and realized that an ADR was
caused by a prescription drug. There is merit in studying the different mecha-
nisms by which new information induces patients and physicians to contribute.
For example, a regulator interested in improving the quality of consumer con-
tributed data may use this information to design strategies increase participa-
tion. Moreover, research on legitimation may benefit from a detailed analysis
of how micro-processes cause individuals, organizations, objects, or practices
to gain legitimacy. Currently, these micro-processes remain under exposed in
organizational research on legitimacy.
Although this chapter did not explicitly test how patients and physicians
learned about the recall of an unsafe drug, an interesting question is whether
this happened through exposure to the media communication of the FDA or
through social influence among patients and/or physicians. Similar to the par-
ents of children diagnosed with autism in (Liu et al. 2010), patients and physi-
cians may become aware of, realize, or legitimize the fact that they experienced
a side effect through their peers. While I have not set up a formal test to an-
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swer this question, the analyses indicate that the second explanation – social
influence – is unlikely to be the sole mechanism to account for the increase. The
regression discontinuity method used in this chapter suggests that the increase
in reporting is instantaneous. If social influence were to be solely responsible
for the increase one would expect a more slowly growing increase18
This chapter applied a social theory of cognition to a serious problem in the
health care domain. In doing so, it showed how social theory can be used to
advance problems in public health. It also provided a detailed account of how
individuals attribute an effect to a cause and how accounting for the cognitive
schemata that audiences use allows one to understand variation in evaluations.
18In an additional analysis not shown here, I proxied the cohesiveness of patients by counting
the number of patient groups organized around the disease that the drug targeted. The hypothesis
that I developed for the collection of this data was that diseases that have tightly organized patient
groups would exhibit different patterns of increasing reports following the discontinuity. I there-
fore divided the drugs up into two groups; one group with a cohesive patient base and one group
with a dispersed patient base. The analyses did not show differences in the patterns of response.
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Appendix A Using AERS to Detect Unsafe Drugs
Regulators and scientists typically use various statistical techniques to detect
disproportionality. A commonly used technique in the medical sciences to de-
tect potential safety issues by using AERS is through a case/non-case method-
ology. In a case/non-case approach the researcher splits up the population of
reports into two samples; one that contains all reports that name drug i as the
potential cause of an adverse event (cases) and one that contains the comple-
ment of the reports that name drug i (non-cases). These two subsets can then
be further partitioned into the reports that report adverse event a - for example
arrhythmia - and the reports that report all other adverse events - all adverse
events but arrhythmia. Table 1 shows how the reports in AERS can be divided
up into subsets that allow researchers to detect disproportionality in reporting.
Table A3.9: Subsets in AERS
Drugi DrugCi Total
Adverse Eventi A B A + B
Adverse EventCi C D C + D
Total A + C B + D A + B + C + D
A = number of reports where suspect drug is Drugi and adverse event is Adverse Eventi
B = number of reports where suspect drug is Drugi and adverse event is Adverse Eventci
C = number of reports where suspect drug is Drugci and adverse event is Adverse Eventi
D = number of reports where suspect drug is Drugci and adverse event is Adverse
Eventci
Note: This cross table is used by medical scientists to compute disproportionality in the reports
filed for a specific drug/adverse event combination.
Although there are various techniques (including frequentist and Bayesian
approaches) that employ different formulas to capture the level of dispropor-
tionality, the basic intuition behind all of those measures is that they capture
the proportionality of the occurrence of a specific adverse event in those be-
ing treated with drug i and the occurrence of that same event in those treated
with other drugs. These techniques are non-parametric versions of a bivariate
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logistic regression where the outcome variable is a dummy that equals 1 if a
report reports the adverse event of interest and the explanatory variable is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the patient in the report is being treated with
the drug of interest. Typically the distribution of adverse events for a given
drugs is skewed with many reports coming in for few adverse events and only
few reports for other adverse events. It becomes apparent that if the number
of reports for a specific drug increases and the confidence bands around the
estimate of the signal become less wide, the likelihood of detecting dispropor-
tionality goes up.
Appendix B Robustness Checks
In order to test whether the observed effect is not the result of another temporal
effect that I did not theorize, I have simulated – for each event – 100 placebo
events. In other words, I randomly selected 100 dates for each observed event
date and I replicate the analyses presented in the chapter. Please note that it is
unlikely that the withdrawal of a prescription drug is the only event to alter the
reporting proportionality. Other events such as extensive media coverage for
a drug, or a widely publicized lawsuit could also trigger strong effects on the
reporting behavior of patients and physicians. Therefore, I expect there to be at
least a few instances in which random selection of placebo dates yields results
that show comparable effects on the the reporting.
Both for the effect on the focal drug, and for the effect on the neighboring
drug, the findings of the placebo analyses indicate that in less then 5% of all
placebo events, the increase in the reporting ratio is significantly different from
0. Moreover, for those placebo events that generate a significant effect on the
reporting behavior of patients and physicians, none is characterized by an effect





This chapter explores the role of industry involvement in the production
of scientific evidence. The analyses are based on the scientific publications
discussing one or more of the 200 prescription drugs approved between
2000 and 2010 and data on the citations between those publications. The
argument developed in this chapter holds that the structure in which sci-
entific publications become embedded can be used to understand the debate
about the safety of a prescription drug. The analyses conducted and pre-
sented in this chapter show that there is substantial variation in the degree
to which pre-approval scientific evidence becomes integrated within the de-
bate that follows the approval of a prescription drug and that this variation
is associated with the cohesion among pre-approval publications. Finally, a
series of regression models show that there is a substantive and significant
association between the pre-approval cohesion of the scientific debate and
the frequency and speed of regulatory action. The findings presented in
this chapter suggest that the unfolding of the scientific debate can account
for the variation in the regulatory actions taken for prescription drugs.
4.1 Introduction
How is the direction and content of science affected by involvement of social ac-
tors affiliated with industry? This question has become increasingly prominent
in the social sciences and has sparked a debate among some who argue that
industry involvement makes academic research more strategic and technolog-
ically relevant and others who have argued that industry involvement distorts
the development of new knowledge (Evans 2010). However, while there is an
abundance of evidence that shows that the direction of science is altered as a
result of industry involvement (Shane 2000; Washburn 2006; Etzkowitz 1998;
Azoulay et al. 2009), studies that have elaborated the mechanisms by which
this change occurs are scant. Moreover, few studies have explored the implica-
tions of change in the direction and content of science on its consumption. This
chapter identifies a mechanism that can account for variation in the direction
of scientific work about the safety and efficacy of prescription drugs and shows
that the regulatory pathway that unfolds after approval of a prescription drug
is adjusted by this variation.
In this chapter I build on data about all scientific publications that discuss at
least one of the 200 prescription drugs approved by the FDA between 2000 and
2010. For each of these 200 drugs, I distinguish between studies that were pub-
lished prior to approval of the prescription drug and those that were published
after approval. The way in which publications about the safety and efficacy of
prescription drugs are produced looks roughly as follows. The studies that are
published prior to approval are sponsored by the pharmaceutical firm in an at-
tempt to produce evidence that will get its new drug application approved for
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marketing in the U.S.1 The research design upon which the analyses in these
studies are built is implemented by physicians who are not employed by the
drug sponsor – they are called clinical investigators and are contracted to study
the drug that the sponsor is aiming to market. However, rarely do these in-
vestigators have any influence on the design of the study and rarely do they
have access to the raw data that the study produces (Baer et al. 2011; Suvarna
2012; Davidoff et al. 2001). And while about 70% of clinical investigators were
affiliated with academic organizations in the early 1990s the proportion had de-
creased to about 35% in 2001 when independent hospitals, private practices and
for-profit, dedicated clinical research sites replaced the academic sites as the
dominant player in the market of clinical trials (Azoulay and Fishman 2006).
The study implemented by the clinical investigator and the analyses produced
by the drug sponsor are used by the FDA to evaluate the safety and efficacy
of the new drug application. After approval of the new drug application, the
newly marketed substance becomes available more widely and research is car-
ried out by academic organizations without contracts with the sponsor of the
drug.
This instantaneous shift from industry-directed science to science produced
by a much more diverse set of actors provides an opportunity to study how
industry science differs from normal science, how the two become integrated,
and how the quality and content of industry science affects how it is consumed.
I exploit this opportunity by analyzing all citations between scientific publi-
1Obviously, official communications issued by drug sponsors will contain somewhat different
language for describing the function of clinical trials. For example, Otsuka – one of the leading
Japanese pharmaceutical firms – states on its website that “Otsuka, as a company focused on inno-
vation, recognizes that access to clinical trial data is valuable for the advancement of public health
and science. The benefits and associated responsibilities of broadly available clinical trial data are
considerable, including wider communication of the safety and efficacy data for our medicines,
of how clinical trials are designed and conducted, and of the diseases for which we, and many
others, are seeking to meet unmet medical needs. Otsuka has been sharing clinical trial data and
results through clinical trial registries in public databases, such as the clinicaltrials.gov website
and through publication in peer-reviewed journals and will continue these efforts.” Please see
bit.ly/1HdZ65l for more information.
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cations in the discourses that discuss the 200 prescription drugs approved be-
tween 2000 and 2010 and I develop hypotheses about how the structure of these
citation relationships emerges and how those same structures can be used to
understand the regulatory process after approval. In doing so I use the im-
age discussed in Latour (1987) about the construction of facts though the pro-
cess of tying knowledge claims to objects (people, claims, devices, etc.) that
support that specific claim. In particular, I study the way in which claims be-
come embedded in a scientific support network and the implications that has
for how consumers of science (including scientists themselves and regulators)
make sense of a body of literature containing a multitude of competing claims.
In this chapter I will develop hypotheses about how the transition from an
exclusive to an inclusive discourse can be used to understand the production of
evidence. Throughout this chapter I will compare the pre- and post-approval
debates and hypothesize about how internal structures are associated with in-
tegration. Moreover, I will show how these structures can be used to under-
stand post-approval outcomes, using data on the regulatory actions taken by
the FDA. First, I will show that the pre- and post approval debates are truly
different. I do so by analyzing the content of the papers published before and
after approval. Second, I study how the discussion network forms. Using Ex-
ponential Random Graph Models I explore the extent to which pre-approval
publications become integrated in the post-approval debate and whether this
is a function of the way in which the pre-approval debate is organized. Finally,
I examine the association between variation in the way in which pre-approval
debates are organized and the regulatory action that follows approval. In doing
so, this chapter aims to understand the extent to which scientific trajectories are
affected when the building of facts shifts from an industry controlled activity
to an activity that is open to a much wider group of scientists.
To anticipate the main findings from this chapter: I show (1) that science
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published prior approval pays less attention to the potential of ADRs than stud-
ies published after approval, (2) that pre-approval publications do not become
integrated into the core of the debate if they are initially highly cohesive, and
(3) that drugs characterized by high levels of network modularity in the pre-
approval citation structure receive fewer label changes and it takes longer for
those drugs to be targeted by larger numbers of regulatory actions.
4.1.1 Industry Science, Academic Science, and the Integration
Discourses
The interaction between university and industry has been widely studied in the
past couple of years and much of the research has demonstrated that from these
interactions, new social and cultural institutions have emerged. An overview
of this literature also makes clear that – although there is some variation in the
understanding about the character of academic and industrial science and the
roles that their interactions play in bringing them closer together or creating a
stronger separation between the two (Evans 2010) – industry and science have
moved closer together over the past decades. For example, Owen-Smith (2003)
has argued that universities and firms are increasingly evaluated based on sim-
ilar criteria. His work shows that universities have become increasingly active
in commercial activities including patenting and that success in the scientific
arena and success in the commercial arena are mutually dependent. Along
similar lines, Vallas and Kleinman (2008) demonstrate that values of scientists
in universities and firms have blended. They argue that academic scientists in-
creasingly engage in activities to commercialize their research and that industry
scientists are increasingly embracing the notion of “basic science”. Yet another
stream of research makes similar claims and argues that interests of govern-
ment, universities and industry have become tightly coupled in a “triple helix”
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(Etzkowitz 1983). In sum, evidence suggests that science and industry have
grown similar over the past decades.
Despite this seeming convergence between industry and academic science,
much of the research that describes how industry and science have become sim-
ilar along a wide range of dimensions focuses only on the forms of production
rather than on its content. For example, Owen-Smith (2003) shows that sci-
ence has become increasingly active in patenting its inventions. He argues that
the adoption of this commercial activity is evidence of the growing similarities
between science and industry. However, his research does not demonstrate if
and how the content of the patents taken out by industry versus science are
similar or whether they differ substantively. A recent study by Evans (2010)
shows that although collaborations between science and industry are increas-
ingly common, differences in incentives still persist and that these differences
translate in different types of science. His study shows that research conducted
by teams that involve more scientists affiliated with industry are more likely to
produce science that builds less on theory.
This change in the direction of science that is produced as a result of indus-
try involvement is seen by some as a serious form of contamination of science
(Proctor and Schiebinger 2008) – thereby adding a negative connotation to the
change in direction. This negative stance towards the change in direction of
science is likely to be related to studies that find that industry sometimes tends
to devise strategies that prevent science from promoting policies that would
harm the constituents of that industry (Proctor and Schiebinger 2008; Oreskes
and Conway 2010; Abraham and Ballinger 2012). An example of a debate in
science that is argued to have suffered from such strategies is the debate about
tobacco carcinogenicity (Shwed 2015).
The context of scientific evidence production about the safety of prescrip-
tion drugs provides a testing ground to explore how science produced by sci-
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entists affiliated to different types of organizations varies. Given the fact that
the incentives to publish critically about a prescription drug are different for
university scientists than they are for scientists affiliated with the organization
that sponsors the product, publications are expected to differ between these
two contexts. In particular, drug sponsors are expected to be less likely than
university researchers to publish about the potential ADRs associated with a
prescription drug. Therefore, I hypothesize:
H1: Studies published prior to approval of a prescription drug are less likely to
discuss the ADRs potentially associated with the prescription drug.
Embedded in the claims about the convergence of industry and academic
science is the observation that industry and academic science have become
more integrated and that this is achieved partly as a result of the increasing
collaborative integration. That is, scientific collaborations increasingly include
both academics and industry scientists (Evans 2010). What is missing from this
conversation, though, is how science produced by industry and science pro-
duced by academics becomes integrated. If industry science and academic sci-
ence emerge as two disconnected discourses, normal science in which knowl-
edge is accumulated and builds on prior knowledge is hampered. To under-
stand how industry science and academic science are integrated, I argue that
the networks of citations between published papers from both sources can pro-
vide a telling picture. A good example of a study that builds on a similar logic
is Shwed and Bearman (2010) who show that a network analysis of citations
allows one to identify levels of consensus. In particular, building on Latour’s
actor-network theory (ANT) and Pinch and Bijker’s (1984) idea of consensus
as closure Shwed and Bearman (2010) show that networks of citations provide
meaningful sociological objects that allows one to assess the level of consensus
between arguments made within a scientific debate. Broadly speaking, the idea
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that they propose and test is that modularity in the structure of the scientific ci-
tation network is likely to proxy for the level of consensus about the question
that has sparked a scientific debate. That is, cohesive citation structures are as-
sociated with high levels of consensus while citation structures with loosely or
unconnected regions are likely to be associated with disagreement.
Implicit in their account is that on average, when authors cite prior work,
they do so because they agree with one or more of the claims made in that study.
A citation between two papers also means that some of the content of the cited
paper has been relevant for the current study. Translating these insights to the
context of drug safety, I argue that industry science becomes integrated in a
scientific debate if the publications produced by industry are unconstrained.
In particular, if the science produced prior to approval of a prescription drug
covers non-redundant questions, that science will be built upon by science ap-
proved after approval of the drug. To operationalize redundancy, I compute
the modularity in the structure of citations between studies published prior to
approval. Since cohesive pre-approval citation networks are less valuable for
post-approval science, cohesive structures in the pre-approval citation network
inhibit those papers from becoming embedded in the post approval citation
network. Therefore, I hypothesize:
H2: Cohesive structures in the pre-approval citation network inhibit those pa-
pers from becoming embedded in the post approval citation network.
How does science inform practice? In their discussion on how the role of sci-
ence has been discussed in the sociological literature, Collins and Evans (2002)
point out the different waves of science studies, each of which contains a body
of fairly consensual literature about the role and function of science in society.
They argue that between these waves the consensual view on the meaning and
value of scientific knowledge has shifted. The first wave of science studies –
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which ended around the 1970s – largely agreed that good scientific training
provided scholars with high levels of authority and decisiveness that often ex-
tended beyond their discipline. Consensus was that decision-making in con-
texts that involved science and technology should be top down and the bases
of scientific argumentation were by no means subject of debate (Collins and
Evans 2002). One of the first to question the broad and unambiguous authority
of the sciences and the scientists that occupied the most prominent positions
was Thomas Kuhn in “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (Kuhn 2012).
His work gave rise to a second wave of science studies that re-conceptualized
science as a social activity. In doing so, this body of literature started to ques-
tion the bases of expertise and the authority linked to the label of expert. For
example, comparisons between scientific expertise and other forms of expertise
sparked debates about the boundaries of jurisdiction.
The third wave in the sociology of science described by Collins and Evans
(2002) seeks to understand how science informs policy. In the case of the med-
ical domain, a prominent task of science has been to evaluate policy and to
protect citizens from unintended harm. That is, the medical scientific enter-
prise does not only develop the basic building blocks of the drugs that patients
consume every day; medical science has also become an active evaluator of
its own inventions. However, when building on science the regulator faces the
problem of which claim is most valid and which claim should therefore be used
to inform policy. Eyal (2013) shows that this uncertainty is often reduced by a
priori classifing stakeholders as experts or non-experts, but that by doing so
valuable information can be ignored. In translating the idea of stratification by
expertise to the context of prescription drugs, one would – for example – only
pay attention to those claims advanced by high status actors. An alternative
to stratification by expertise is assessing the level of consensus among a body
of claims. Kogut and Macpherson (2011), for example, studied economists and
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has shown that agreement or consensus within a set of professionals affects the
diffusion of policies over which they agree.
Developing strategies to make sense of a body of scientific claims is fur-
ther complicated if the production of science is controled by one organization.
If commercial parties control the production of science they may refrain from
producing science that contradicts a claim made by the commercial party out-
side the realm of science. For example, various studies have shown that in-
dustry sponsored science is constrained in some sense and may not be in the
interest of promoting public health (Proctor and Schiebinger 2008; Oreskes and
Conway 2010; Abraham and Ballinger 2012). Industry science is therefore ex-
pected to be most valuable if it is not constrained by financial incentives and
if it provides a set of non-redundant insights about the safety and efficacy of
prescription drugs. In line with hypothesis 2, I argue that pre-approval citation
structures that are highly cohesive provide less information about the safety
and efficacy of a prescription drug and that drugs characterized by such evi-
dence are therefore more likely to experience regulatory action after approval.
Therefore, I hypothesize:
H3: Scientific debates characterized by high levels modularity (low cohesion)
will be targeted by fewer regulatory actions and slower unfolding of regulatory
action patterns.
4.2 Roadmap
The aim of the analyses in this chapter is to examine patterns by which scientific
debates about prescription drugs unfold. In doing so, I pay particular attention
to the ways in which the debate differs between the pre-approval stage and
the post-approval stage and how and whether the evidence in the two stages
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becomes integrated. Moreover, I also explore the impact of the way in which
scientific evidence making unfolds on regulatory action. I do so by conducting
several tests – each of which attempts to obtain a more crystallized description
of the process of scientific evidence production.
In the first set of analyses, I will show how the debate about drug safety and
efficacy differs between the pre- and the post-approval period. By analyzing
the content of the scientific literature published about a prescription drug, I test
whether the pre- and post-approval stages differ with respect to their attention
for the potential of ADRs. I use several Logistic regression models in which I
specify the likelihood of a paper discussing ADRs as a function of the stage in
which it was published and a set of control variables.
In a second set of analyses, I move to the data about citations between pa-
pers in each of the 200 prescription drugs in the sample. The goal of the anal-
yses is to model the process by which citations are created between papers in
the scientific debate about a prescription drug. I do so by using Exponential
Random Graph Models (ERGMs) in which I treat papers as the nodes in the
network and the citations as directed network ties. A correctly specified ERGM
allows me to recover the mechanisms that have guided the process of tie for-
mation. The mechanism of interest can be described as the likelihood of a post-
approval paper citing a pre-approval paper conditional on the cohesion within
the pre-approval citation structure.
In the final set of analyses, I build on the insights generated by the ERGMs
and specify sets of Poisson regressions and Cox Proportional Hazard models to
capture the effect of pre-approval citation cohesion on the number and rate of
regulatory actions targeting a prescription drug. The main goal of these analy-
ses is to understand how the level of cohesion within the publications prior to
approval has an impact on the regulatory trajectory through which a drug goes
once the drug is approved.
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Finally, I will summarize the outcomes of the statistical analyses and I will
interpret the outcomes to describe how the production of scientific evidence
unfolds.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
I conducted three sets of analyses. The first uses data at the paper level and
models the likelihood that papers will explicitly and prominently address the
ADRs associated with a prescription drug. Hence, the response variable is bi-
nary and equals 1 if the paper explicitly discusses the adverse effects associated
with a prescription drug and 0 otherwise. I model this binary dependent vari-
able as a function of the hypothesized effect of publication stage and a set of
control variables by using a series of logistic regressions. I estimate models in
which I pool the observations for all drugs, but I also fit multi-level models to
account for the nested structure of a paper in a scientific debate about a specific
prescription drug.
The second set of analyses focus on understanding the evolution of cita-
tion structures in scientific debates. I do so by employing Exponential Random
Graph Models (ERGMs). ERGMs are widely used by researchers interested in
different substantive contexts (Wimmer and Lewis 2010; Srivastava and Banaji
2011; Papachristos et al. 2013; McFarland et al. 2014) and they allow the re-
searcher to test hypotheses about the social mechanisms that generated a set of
(social) interactions between nodes2 in a network. In contrast to widespread
standard regression techniques such as the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Pro-
bit, or Logit regression3, ERGMs accommodate various types of dependencies
2When I discuss general topics related to network analysis, I will used the terms nodes and
edges to refer to the actors in a network and their relationships, respectively. When I discuss the
empirical case of scientific debates, I will refer to the actors in the network as papers and to the
relationships between papers as citations.
3Modeling network formation using standard regression techniques violates the independence
assumption and – as a result – errors will be correlated with the structure of the network. Standard
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between observations within a sample. In particular, rather than assuming that
each dyad (i.e. a tie between two actors) is independently formed, ERGMs
build on the idea that the probability of dyad formation is a process that is con-
ditional on the structural properties of the network in which a particular dyad
is embedded. Moreover, the ERGM framework allows the researcher to specify
the precise structure of the dependencies between the actors in a network that
are hypothesized to guide the process of dyad formation.
Similar to standard regression, the equation for an ERGM includes a depen-
dent variable and a set of independent variables. The dependent variable is
the observed network (i.e. the network that the researcher is interested in ex-
plaining) and this network represents one realization from the set of possible
networks given the set of nodes. Since there is no variance in a single network,
the ERGM exploits the hypothetical variation over the set of possible networks
(Cranmer and Desmarais 2011). The goal then is to specify an equation for
the ERGM that includes independent variables that capture theoretically moti-
vated social processes that are likely to have caused network ties in the network
of interest to be formed. Under the model specified by the researcher, each net-
work in the set of possible networks can be assigned a probability. If the model
specification assigns a high probability to the observed network (which is one
network in the set of all possible networks) the model is argued to fit the data
well. That is, to generate a good model fit the values of the parameters are
set in such a way that the most probable network statistics computed on the
networks are those that describe the observed network (Robins et al. 2007).
ERGMs can be fitted on relational data that comprise nodes, the attributes
of those nodes, and alternative relationships between the nodes. The indepen-
dent variables are the local network configurations (e.g. triangles, stars, etc.),
regression techniques also lack a design that can accommodate structural terms. For example,
standard regression techniques are unable to model network formation as a function of triadic
closure and will therefore – in the presence of a triadic effect – be characterized by an omitted
variable that could potentially introduce bias in the model estimates.
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exogenous dependencies (i.e. spatial distance between actors), and actor char-
acteristics (e.g. age, size, etc.) that are hypothesized to influence the process of
tie formation. The observed network is regarded as a random draw from the
probability distribution of networks and the ERGM uses Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) maximum likelihood estimation to determine which parame-
ters of the model create a probability distribution of networks in which the
observed network has a high likelihood of being the outcome of the modeling
process. The ERGM is specified as follows:












where the probability that a network Y generated by an ERGM equals the
observed network y is a function of the sum of all network configurations A4,
where gA(y) is the network statistic corresponding to configuration A, equal to
the frequency at which configuration A is observed in network y5, and ηA is the
estimated parameter associated with gA(y). This parameter captures the im-
portance of configuration A for generating the network that is modeled and is
assumed to be homogeneous for the entire network. The normalizing constant
k ensures that equation 4.1 is a proper probability distribution and is essentially
equal to the sum over all possible networks given N nodes in the network.
While equation 4.1 has a global orientation because it models the probability
of an entire network, one may also write an ERGM in a way that is more akin
to a standard regression equation. By writing the ERGM in this alternative
4A configuration is a subgraph structure for which there is a parameter in the model. Examples
of such configurations are mutual dyads (reciprocity), triangles (triadic closure), or stars (popular-
ity).
5Each configuration refers to only a small set of nodes in the network. For example, if reci-
procity is one of the hypothesized social mechanisms for dyad formation a configuration is in-
cluded for each possible dyad in the network. Since estimating parameters for all these sets is
infeasible, they are aggregated if the configurations they refer to are of the same type (e.g. reci-
procity) and one thereby ignore the labels on the nodes. This constraint is termed the homogeneity
of isomorphic network configurations. As a result of this constraint, the gA(y) term can be viewed as a
count rather than as a binary term that indicates whether a configuration is present or not.
111
form one can directly probe the probability of a single tie (Yij) being formed
conditional on the rest of the network (Yc):
logit Pr(Yij|Ycij) = ∑
A
ηAδgA(y) (4.2)
In this representation of an ERGM, the parameter estimates ηA generated
by fitting ERGMs can be expressed as conditional log-odds and can therefore
be interpreted as the change in the log-odds of a tie being present in response
to an increase in the variable of interest. Hence the parameter corresponding to
a specific covariate (e.g. one of the included network structures) tells us if the
log-odds of observing a network tie increase or decrease as the tie is embedded
in the the network configuration for which the covariate value is computed.
Similar to standard regression techniques, the Goodness-Of-Fit (GOF) of an
ERGM can be computed and one way of doing so is by using standard statistics
including BIC and AIC. Besides these measures known from standard regres-
sion, ERGMs also allow for another class of GOF statistics. After estimating
each of the models presented in this chapter, I inspect its GOF by comparing
counts of network statistics6 in the observed network to the counts of those
same statistics in a set of simulated networks (these networks are simulated
from the estimated coefficients in the ERGM). If the statistics for the observed
network lie in the center of the distribution of statistics for the simulated net-
works (i.e. there is no significant difference between the observed and simu-
lated network) the model is arguably a good representation of the data gener-
ating process.
Before describing the third set of analyses, I would like to note that the use
of ERGMs in this chapter may seem inappropriate at first. Since the questions
that I am trying to answer are clearly about the unfolding of social ties over
6Typically a set of network statistics is chosen that was not included in the original model.
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time, one may argue that some of the newly developed methods that allow for
the analysis of social networks over time are more appropriate. Two of the most
popular methods are Stochastic Actor Oriented Models (SAOMs) which are im-
plemented in the RSiena R-package and TERGMs which is essentially ERGMs
version of a panel regression. While these methods are statistically advanced
and provide a wide range of options to customize the model for many differ-
ent contexts, they also come with several shortcomings. For example, SOAMs
do not handle networks of the size used in this chapter. They are simply too
computationally intensive. A shortcoming that both models share is that they
require panels of network relations, where each panel represents a slice of the
network in time. Since network ties in a citation network never dissolve, it is
not quite clear how to practically implement this empirical setting. Given these
limitations, I argue that SOAMs and TERGMs do not provide the methodologi-
cal framework that could accommodate the analyses of the data in this chapter.
However, by building on an innovative set of variables I will show that ques-
tions about the temporal unfolding of network ties can be modeled within the
classic ERGM framework.
The third set of analyses link the structure of the pre-approval citation net-
work to: (1) the number of regulatory actions and to (2) the duration to a given
number of regulatory actions.
The number of regulatory actions is the dependent variable and has the
following characteristics: 1) its value is non-negative and discrete and 2) it ex-
hibits overdispersion which is a result of its skewed distribution. Since certain
assumptions of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression are violated, non-
negative discrete outcome data is most commonly analyzed by assuming that
the data-generating process follows Poisson distribution. However, various
factors including overdispersion violate the assumptions of the Poisson pro-
cess. Since Negative Binomial regression models do not carry these assump-
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tions I employ negative binomial regression models to study the effect of struc-
tures in the pre-approval citation network on the total number of regulatory
actions.
To test the hypothesis about duration until regulatory action I estimate a
set of Cox Proportional Hazard models (Cox PH models). These are semi-
parametric regression models that are commonly used to model the survival of
humans in medical settings, but have – in recent years –increasingly been used
to accommodate the analysis of duration until an event. The Cox PH model
describes the hazard rate of a prescription drug receiving a given number of
regulatory actions as a function of covariates and a baseline hazard rate. The
hazard rate at age t indicates the rate at which drugs receive the xth regulatory
action given that that did not happen up until t and can therefore be referred to
as the conditional instantaneous rate at which events occur. In particular, the
hazard rate in the Cox PH model employed in this chapter can be specified as
a function of the number of months of a drug on the market and the indepen-
dent variables described in the following section. I define the hazard rate as
h(t, X(t), β) for a drug that has been on the market for t with independent vari-
ables X1(t), X2(t) ..., Xk(t) – which are collected in matrix X(t) – and a vector of
regression parameters β. Please note that X(t) allows for the inclusion of time-
dependent covariates in the model used to estimate the model parameters. The
Cox PH model employed in this paper can now be described as:
h(t, X(t), β) = h0(t)exp(βX(t)) (4.3)
The first expression in the function is the baseline hazard and can be esti-
mated non- parametrically. The regression coefficients in the β vector are ob-
tained through maximum partial likelihood, a technique that exploits the order




To address the questions outlined in the introduction of this chapter, I collected
data on the names, approval dates, and sponsors of all 200 drugs approved by
the Food and Drug Administration between 2000 and 2010. Essentially, this
data is a subset of the data described in Chapter 3. The data is built from four
main sources: Drugs@FDA7, a 1989 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
publication, NDA Pipeline, and the 1999 - 2011 Drug and Biologic Approval
Reports8. The main reason for focusing on the subset of drugs rather than
the entire population is twofold (and mostly pragmatic): First, left truncation
is needed because citation data for older publications (mostly pre-1996) is of
much lower quality than more recent citation data. Second, right truncation is
used because for each prescription drug a window is needed after approval of
the substance to test the hypotheses that are the focus of this chapter.
After identifying all drugs approved between 2000 and 2010, I matched each
of the generic names of these drugs to a unique MeSH term9. MeSH is a clas-
sification scheme and controlled vocabulary and it is mainly used to classify
academic literature through the matching of the primary content of a publica-
tion with one or multiple MeSH terms. MeSH is maintained by the National
Library of Medicine and can be downloaded for free from PubMed.10 In some
cases a drug was not indexed as a MeSH term but only as a Supplementary
Concept Record (SCR). SCRs are used to index chemicals, drugs, and other sub-
stances that are not included in the MeSH vocabulary. The main reason why
these drugs are not included in the MeSH tree is simply that there are too many:
71.usa.gov/1pCpJaZ.
81.usa.gov/1vr3lHr.
9MeSH is the acronym for “Medical Subject Headings”.
10ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/mesh.
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while there are about 26,000 MeSH terms, there are about 200,000 SCR records
with over 505,000 SCR terms. The major difference between a MeSH term and
an SCR is that the former has its own MeSH tree number. However, each SCR is
linked to one or more MeSH terms11 and like MeSH terms, SCRs are searchable
through PubMed.
After matching each of the generic names of the prescription drugs in the
sample to a MeSH term, I extracted all publications from PubMed that were
assigned at least one of these MeSH terms (or SCRs). PubMed is National Li-
brary of Medicine’s database of academic publications in the fields of medicine,
nursing, dentistry, veterinary medicine, health care systems, and pre-clinical
sciences and has been show to be one of the most complete resources for query-
ing publications in these fields (Falagas et al. 2008). The extraction of the publi-
cations from PubMed was done through a Python script that interacts with The
Entrez Programming Utilities, the API of the National Center for Biotechnology
Information (NCBI). The script downloads the PubMed ID (PMID) of each pub-
lication and a series of characteristics of the publication including title, journal
title, authors, associated MeSH terms, language, etc. I subset the data to only
include publications that were in the English language.
After identifying all PMIDs of the publications associated with the 200 pre-
scription drugs, I used the Scopus API to download all the references of those
papers. Scopus is a commercial product from Elsevier and has been argued
to be one of the most detailed resources for retrieving citation data (Falagas
et al. 2008). Although this strategy to download citations is superior to any
other currently available strategy, it comes with one caveats. First, some of the
academic journals indexed in PubMed are not indexed in Scopus. As a result,
the citations for those publications cannot be retrieved. This problem is minor
11The MeSH terms to which SCRs are linked typically describe a drug class which is defined
either on the basis of chemical similarity or on the basis of similarity in the mechanism of action.
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for the analyses conducted in this chapter because less then 1% of the PMIDs
downloaded from PubMed is not found in Scopus.
4.4.2 Variable Descriptions
4.4.2.1 Logistic Regressions
Data for the first set of analyses come mostly from PubMed. The risk set com-
prises all papers that discuss one of the 200 drugs in the sample and the re-
sponse variable in the models is binary and equals 1 if the MeSH terms on a
paper include the MeSH qualifier “adverse effects.” The independent variables
in the model include a Post-Approval Publication dummy which is equal to 1
if the paper was published after approval of the drug by the FDA and 0 other-
wise. The second independent variable, Previous Article Counts, is the sum of
all articles about a given drug published prior to the focal paper. This variable
controls temporal variation in the likelihood of publishing adverse effect papers
that can be accounted for by the stage in which the debate is in. If papers about
adverse effects need a critical basis of scientific work to become meaningful,
one would expect that the early stages of a scientific debate are characterized
by low levels of papers about adverse effects. I include a similarly constructed
variable, Previous AE Article Count, that captures the number of publications
prior to the focal paper that have been assigned the adverse effects MeSH qual-
ifier. This variable controls the variation in the dependent variable that relates
to opportunities to publish a specific type of paper. One may argue, for exam-
ple, that first publications on a specific topic suffer from a first mover penalty
and that the risk of publishing an adverse effect paper increases with the num-
ber of adverse effect papers. Conversely, there might be a premium for those
publications that pioneer uncharted territory which would reduce the num-
ber of publications about adverse effects if the number of adverse effect papers
117
increase. The fourth independent variable, Number of Authors, controls varia-
tion introduced by the type of publication. Different types of publications vary
in how much time and resources are needed to carry out the research (Wuchty
et al. 2007), and the number of authors of a publication represents a crude proxy
size of the project.12 Debate Embeddedness captures the share of the references
citing another paper within the debate. Obviously, some of the references on
the papers within the scientific debate about a prescription drug are citing pa-
pers that are not embedded within the debate so those citations are coded as
external citations. The variable is computed then as the sum of citations within
the debate over the total number of citations. Finally, the Missing References
dummy captures whether a publication has no references. That can have three
reasons: 1) the publication is too recent and is not yet added to Scopus, 2) the
publication contains no references, and 3) the publication contains no references
to publications within Scopus.
4.4.2.2 ERGMs
Before describing the variables used to model the ERGMs, let me briefly review
the definitions used to construct the network. Nodes in the citation network are
represented by papers, while the ties or edges between papers are represented
by a citation from one paper to another. The relationship between two papers
is binary – it indicates the presence or absence of a citation going from node i
to node j – and it is directed. Therefore, by definition, an edge that runs from
node i to node j implies that the paper represented by node j must have been
published before node i was published.
The network mechanisms that I will introduce below aim to account for the
actual tie-formation processes. The first variable included in ERGM is the Edges
12I experimented with this variable. For example, I included a squared term for the Number
of Authors, but decided not to include the variable in the model because it was statistically not
significant and it did not alter the effect size or significance of the variable of interest.
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term. This variable is akin to a constant in a standard regression model and if
all other variables are removed from the model it is equal to the density of the
network. It therefore captures the average tendency of actors in the network to
form ties with other actors in the network.
I constructed an Adverse Effect variable and included it in the model as
a “nodemix” term.13 This variable builds on a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 if the paper was assigned an adverse effect MeSH qualifier and 0 if not.
What a nodemix term allows the researcher to do is to model the effect of all
possible combinations of the dummy variable while leaving one of the possible
combinations out to serve as the reference group. Since the network in this
chapter is directional, there are four possible combinations: 1-1, 1-0, 0-1, and
0-0. I leave out the 0-0 combination and the log-odds for the remaining three
combinations can be interpreted as differences from the reference group.
The third variable included in the models also builds on a dummy vari-
able: it captures whether a paper was published prior to the approval of the
prescription drug addressed in the paper or whether if was published after
approval. This variable is modeled through the inclusion of a nodemix term.
Since, a citation from a paper published prior to approval to a paper published
after approval is logically impossible, the term only leaves three combinations.
Moreover, since the hypothesis outlined earlier builds on the concepts of pre-
approval cohesion and post-approval integration, I could leave out the combi-
nation 0→ 1 or 0→ 0, where 1 represents a pre-approval paper and 0 represents
a post-approval paper. The 1→ 1 must be included because it captures the co-
hesion within the pre-approval publications. The two realizations of the term
essentially capture whether citations within a stage are more or less likely to
occur between stages (i.e. in the pre- or post-approval stage).
13The independent variables in an ERGM can come in a variety of forms. See ? for a detailed
overview of the available terms.
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I also include a “nodeofactor” variable. This term captures the average ten-
dency of a group (the two groups of pre- and post-approval publications in the
current context) to send ties – hence the “o” in the term which stands for outde-
gree. This term can be seen as the main effect of the pre-post nodemix variable.
While the model by definition corrects for the sizes of the groups for which mix-
ing is evaluated, the model does not account for different levels of networking
tendencies. A nodefactor variable does precisely that. I have included a nodeo-
factor variable because the opportunities for pre-approval publications to send
out ties within the debate are much fewer (i.e. there are fewer within-debate
papers available). It is not advised to include a nodeofactor variable for each
group because, because the sum of all such statistics equals twice the number of
edges and hence a linear dependency would arise in any model also including
edges (Morris et al. 2008). Therefore, one of the groups is omitted and serves as
the reference group.
The fifth variable is included as a control variable. If science evolves cumu-
latively and if new findings replace older findings, citation patterns are likely to
be characterized by short lags between the publication date of the focal paper
and the cited paper.14 However, this would also increase the likelihood that
papers within stages cite one another. To control this temporal effect I include
it in the ERGM as an absdiff term. Such a term requires the researcher to as-
sign some value to all nodes and the model then computes a matrix in which
the differences between these absolute values are stored. Although are data are
time-stamped at the day level I include the variable as the difference in weeks
to generate a larger size for the estimated coefficient. Including the term allows
one to test whether papers published closer together in time are more likely to
14Please note that I am using the publication data here, not the submission date of a paper.
While a number of journals provides the submission date of a paper on their website, it is not
always available in PubMed. However, manual inspection of the time difference between submis-
sion and publication in the medical sciences is short. Rather than months or years, the lag between
submission and publication in the medical sciences tends to be a couple of weeks at most.
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cite one another than papers published further apart.
The sixth variable captures similarity in the content of two publications.
Based on the MeSH data described above, I generate a set of possible MeSH
terms for each scientific debate about a prescription drug. From this set of
terms, I construct a vector that captures whether a publication was assigned
a specific MeSH term (i.e. I set the value in the vector to 1) or not (i.e. I set
the value of the vector to 0). I then compute the cosine similarity between the
vector of each publication in a debate and I store the values in a square matrix.
This matrix is essentially a distance matrix (i.e. rather than capturing spatial
distance, it captures distance in content) and is has the same dimension as the
matrix of observed citations. Since in many of the larger networks, the inclu-
sion of the distance matrix inhibits convergence, I transform the valued matrix
to a binary matrix by assigning a 1 to cases that exceed the median and 0 to
cases that are equal to or lower than the median. The estimated coefficient for
the term indicates whether more similar papers are more likely to be linked
through a citation from the more recent to the older paper.
The seventh variable in the model is also an edgecov term. It builds on a
matrix of dummies indicating whether there is overlap in the author sets of two
papers. If two papers share at least one author, the cell in the matrix is equal
to 1 and it is equal to 0 if there is no overlap between the two. The estimated
coefficient for the term indicates whether papers with overlap are more likely
to be linked through a citation than papers that do not share authors.
Finally, the model includes two network statistics. The first statistic – GWESP,
or “geometrically weighted edgewise shared partner” – captures triadic clo-
sure. In the case of citation networks it allows one to test whether a citation
from paper A to paper B (A → B) is more likely to occur if A was also citing
paper C and paper C had also cited paper B (A→ C and C→ B). An alternative
term in the model would have been the triangle term, but inclusion of such a
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term increases the likelihood that the ERGM is degenerate. The GWESP vari-
able is essentially a parametric version of the triangle variable and it reduces
the potential for degeneracy.15 The GWESP term adds a network statistic to the
model that equals the (geometrically weighted) edgewise shared partner dis-
tribution – the number of times each connected pair shares ties with a common
third.16
The second network statistic included in the model is the “geometrically
weighted dyadic shared partner” (GWDSP) statistic, which is a function of the
number of dyads which have k neighbors in common (where k ranges from 1
to N − 2). The GWDSP statistic models the distribution of shared partners of
nodes that may or may not be tied themselves. Since the GWESP statistic is
included in the model, the GWDSP statistic can be thought of as a measure of
structural imbalance, representing situations where A does not cite B despite
having one or more citations in common. Evidence of endogenous clustering
in a network would be supported by a positive GWESP term and a negative
GWDSP term in the same model.
Given these data, the resulting model looks as follows:
15Model degeneracy stems, in part, from the cascading tendencies of the transitivity term. That
is, in closing one triad another triad involving adjacent nodes will typically be opened leading to
an infinite regress) (Hunter et al. 2008).
16Compared to the triangle term, the GWESP term implies a decreasing marginal return to each
additional shared partner that would create a transitive triad.
122
Pr(Y = y|X) = β0c(Edgesij)+
β1c(Adverse E f f ectij)+
β2c(Pre− Approvalij)+






4.4.2.3 Negative Binomial and Cox Proportional Hazard Regressions
The risk set in the analyses predicting the volume and speed at which drugs
are targeted by regulatory action comprises all 200 drugs in the sample. The
dependent variable for the Negative Binomial Model captures the number of
label changes that a drug has been characterized by since approval of the sub-
stance. The dependent variable for the Cox PH model is the duration to the
second label change, which is the median of the number of label changes in the
first 4 years since approval. Appendix A of this chapter further describes the
details of duration until label changes using Kaplan-Meier plots.
The independent variables in the model include a dummy variable for Prior-
ity Review which is equal to 1 if a drug was approved through Priority Review
and 0 otherwise. A Priority Review designation means that the FDA reviews
the drug application within 6 months (compared to 10 months under standard
review). Drugs that the FDA believes would be significant improvements in
the safety or effectiveness of the treatment of serious conditions are eligable to
receive Priority Review designation. The second variable included in the model
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captures the number of approved drug applications by the sponsor of the focal
drug prior to submitting it for approval. As I have mentioned before, new drug
applications that were submitted but not approved are unfortunately not pub-
licly available. The third variable captures the number of months it took to get
the drug approved by the FDA. For each submission, I recorded the submis-
sion date and the approval date, calculated the days in between those dates,
and transformed the variable from days to months. I also included variables
that describe the pre-approval scientific debate. First, I include a count of the
number of academic papers that have been published about a given prescrip-
tion drug before the drug is approved for marketing in the U.S. Finally, I also
include a variable that described how cohesive the citation structure is among
the papers that were published before approval of the prescription drug. Build-
ing on the citation network of the pre-approval publications, I compute com-
munity membership based on a community detection algorithm developed by
Newman and Girvan (2004). This algorithm essentially captures the idea that
it is likely that edges connecting separate communities must have high edge
betweenness (meaning that those edges serve as high traffic routes if one were
to find all shortest paths between all nodes in the network). By gradually re-
moving edges with the highest edge betweenness one can create a set of com-
munities. Based on this detection method, I compute the modularity score.
4.5 Results
The results of the analyses aiming to describe the differences between the pre-
and post-approval debate are shown in Table 4.1. Each of the four models pre-
sented in this table shows the coefficient estimates of a Logistic regression. In
the first column all observations across all drugs are pooled; the second column
presents a drugs fixed-effects model; the fourth column presents a multilevel
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model with random intercepts; and the final models is a multilevel model with
random intercepts and random slopes. The results show that scientific stud-
ies published prior to approval of a prescription drug differ significantly from
studies published in the post-approval stages of a drug’s life-cycle. In partic-
ular, the pre-approval debate is characterized by significantly lower numbers
of publications that are specifically about ADRs potentially associated with a
prescription drugs. Despite the fact that the coefficient estimates vary across
all four models, the Post-Approval Publication variable is consistently positive
and significant. The most conservative estimate – shown in column 2 – implies
that the odds of a post-approval publication discussing ADRs are 1.5 times the
odds of a pre-approval publication discussing ADRs. The least conservative
estimate – shown in column 1 – suggests that the odds ratio is 2.5. Other coef-
ficients indicate that publications are likely to be explicitly about ADRs if the
number of previous articles on the specific drug is higher, if the number of pre-
vious ADR articles is lower, if the number of authors on a publication is higher,
and if the publication is more engaged with other publications about the same
drug.
The main finding can be interpreted in two ways. First, the difference can be
explained by arguing that the resources to identify the effect of treatment with a
drug on the incidence of ADRs are increasing after approval. Examples of such
resources include increasing data volumes, allowing for the statistical identi-
fication of the effect, and the increase in human resources which allows for a
wider variety of hypotheses to be constructed. In the absence of other explana-
tions, this interpretation should hold across essentially all drugs and the effect
size should be fairly homogeneous – meaning that the lower likelihood for pub-
lications prior to approval to discuss ADRs associated with a drug should be of
similar size across all drugs.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sor of a drug has on the way in which science is conducted prior to approval.
It is obviously in the interest of the sponsor of the drug to have the new drug
application associated with as few ADRs as possible, and sponsors of new drug
applications are therefore incentivized to limit the number of publications that
could potentially jeopardize the success of their product in the approval pro-
cess.17 This explanation would also be consistent with prior research showing
that there is supply-side18 driven publication bias – firms holding back publi-
cations that could negatively impact the product that they represent (Ahmed
et al. 2012; Chalmers et al. 2013; Perlis et al. 2005; Higgins et al. 2011).
In order to distinguish between these two explanations, Figure 4.1 shows a
simple scatterplot of the bivariate relationship between the proportion of pre-
approval ADR papers (all pre-approval ADR papers / all pre-approval papers)
and the difference between the proportion of post-approval ADR papers and
the proportion of pre-approval ADR papers.19 The plot demonstrates that drug
debates with relatively few pre-approval ADR publications are characterized
by higher proportions of post-approval ADR publications.20 The second inter-
pretation differentiates between drugs (i.e. if pre-approval ADR publications
are held low, the increase in post-approval ADR publications will be high be-
cause ADRs that could have been identified before are now identified only after
17One could argue that sponsors of drugs would not exert their power to steer the process at the
risk of the drug being targeted by post-approval regulatory action. However, if one accounts for
the fact that pretty much all drugs are targeted by regulatory action and that market withdrawals
are rare events, the trade-off may favor exerting pre-approval influence on content of scientific
publications.
18Supply-side driven publication bias is defined here as publication bias that results from re-
search that is not being conducted or research that is not being submitted. Conversely, demand-
side driven publication bias results from research publishers exhibiting bias in the acceptance of
research for publication.
19Making this comparison makes more sense than directly comparing the pre-approval and
post-approval proportions, because some drugs are inherently more problematic than others and
will therefore exhibit a strong and positive correlation by definition.
20Obviously, since proportions are bounded between 0 and 1, a very high pre-approval ADR
proportion is by definition paired with a smaller pre-post difference. However, even if one were
to focus only on the cases in which the pre-approval proportion was less than 0.19 – which is the
average accross all observations, the negative correlation is still present and highly significant at
0.29. For this sample, the maximum difference between the pre and the post proportions is 0.58
which would still leave ample room for additional ADR papers.
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approval) and is consistent with the graph. The first interpretation, however,
seems less plausible since it cannot account for the heterogeneity in differences
and the strong correlation between the pre-approval ADR publication propor-
tion and the difference with the post-approval proportion. Although the graph
does not completely resolve the causal question, it shows a pattern that is con-
sistent with the idea that if the sponsor of a drug is able to reduce attention
for ADRs prior to approval, attention for those ADRs will be picked up in later
stages of the drug life-cycle.













































































































































































































Note: This scatterplot shows the bivariate relationship between the proportion of pre-approval
ADR papers (all pre-approval ADR papers / all pre-approval papers) and the difference between
the proportion of post-approval ADR papers and the proportion of pre-approval ADR papers. The
correlation coefficient is -0.49 and is significant at the 0.01 level.
The second set of findings are derived from the ERGMs that I have esti-
mated for the citation networks of all drugs approved between 2000 and 2010.
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Before going into the specifics of the variables of interest, Figure 4.2 describes
the distribution of the coefficient estimates across all 200 models. The first vari-
able, Pre nodefactor, captures the tendency of pre-approval papers to cite other
papers. The reference group comprises all post-approval papers. Obviously
the estimated coefficients are always negative: papers published prior to ap-
proval have much fewer options to cite other papers in the debate than papers
published after approval. The average estimate for this variable indicates that
pre-approval publications are citing 97% fewer other papers in the debate than
do post-approval publications. The second variable, Pre-Pre citation is pos-
itive – as expected – and implies that edges between papers that were both
published prior to approval are much more likely than edges between papers
published after approval. While this finding is trivial, what’s not trivial is its
variation across models. I will discuss this variation shortly. Figure 4.2 also
shows that the Post-Pre citation variable is mostly positive. This implies that,
in general, publications that came out after approval of a prescription drug are
more likely to cite papers that came out before approval than papers that came
out after approval. This finding is in line with the idea that the making of facts
in these networks is a cumulative process, where recent work builds on ear-
lier work. The following three variables capture the mixing patterns of papers
that discuss ADRs and papers that do not discuss ADRs. The reference group
comprises ties between papers that do not address ADRs. Among these three
variables, the tendency of ADR papers to cite each other is the strongest.
The models also contain endogenous network statistics. The GWDSP vari-
ables – which are mostly negative – and the GWESP variables – which are
mostly positive – indicate that citations are likely to form ties that complete
transitive triads. In other words, a citation from paper A to paper B (A → B)
is more likely to occur if A was also citing paper C and paper C had also cited
paper B (A→ C and C→ B). Please note that this effect is the net effect of those
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structural properties and that the effect cannot be explained by similarities in
content, or any of the other variables in the model. Finally, the two variables
that capture similarity in terms of authors and MeSH terms both indicate that
citations are more likely to be present between papers that share authors and
between papers that have similar sets of MeSH terms associated with them.
The majority of the models provides estimates that confirm the findings in ear-
lier work on how citation networks form and this provides confidence that the
modeling strategy allows me to make correct inferences in the processes that
have guided the formation of the network.
However, to assess if the models indeed do a good job of describing the
network formation process, I computed the GOF statistics for each of the 200
models. Although for a few individuals cases other model specifications pro-
vided better GOF statistics, the model specification shown here provides the
best average fit among a series of model specifications that I have tested.
To assess the hypothesis developed earlier in the chapter about the relation-
ship between the internal structure of the citation network in the pre-approval
stage and the extent to which those papers become integrated in the post-
approval debate, Figure 4.3 plots the paired coefficient estimates for Pre-Pre
citation and Post-Pre citation. The left panel of Figure 4.3 plots the sorted co-
efficient estimates for Pre-Pre citation, while the right panel plots the paired
coefficient estimates for Post-Pre citation. That is, figure 4.3 contains 200 lines
(along the vertical axis of the graph) and each line contains the estimates of
the Pre-Pre citation variable and Post-Pre citation variable. The graph shows
that there is a strong tendency for debates with relatively low internal cohesion
in the pre-approval stage to be characterized by relatively high levels of Post-
Pre mixing. That is, the likelihood that papers in the post-approval debate cite
papers in the pre-approval debate (versus other papers in the post-approval de-
bate) is higher when the likelihood of papers in the pre-approval debate citing
130
Figure 4.2: Boxplot of coefficient estimates


























Note: This graph provides a summary of the coefficient estimates for all 200 ERGMs estimated for
the drugs in the sample. The boxplots show what the range of the estimates is and the vertical red
line shows the boundary between a positive and a negative estimate.
each other is lower. This implies that as there is less cohesion among papers
in the pre-approval debate, these papers are more likely to be integrated in the
post-approval debate. This finding suggests that a lack of pre-approval intra-
debate cohesion is reflective of the wider range of possible hypotheses that are
studied for those drugs and that research is therefore less redundant. Or to put
it in opposite terms, if all pre-approval research only focuses on one or a set of
closely related questions, post-approval research will only cite one or a few of
those papers because the questions that they address are redundant.
I now move from the question about how citation networks form to the
question of how the structure of a debate is associated with the rate and volume
of regulatory action. Table 4.2 shows the coefficient estimates for three models
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Coeffcient Estimates
Note: These two plots show the relationship between the Pre-Pre and Post-Pre mixing coefficients
extracted from the ERGMs. The left panel is sorted from small to large and the estimates on the left
are matched – meaning that two points that line up horizontally belong to the same ERGM. Similar
to Logistic regression, exponentiating the coefficient estimates provides one with the odds-ratios.
predicting volume of regulatory action and three models predicting duration to
regulator action. Across all six models, the final set of findings show that drugs
characterized by high levels of pre-approval network modularity are targeted
by fewer regulatory actions. The coefficient in model 3 implies that an increase
in modularity of 0.1 reduces the number of label changes by 7.4%. The Cox
PH models also show that drug debates characterized by high levels of pre-
approval network modularity are slower to accumulate regulatory action. This
is consistent with the hypothesis 3 developed earlier in this chapter. High levels
of modularity suggest that there is little redundancy across the publications and
the pre-approval set of publications is therefore likely to have tackled a wider
132
range of questions.
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to describe the process by which scientific evidence
about prescription drugs is produced and to examine its relation to the regula-
tory trajectory that characterizes the drug after approval. Since the production
of evidence prior to approval is controlled by the sponsor of the drug, I have
compared evidence production in the two stages and I have looked at how the
evidence produced by sponsors of the drug become integrated in the scientific
debate that unfolds after approval.
The chapter presents three main substantive findings. First, publications
of studies conducted prior to approval that are commissioned by drug spon-
sors are less likely to discuss in detail an ADR that is potentially associated
with treatment with the drug. Additional analyses show that drug applications
characterized by low levels of ADR publications prior to approval are associ-
ated, on average, with a higher number of post-approval publications that are
specifically about the ADRs associated with a drug. This finding is consistent
with the idea that some firms are able to develop publication strategies that
benefit the drug that they sponsor. The second finding is that cohesive citation
structures among studies published prior to approval are less likely to become
integrated in the post-approval scientific debate about the safety and efficacy
of a prescription drug. One interpretation of this finding – that is in line with
the first finding –holds that there is an incentive for sponsors of prescription
drugs to limit the number of different questions asked about the safety of a pre-
scription drug. Doing so will protect them from critique that could jeopardize
approval. However, as a result, studies conducted after approval will have to









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tions will therefore have no broad scientific basis to build on. The final set of
findings show that prescription drugs characterized by cohesive pre-approval
citation structures are subject to higher levels and higher rates of label changes
after approval. The interpretation of this finding relates closely to the findings
one and two: fewer questions answered prior to approval, leads to more prob-
lematic regulatory biographies of drugs after approval.
Although the analyses presented in this chapter do not allow me to causally
identify the mechanisms that produce some of the patterns that I observe, the
analyses are consistent with the idea that the adoption of certain publication
strategies by drug sponsors can interfere with the goal of the FDA to regulate
drugs efficiently. Prior work has shown that industry involvement in science
can introduce publication biases (Ahmed et al. 2012; Chalmers et al. 2013; Perlis
et al. 2005; Higgins et al. 2011) and it can affect the type of science that is con-
ducted (Evans 2010). What the study presented in this chapter adds to this
work is that companies may influence how facts about prescription drugs are
produced and it shows that those practices have real effects in terms of the reg-
ulatory actions that follow approval.
There are two shortcomings of the study presented in this chapter that I
would like to address in future work. First, I have shown that the structure of
science prior to approval allows me to predict at which rate the drug will be tar-
geted by post-approval regulatory action. Moreover, I interpret this as evidence
of strategic action on behalf of the firm sponsoring the drug. However, I have
not been able to make a compelling argument that the drug itself rather than the
firm sponsoring the drug is responsible for the structure of science production
prior to approval. For example, an alternative explanation would be that new
drugs with a mechanism of action that is similar to already approved drugs are
less likely to be subjected to a wide variety of tests. Although the Priority Re-
view variable controls for this explanation to some extent, the analyses could
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benefit from measures such as those used in King and Bearman (2015). They
typify medications according to their innovativeness based on descriptions in
the Medical Letter which is a non-profit publication.
A second limitation of the study presented in this chapter is that, since the
number of observations is low and data that describe the firm is scant, I am
unable to explore in detail how firms vary in their publication strategies and
how this affects the direction of scientific debates and the rates and volumes
of regulatory action. The analyses presented in this chapter show that there is
substantial variation across the 200 drug debates that I have studied. Some pre-
approval citation networks are characterized by low levels of modularity while
others comprise papers that do not cite each other. And while I have shown
that this variation has an effect on how the scientific debate that follows un-
folds and that this variation explains the volume and rate of regulatory action,
this chapter does not answer the questions of which firms are able to steer the
process and how the regulator deals with these different strategies.
One way to extend the analyses presented in this chapter is by increasing
the sample to exploit the increased variation between firms in a larger sample.
For example, the 200 drugs analyzed in this chapter have been produced by
119 unique firms and the majority of firms only appears once in the sample.
A larger sample with multiple observations per firm would allow me to ask
and answer a set of interesting questions: does variation in the way in which
publications become embedded in the pre-approval debate cluster at the firm
level? And if so, which types of firms adopt which types of strategies?
Another extension would be to move from the level of the paper to the level
of the individual authors of the paper. If the finding from Azoulay and Fishman
(2006) – that clinical research has moved away from universities – holds, one
would expect that the individuals employed by other research contexts are less
embedded in academia and that that would drive a wedge between the pre-
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approval debate and the post-approval debate. In particular, if that is the case,
the narrative introduced in this paper would be one that heavily builds on a
disconnect between organizational cultures. If some firms are more likely than
others to conduct their studies in non-university research contexts and if the
science produced in those contexts differs strongly from university science, a
disconnect between the pre- and post-approval debate is likely to emerge.
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Appendix A Time to Regulatory Action: Kaplan-Meier
plots
Virtually all drugs receive at least one label change throughout their life-cycle
but there is substantial variation in the rate at which this happens. Figure A4.1
show the Kaplan-Meier plots for the duration until the 1st, 2nd, and 6th label
change. Kaplan-Meier plots are typically used to graph a survival function. In
the context of drug safety and label changes, the function captures the popula-
tion that, at time t, has not yet received n label changes. In Figure A4.1, n equals
1 in the upper panel, 2 in the middle panel, and 6 in the lower panel. Formally,
the Kaplan-Meier survival estimate is computed as follows:
St =
# o f non-targeted drugs − # o f targeted drugs
Number o f drugs in sample
(4.5)
The upper panel of Figure A4.1 shows that after about 20 months, 50% of all
drugs approved between 2000 and 2010 have received at least one label change
and that this number increases to 75% after 50 months. The middle panel shows
that it takes about 40 months for half of the sample to receive the second label
change. The bottom panel shows that after 59 months, more than 50% of all
drugs have received 6 or more label revisions. Moreover, about 30 of the sample
does not receive 6 or more label changes during the observed time window.
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Note: Two Kaplan-Meier plots for the time to first regulatory action (upper panel) and time to
median number of regulatory actions (bottom panel). The y-axis shows the percentage of drugs
that had not yet been targeted while the x-axis shows time in months. The dashed lines show the
confidence interval around the estimate and the red symbols indicate right-censored drugs.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion – Structure in the
Production of Evidence
5.1 Synthesis and Discussion
The main contribution of this dissertation has been to show how social and
cognitive structures that bind those who generate evidence about drug safety
can be used to make sense of this evidence. Moreover, this dissertation has
provided answers to the question of why it may take a long time before pre-
scription drugs are identified as unsafe by the FDA.
In the first empirical study, I have shown that the communication of the re-
call of a prescription drug causes patients and physicians to file a large number
of reports for the drug that is recalled. While this finding may seem trivial at
first, one could argue that it is counterintuitive: the drug has already been taken
of off the market and patients and physicians cannot use the anonymous report
to strengthen their case against the sponsor of the drug (if they decide to pursue
legal charges). Although my analyses do not allow me to identify the motives
of the patients and physicians filing the additional reports, one motive seems
most plausible: patients and physicians file reports for the recalled drug after
it is recalled to make their voices heard. When patients and physicians were
treated with and prescribing the drug respectively, they were doing so under
the impression that the drug was safe. The substance had been approved by the
FDA – which implies that the FDA argues that the drug is safe and effective.
However, the recall of the prescription drug shows that the expertise held by
the regulator was not sufficient to protect the health of patients and the credi-
bility of physicians. In such a context, the filing of a report can be interpreted
as an instance in which the patient or physician expresses his or her concerns,
anger, or discontent.
An alternative explanation is that people report because they think that re-
porting would strengthen their legal case. However, if this is the mechanism
that would account for the observed effect, one would expect that the effect was
larger for patients than it was for physicians. Although a recall is a rare event,
physicians will experience a recall several times during their career and are ex-
pected to learn from their prior experiences. For patients, it is much less likely
that they will experience a recall of a drug that they are treated with several
times during their lives
A second finding shows that physicians respond to the recall of the pre-
scription drug not just by reporting cases in which the recalled drug had been
the suspect drug, but also cases in which drugs that treat the same health con-
dition had been the suspect drug. What is more, this finding does not hold for
patients: their response is limited to the drug that is recalled. Identifying these
patterns and the way in which they are created is important for the regulator
that needs to distinguish between increased reporting caused by an increase in
the number of ADRs versus an increase in the likelihood of reporting. This lat-
ter type of increase could be termed a false positive response. Obviously, these
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two data generating processes require different responses from the regulator
and the inability to distinguish between them could cause serious problems
– including withdrawing perfectly safe drugs and failing to withdraw unsafe
drugs. Finally, preliminary evidence suggest that episodes of stimulated re-
porting cause problems for the FDA because the speed with which they detect
true safety problems is reduced. This finding is consistent with the idea that
the presence of false positive signals creates ambiguity for the FDA in the inter-
pretation of drug safety signals.
Besides the impact that these findings have on the medical profession, the
findings in Chapter 3 also have important sociological implications. The study
shows that diffusion of behavior may be structured not in terms of social inter-
actions but in terms of the cognitive maps that underlie the behavior of social
actors. If individuals have been conditioned in a way that connects signal to
behavior, individuals do not have to interact to create cascading effects.
Rossman (2014) makes a somewhat similar argument about how innova-
tions diffuse. Building on models of exogenous diffusion and endogenous dif-
fusion, Rossman (2014) asks whether the legitimacy of the innovation moder-
ates the adoption of the innovation under the exogenous diffusion condition.
The simple idea behind this hypothesis is that when individuals find that an in-
novation belongs to a category that is legitimate (i.e. the category contains older
innovations that have been well-established and socially adopted), they do not
need social influence to adopt; all they need is awareness about the availability
of the innovation. However, when the innovation is not a member of a legit-
imate category, (Rossman 2014) argues that the innovation will only diffuse if
there is social influence (i.e. endogenous contagion). The crux here is thus to
understand how an innovation is embedded in a set of other innovations. If the
social actors who are at risk of adopting have internalized shared understand-
ings about the embeddedness of an innovation in a set of innovations, their
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actions will by synchronized – even if there is no social influence.
The second empirical study shows that the way in which scientific publi-
cations build one one another varies between drugs. Drugs for which the pre-
approval debate is narrow – meaning that the scientific publications are linked
through a cohesive structure – are less likely to be of value for post-approval
scientific work and are more likely to be targeted by large numbers of regula-
tory actions. Regulatory action is also more likely to occur fast for those drugs.
In contrast, prescription drugs that are characterized by pre-approval scientific
publications that are not tightly connected to the other pre-approval publica-
tions are more likely to be of value for later research and those drugs are not
as likely to be targeted by regulatory action. This research has implications for
the way in which we think about pre-approval regulation by the FDA. Which
studies should be conducted? Which linkages – between a drug and a specific
ADR – should be investigated? And what is the role of firms versus the FDA in
terms of answering those questions?
The research also reveals an interesting link between what happens before
approval and after approval. One might argue that a “spiral trajectory” (Shwed
and Bearman 2010) is what the science conducted to understand the safety and
efficacy of prescription drugs should look like. However, some drugs are char-
acterized by spiral trajectories that emerge only after the drug is approved.
In particular, the post-approval science in those cases essentially starts from
scratch. Although the chapter is unable to establish a causal link between firm
characteristics and the way in which the debate develops, evidence is consis-
tent with the idea that experienced firms are able to set up evidence production
in a way that favors positive evaluations of their product.
The second empirical study also shows how the structure in which claims
are embedded is formed and how it impacts they way in which a regulator can
build upon those claims. In particular, by using network analytic techniques,
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the study reveals initial insights on how organizations can discipline social net-
works. Although it is difficult to identify a causal effect, the evidence is con-
sistent with the idea that some organizations are able to exert influence on the
ways in which connections are made. Once the organization loses control over
the way in which networks are formed, the initial mode of network formation
can have a lasting impact on the way in which future connections are made and
the ways in which regulators can extract the meaning from those networks.
5.2 Conclusion
This dissertation has provided insights into a context that has never been stud-
ied by sociologists: the production of evidence about drug safety. Studying this
context is important for two main reasons: First, many patients are dying from
treatment with unsafe drugs and earlier detection of unsafe drugs may reduce
that number. Second, the detailed accounts of how the behaviors of social ac-
tors translate into bodies of knowledge advances the sociology of knowledge
production.
Building on sociological theories about how knowledge claims are constructed
and how scientific associations form, the broad argument laid out in the dis-
sertation holds that to extract meaning from massive sets of data, accounting
for the social and cognitive structure in which the data production process is
embedded is crucial. That is, complex systems such as the one in which the ev-
idence about the safety and efficacy of prescription drugs is generated are char-
acterized by heterogeneous actors who’s behavior varies over time. Theorizing
about those complexities allows one to capture the meaning of that aggregated
behavior.
The implications of this argument extend beyond the context of drug safety.
For example, the recently popularized idea that “big data” will allow science
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and industry to accurately predict future behavior of social actors is meaning-
less if one does not have a clear understanding of how the data used to generate
the predictions is produced. Chapter 3 of this dissertation has shown that the
production of data varies between groups and over time. For the data scientist
trying to use big data to predict future patterns of human behavior without us-
ing social theories, that variation will represent noise leading to less accurate
predictions.
The research presented in this dissertation also has implications for research
on diffusion studies. The analyses presented in Chapter 3 show that behavior
diffuses and becomes clustered in time, not because social actors interact with
one another, but because the response of social actors to media events spreads
to contexts that go beyond the media event. In particular, the central object
in the media event is embedded in a larger set of objects and social actors in-
clude those related objects to inform their behavior. This suggests that recent
research on social networks and complex systems should also pay attention to
interdependencies that represent commonly held beliefs.
Finally, this dissertation has implications for how science is conducted. The
analyses in Chapter 4 show that a scientific debate may become characterized
as disconnected if industry involvement in science steers science into certain
directions. Although the pharmaceutical industry is obviously one of the most
well-known industries to become involved in science, many other disciplines
accommodate non-university science. Understanding how these different af-
filiations affect how science evolves is important if the science is consumed by
policy makers trying to extract best practices from a body of scientific literature.
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